Time to Play

Action and Interaction in Contemporary Art

Katarzyna Zimna

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9780857736253
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Arte
• Subtopic: Historia del arte contemporáneo

Play art' or interactive art is becoming a central concept in the contemporary art world, disrupting the traditional role of passive observance usually assumed by audiences, allowing them active participation. The work of 'play' artists - from Carsten Holler's 'Test Site' at the Tate Modern to Gabriel Orozco's 'Ping Pond Table' - must be touched, influenced and experienced; the gallery-goer is no longer a spectator but a co-creator. Time to Play explores the role of play as a central but neglected concept in aesthetics and a model for ground-breaking modern and postmodern experiments that have intended to blur the boundary between art and life. Moving freely between disciplines, Katarzyna Zimna links the theory and history of 20th and 21st century art with ideas developed within play, game and leisure studies, and the philosophical theories of Kant, Gadamer and Derrida, to critically engage with current discussion on the role of the artist, viewers, curators and their spaces of encounter.
She combines a consideration of the philosophical implications of play with the examination of how it is actually used in modern and postmodern art - looking at Dada, Surrealism, Fluxus and Relational Aesthetics. Focusing mainly on process-based art, this bold book proposes a fresh approach - reaching beyond classical cultural theories of play.

1
Modern Perspectives on Play

In the introduction I briefly presented various modern perspectives on play developed within the human and natural sciences. From these theories emerges an image of play as a disinterested, experiential and metacommunicative frame and as a process in which activities, gestures and objects do not only shape an experience ‘as self’ but also become ‘something else’. I stressed the ambiguous character of play as stretched between opposite poles on many different levels: between reality and fiction, experience and representation, rules and freedom, safety and danger, and so on. After Mihai Spariosu, I also referred to two competing (and complementary) modes of Western thought – pre-rational and rational – that have structured historical interpretations of play.

The distinction between ‘rational’ and ‘pre-rational’ perspectives or narratives is useful in systematizing modern interpretations of play within the fields of art and aesthetics. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the consequences of interpreting play as either ‘rational’ or ‘pre-rational’ in modern theory and practice of art. I will argue that there is a connection between this interpretation and the underlying notion of representation – the rational position uses play to support the traditional concept of representation, while the pre-rational one most often sees the ‘play of art’ as a domain where subjectivity and authorial control ‘dissolve’. When one applies the pre-rational perspective to artistic practice, play becomes a tool to evoke ‘experience’ instead of ‘representation’, to reveal ‘being’ instead of representing it.

The present chapter will also briefly refer to the work/play dichotomy in the context of art, which will be further developed in the next chapter. As I will argue there, the traditional notion of representation is strongly influenced by the rational concept of work, which since Plato and Aristotle has evoked connotations with ‘proper’ function, hierarchy and order. In the present chapter I will discuss the impact of Kant, who introduced play as a condition of ‘fine art’. In my view his aesthetic theory marks a turning point from work- to play-oriented approaches. However, its ‘rationality’ and subject-oriented character, and its contribution to the process of alienation of art, made Kant’s theory a convention to be challenged in modern and postmodern art. Consequently, the ‘pre-rational’ notion of play has become a tool for avant-garde artists to oppose the traditional ‘rational’ post-Kantian concept of artistic representation.

‘Rational’ Play of Art

The notion of play as a ‘rational’ activity separates play from the ‘unmediated power’¹ and the processes of life. This separation occurs due to the mediation of reason, language and cultural conventions. From this perspective, play is treated primarily as a process of communication initiated by the players who consciously suspend the ordinary rules and apply the alternative ones, which do not affect ‘real life’ consequences and practical outcomes. The domain of play becomes a ‘magic circle’, distinct from ‘reality’. Importantly, from the rational point of view, players are in control of their play. Play is disinterested and it lacks objective purposes, but it is, nonetheless, functional. It supports education and development; it acts as safe training, vicarious activity, catharsis and so on.

