1 Prologue
For over a century, Islamic society has felt the impact of various sociopolitical, cultural and philosophical ideas, the bulk of which are Western in origin. Muslim thinkers claim that the constructs of nationalism, secularism, socialism, secular democracy and modernism, together with the sociopolitical movements they spawned, have taken hold in Islamic society at the expense of Islamic values.1 This has led to debates as to the cultural and sociopolitical role that Islam should play in dealing with the challenges implicit in these Western ideologies.
Sayyid Qutb was a prolific writer. His literary and ideological legacy was firmly established by his death in August 1966. Qutb advocated a strong sociopolitical role for Islam in the Muslim world. He claimed that the Islamic system was superior to all systems known before and after Islam. His claim was based on an understanding of the centrality to the notion of governance of hakimiyyah (sovereignty), which is practically the rule by Islamic law (shariâah). In this context, Qutb published a large number of books and articles in scholarly journals.2 Haddad (1983) divides Qutbâs writings into two phases; the first comprises novels and poems, and the second represents Qutbâs commentaries on the Qurâan.3 The latter are regarded by Haddad as a response to the British policies towards Arab Muslims in the region, the independence movement in Egypt after the Second World War and the creation of Israel.4 Nettler (1987) concurs with Haddadâs chronological schema that regards the period 1949â1956 as Qutbâs formative stage. Nettler considers Qutbâs imprisonment in the 1950s as critical to the final articulation of his concept of jahiliyyah.5
A number of scholars suggest that Qutb borrowed jahiliyyah from Mawdudiâs Mabadiâ al-Islam.6 However, William Shepard (2003) pointed out that the term jahiliyyah is not a new term as it was there in Arabic literature. To him, hakimiyyah (sovereignty) is a âneologismâ and it perhaps was âcoined by Mawdudiâs Arabic translatorâ.7 In this context, Choueiri (1990) considers that the Indian Muslim thinkers were the first to use the concept of jahiliyyah to describe the paganism of Hinduism, but Qutb used it with reference to âreligious ignoranceâ.8 In his What Has the World Lost as a Result of the Decline of Muslims (1950), Abu al-Hasan al-Nadawi, as asserted by Choueiri, describes European civilization as âpaganâ and âmaterialisticâ. In the introduction to the second edition of the same book, published a year later, Qutb specifies jahiliyyah as âreligious ignoranceâ in reference to European civilization: âSayyid Qutbâs diagnosis was overwhelmingly uncompromising in its condemnation of the new aspects of religious ignorance . . .â9 According to Choueiri, Qutb pointed out that jahiliyyah is prevalent now that Islam has lost its leadership role.10
Leonard Binder (1988) noted that âthe word jahiliyyah, often translated as âignoranceâ, is the specialized term used to refer to the cultural and intellectual state of the Arabs before the Islamic revelationâ.11 In Haddadâs view, however, Qutbâs concept of jahiliyyah does not simply denote ignorance and it âis not a period in time, but a condition that is repeated every time society veers from the Islamic way whether in the past, the present or the futureâ.12 The jahiliyyah of the pre-Islamic period can prevail again in a different form and shape. Haddad cites Qutb as saying that âthe older jahiliyyah was based on âignorance, naivete, and youth. As for contemporary jahiliyyah it is grounded in knowledge, complexity and scornâ. It is established on the principle of âaggression against Godâs governance on the earthâ under the rubric of the right to create visions and values and to legislate laws disregarding Godâs Pathâ.13
Concerning the historical and contemporary jahiliyyah, Choueiriâs analysis of Qutbâs view argues that, before the birth of Islam, jahiliyyah was based on ignorance due to lack of knowledge of the world. In todayâs world, human beings cannot claim lack of knowledge. Therefore, contemporary jahiliyyah cannot be based on lack of knowledge, but rather on âaggression against Godâs governance on the earthâ.14 Choueiri notes that the historical jahiliyyah was respectful of its deities and, in the case of the Arabian Peninsula, offered them gifts and sacrifices to intercede on its behalf with Allah. In the contemporary period, however, humankind elevates deities above Allah, obeying them and rejecting the commandments of Allah.15 Choueiri states that âQutb readily acknowledges that the Muslim communities still believe in one God and worship Him in their devotional acts. But they relegate the most essential attributes of God â His legislative authority â to others who determine almost all the fundamental issues of their livesâ.16
Choueiri emphasizes that the present knowledge, in Qutbâs view, would be of no value unless âfaith in the unknown becomes an integral part of human life and thoughtâ.17 Choueiri stresses the Islamic mentality in Qutbâs conclusion as both âmetaphysicalâ and âscientificâ. It is metaphysical in the sense conveyed by the Qurâanic verses concerning Godâs knowledge. For example, âHe has the keys of all that is hidden: none knows them but He. He has knowledge of all that land and seas contain: every leaf that falls is known to Himâ (6:59). Islamic mentality is also scientific, Choueiri continues, because âit believes in the natural law, only the knowledge of some of their aspects is necessary for human life on earth. Moreover, scientific theories are relative, and liable to transformations. They could not, therefore, form a reliable basis of a comprehensive doctrineâ.18