The rational perspective on play in art can best be described in reference to Kant’s theory because he introduced the concept of (‘rational’) play as a central element in modern aesthetics and, most importantly, because his account has served as a point of reference for both ‘rational’ and ‘pre-rational’ approaches in art theory and practice ever since. Kant uses the notion of play in two senses: as an actual activity, which he treats as disinterested and unproductive (a model for ‘fine art’), and as a philosophical concept – a ‘free play’ of cognitive faculties in the aesthetic judgement and the artistic ‘genius’. It is the latter that he makes a central point of his aesthetic theory, stating that ‘the delight which determines the judgement of taste is independent of all interest’.²

In the Critique of Judgement (1790), Kant exposes the basic features of ‘art as play’ by distinguishing between fine art and craft. The former, as he writes, ‘could only prove final (be a success) as play, i.e. an occupation which is agreeable on its own account’.³ Handicraft, on the other hand, is ‘labour, i.e. a business, which on its own account is disagreeable (drudgery), and is only attractive by means of what it results in (e.g. the pay), and which is consequently capable of being a compulsory imposition’.⁴ Although Kant praises free arts over crafts due to the element of disinterestedness, he nonetheless argues that the ‘play’ of art must be subordinated to some rules, a ‘mechanism, without which the soul, which in art must be free, and which alone gives life to the work, would be bodyless [sic] and evanescent’.⁵ He also expresses a reservation; that it is misleading to regard free art as devoid of all restraint. The absence of restraint would convert art ‘from labour into mere play’, into something merely ‘agreeable’, instead of ‘fine’ art. As he writes, ‘aesthetic art, as art which is beautiful, is one having for its standard the reflective judgement and not organic sensation’.⁶ These remarks reveal the ongoing struggle in Kant – between the affirmation of freedom in art and the need to subordinate it to the laws of reason. The latter tendency predominates – Kant applies the concept of play as limited and rational to avoid the risk of nonsense and excessive freedom of imagination.

On a philosophical level, Kant describes ‘free play’ as an attribute of the aesthetic judgement and artistic genius. He defines ‘genius’ as ‘the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art’ or, more precisely, ‘the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art’.⁷ The operation of genius is not predetermined in advance – it does not follow any known rules – it must always be original. Although genius seems to be a ‘power’ originating outside the subject and transgressing one’s limitations, it is also tamed by rational control. The works of art produced thanks to genius must be exemplary and they must serve as a standard for imitation by others. They must also conform to the critical judgement of taste, which ‘introduces a clearness and order into the plenitude of thought’.⁸ Kant excludes the ‘original nonsense’ from his notion of fine art. Through taste,

[the] artist controls his work and, after many, and often laborious attempts to satisfy taste, finds form which commends itself to him. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or a free swing of mental powers, but rather of a slow and even painful process of improvement …⁹

Kant describes artistic process as a negotiation between genius and taste; the initial playful moment of freedom must be followed by the laborious procedure of refinement and struggle with form. It can be said that the natural, ‘pre-rational’ artistic instinct must be followed by the ‘rational’ search for harmony within the limits of taste. The same rule governs the functioning of the internal powers constituting genius: imagination and understanding. They ‘play’ with each other – not producing any concepts, but staying within the limits of the rational mind. Imagination enjoys ‘freedom from all guidance of rules’ but it must become synchronized with ‘the understanding’s conformity to law’.¹⁰ Although both ‘playful’ (genius and imagination) and ‘reason-guided’ (taste and understanding) aspects of the creative process are listed by Kant as requirements for fine art, he makes it clear that the latter two must be seen as dominant: ‘For in lawless freedom imagination, with all its wealth, produces nothing but nonsense.’¹¹

In my view, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, the rational image of play supports the conventional approach to representation (and vice versa). The crucial factor appears to be the idea of the controlling mechanism of the laws of reason – an unavoidable limit that prevents the irrational wandering of thought and art for art’s sake as a private nonsense. For Kant, reason’s productive activity is suspended in the act of aesthetic judgement but, nonetheless, its laws are binding. The most important characteristic of ‘rational’ play in terms of the notion of representation is, therefore, its connection with the rational, self-aware subject. Artists and viewers structure their aesthetic experience or activity according to the laws of reason. However, importantly, the ‘rational’ play of art is ‘universally communicable’ and also ‘exemplary’ despite its subjective nature. Such an approach to subjective control is closely linked with the notion of mastery – as imposing order and dictating rules for others to follow. The act of representation, interpreted this way, becomes perceived as a manifestation of authorial power – as applying one’s perspective as universal or even as the only valid one. This locates the artistic activity as a somehow privileged or elitist occupation. Artists (having been gifted innate talent by nature) are those who are capable of representing (interpreting) the world to non-artists. This position of power provokes the critique against artistic representation as a ‘will to fixity and mastery’.¹²

It is also worth stressing that the concept of play in Kant seems to be very ‘work-like’. It lacks work’s direct orientation towards goals and it is not ‘productive’ of concepts (which distinguishes the aesthetic judgement from the cognitive one), but Kant stresses that play cannot be interpreted as the unlimited and ‘free swing of mental powers’. According to him, the operation of genius is a ‘laborious’, ‘slow’ and even ‘painful’ process. To be regarded as ‘fine art’, art cannot be simply pleasurable; it has to be laborious, to be work-like. In my view, this vocabulary of work (including also ‘control’, ‘mechanism’, ‘guidance of rules’, ‘process of improvement’, ‘conformity to law’, etc.) is characteristic of the traditional approach to representation. Work or work-like play seems to belong to the traditional notion of representation due to the connotations of rationality, hierarchy, order, rules and limits. Nonetheless, despite its rational character, Kant’s contribution can be seen as a ‘play-turn’ in terms of a general approach to the role of art and its place in Western society, as well as the responses it evoked in twentieth-century art.

Aesthetics of Autonomy

Kant’s writings introduced the approach to aesthetic judgement (and, in consequence, to both the creative act and its reception) as occurring in the ‘play mode’ – as if reason was in ‘idle gear’, keeping watch but released from its usual functions. Although carefully restricted to avoid association with excess and nonsense (and therefore rational), play is a crucial characteristic of aesthetic judgement in Kant. Cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding are active, ‘as if’ they follow usual rules – but they ‘play’ with each other without producing any binding concepts or rational outcomes. The whole process is basically disinterested; it does not follow any practical purpose, unlike cognitive judgement. In effect the ‘play of aesthetic judgement’ (and consequently ‘play of art’) becomes alienated from the goal-oriented ‘reality’.

The popular notion of ‘art for art’s sake’,¹³ stripping art of purpose and conceptualizing it, therefore, as somehow a playful occupation, has its roots in Kantian aesthetics: ‘In the nineteenth century, ideas of the autonomy of the aesthetic judgements soon became linked to the idea of the autonomy of art itself.’¹⁴ Traditionally, up to this point, the position of art was grounded in the ancient Greek word techne, meaning ‘craft’ or ‘skill’ and connoting physical labour and technical expertise at the service of values and meanings dictated by society. ‘The idea of artistic labour as a personal quest for perfection, in particular objects without immediate thought of buyers or clients did not arrive until the nineteenth century.’¹⁵ Art gained its freedom and, at least in theory, was no longer subordinated to the dictatorship of the ruling classes, politics and the Church. Artists became masters of their own work, ‘geniuses’, seeing the creative act as close to God’s actions in Genesis, bringing independent entities into being.¹⁶ From the perspective of other members of the community, however, the emancipation of art and its ‘creative’ ambition was widely considered to be irresponsible, a whim which deviated from the ‘proper’ function of art. Artists, struggling for independence and living on the margins of conventional middle-class life, were often regarded as society’s fools, vagabonds or parasites.

Although Kant limited the freedom of play by the matrix of the laws of reason, his theory of aesthetics has inevitably encouraged the process of art’s liberation from all sorts of constraints. Play proved to be difficult to restrict and apply instrumentally. Unintentionally, Kant initiated what can be called ‘the aesthetics of autonomy’¹⁷ – the view of art as necessarily immune to any concerns other than the aesthetic or art-specific, in effect detached from the given reality. This view resulted in the approach to artistic production as ‘divorced from the totality of social activities’, which are ‘confronted abstractly’ in the work of art.¹⁸ According to Rosalind Krauss, this perspective contributed to the ‘shift that Walter Benjamin in his essays of the thirties called the historical transition from cult-value to exhibition-value’,¹⁹ and the development of the formalist approach to art. The operation of (‘rational’) play had liberated art, to a large extent, from the traditional service to aristocracy and religion, but made it a ‘free-floating commodity on the bourgeois market of objects and luxury goods’.²⁰

Revolution of Pre-Rational Play

According to Peter Bürger, the European avant-garde movements negated ‘art as an institution that is unassociated with the life praxis of men’. However, as he writes,

Now, it is not the aim of the avant-gardistes to integrate art into this praxis. On the contrary, they assent to the aestheticists’ rejection of the world and its means-ends rationality. What distinguishes them from the latter is the attempt to organise a new life praxis from a basis in art.²¹

Following Bürger’s observation, I propose to consider play as a creative tool applied by modern artists and art theorists to bring art back to life and make it a model for social interaction. However, it is crucial to stress that in most cases those artists and theorists reached for ‘pre-rational’ play, because the notions of work (as techne, labour, productio...