Commenting on Qutbâs book Milestones, Binder (1988) emphasizes that Qutb âcontrasts abstract or speculative theory with practical wisdom, or practical experience (but not with pragmatism which he actually condemns in the Social Justice volume). In several places he describes Islam as practical, realistic, concerned with life, down to earth. The rhetoric which he employs in these passages seems heavily influenced by existentialismâ.19
In Binderâs view, Qutb links the concept of hakimiyyah (sovereignty) to âhuman freedomâ. Binder emphasis that âfor Qutb divine sovereignty is so comprehensive that it precludes all human sovereignty and authority. Any non-divine authority is taghut, that is, illegitimate, irreligious and tyrannical. The purpose of Islam is to remove taghut and replace it with Islamic or divine authority. Human beings are totally bereft of any liberty vis-Ă -vis Allah and therefore, since all are equally slaves of God, none has any shred of authority over other human beingsâ.20 Binder notes that Qutb stresses the need for an Islamic government, but the emphasis he makes on the âorganizationâ of the proposed Islamic state âis less than he does on the opposition to the un-Islamic stateâ.21
Binder emphasizes that âQutbâs underlying problem is the contradiction between divine sovereignty and humanityâs disobedience. The separation of theory and practice is precisely what Qutb attacks as jahiliyyah â even perhaps worse, because it is jahiliyyah posing as Islam, while the ordinary form of jahiliyyah is strong precisely because it does not separate theory and practice, because it is, consciously or not, monistic, praxis-oriented and concerned with existential survival. Islam requires that thought and action be integrally related. Islam must be lived from the inside (i.e. from belief ) out (i.e. to the collectivity)â.22
Binder argues that Qutbâs concept of jahiliyyah follows from the failure to distinguish between spirit and matter. He claims that Qutbâs distinction between spirit and matter, human and animal, shows the conflation of these contradictions as a characteristic of jahiliyyah. Binder emphasizes that Qutb recognizes spirit and matter as separate but equal, while humanity is quite clearly non-material and superior to the animal. In this regard, Binder notes that âthis dualism is not selfconscious. Qutb is rather concerned to maintain the separate and distinct existence of all essences. Most importantly, this concern is reflected in a virtually compulsive insistence that there can be no social circumstance or situation which is mostly Islam or partly jahili. Whatever is not Islam is jahiliyyah. The only Islamic society is one which is completely devoted to the worship of God alone, that is to say it cannot be partly anything else because it is totally Islamicâ.23
In his preface to Kepelâs book The Prophet and the Pharaoh (1985), Bernard Lewis asserts that âIslamic history, tradition and law embraced two distinct and indeed contradictory principles, one activist, the other quietistâ.24 Lewis refers to two aspects of the Prophetâs life: the ârebel in Makkah and the sovereign in Madinahâ.25 He suggests that these two aspects of the Prophetâs life constitute the condition of âactivistâ and âquietistâ and reflect parallel traditions in Islamic history: âIn this as in so much else the Prophet was seen as a model, and his career as setting a pattern. Many later political aspirants attempted to follow his example; some of them succeeded, others failed. The two traditions, the Prophet as sovereign and the Prophet rebel, often recur through the centuries of Islamic history. Both are still very much alive.â26 This idea alerts Kepel to consider Qutbâs ideas and movement as âactivistâ and âquietistâ, both rooted in early Islamic tradition. Thus, Qutbâs interpretation of jahiliyyah and hakimiyyah (sovereignty), whether considered radical or otherwise, has its origin in early Islamic tradition.27
Kepel emphasizes that Qutb saw the Prophetâs Islamic State as a model to be implemented in todayâs societies. Qutb compares Makkan society before the hijrah with contemporary Egypt. Qutb pronounces Egypt to be jahiliyyah.28 Kepel asserts that Qutb considers the Prophetâs response to the jahiliyyah of the sixth century as a model for dealing with the contemporary jahiliyyah of Egypt.29 This jahiliyyah must be overcome as was the historical one. In Kepelâs view, Qutb sees the Prophetâs hijrah from Makkah to Madinah as a temporary hijrah: a hijrah from the state of jahiliyyah in which Muslims were weak. When their strength grew in Madinah, the Muslims returned to Makkah to overthrow the jahiliyyah there and establish the Islamic State.30
Kepel interprets Qutbâs statements in his Milestones as revolutionary statements in preparation for Islamic action to overthrow the contemporary jahiliyyah. Kepel believes that Muslims should be...