First In Last Out

The Post-war Organisation, Employment and Training of Royal Marines Commandos

Paul Winter, Paul Winter

• Verlag: Casemate
• Jahr: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781612009636
• Thema: Histoire
• Thema: Histoire de l'armée et de la marine

"…the level or research, the quality of graphics, and the readability are exceptional. […] It is a subject area not covered often and it is a worthy addition to the bookshelves of readers with an interest in early Southwest Pacific air campaigns of World War Two." — Sir Henry Beverley Lieutenant General RM The official document Amphibious Warfare Handbook No. 10a: The Organisation, Employment and Training of Commandos is a unique piece of postwar Royal Marines Commando doctrine, never before published, or quoted at length. Prepared in 1951 at the height of the Korean War by the Chief of Amphibious Warfare and the Commandant General Royal Marines, this seventy-page aide memoir is, in essence, the distillation of major lessons learned by the British wartime Combined Operations Headquarters regarding amphibious warfare, raiding, cliff assaults, sabotage, intelligence-gathering, specialized infantry work, guerrilla warfare and Commando tactics. In addition, it offers its readership a delineation of the characteristics, skills and qualities required of a Royal Marines Commando. Published to mark the seventieth anniversary of its official issue, this rare example of bespoke Commando doctrine is a timely and highly relevant addition to a growing body of work on The Corps of Royal Marines. Currently undergoing significant institutional changes by means of the Future Commando Force (FCF) program, the Royal Marines are having to challenge their existing operating concept, force structures, doctrine, and organizational design to meet the emerging defense challenges of the 21st century. It serves to remind those currently evolving the FCF concept of General Sir John Hackett's advice, namely, "To see where we are going, we must know where we are, and to know where we are, we need to discover how we got here."

PART I—OPERATIONS

“There will certainly be many opportunities for minor operations, all of which will depend on surprise landings of lightly equipped, nimble forces accustomed to work like packs of hounds”.

Winston Churchill.

Minute dated 25-8-40.

The Second World War, Vol. I.

CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

1.Commando units and formations exist to undertake certain distinctive roles:—1

(a) All forms of amphibious raids.

(b) Assault tasks requiring special skill in amphibious operations.

(c) Seizure of ports or similar strategic areas.

They are also able to fight as normal infantry and to undertake internal security duties in peace.

2.They are therefore trained and organised so that they possess certain characteristics:—

(a) Sound basic training in normal infantry tactics.

(b) Specialised skill and organisation for amphibious operations enabling, them to exploit conditions unsuitable to non-specialised troops.

(c) Ability to operate independently as small parties or even as individuals.

(d) Ability to plan, move and fight fast.

(e) Specialised skill in night operations.

(f) Ability to operate on a low scale of transport, or on occasion without transport.

In addition, units and formations are required to possess a high degree of strategic mobility. They must be able to move easily by sea or air.

3.These characteristics can only be achieved by units of high morale, whose individual members have undergone a sound basic training, during which men lacking in moral fibre or otherwise unsuitable are retrained or eventually eliminated.

4.Although commandos have distinctive roles and characteristics it is neither to be expected nor desirable that they should be employed in these roles exclusively. Furthermore, many borderline tasks such as beach landings or penetration on thinly manned fronts, will occur. Non-specialised troops could do these tasks, but commandos could probably do better and more economically. Some factors which may influence the decision whether or not to employ commandos are:—

(a) Economy

It is on the one hand uneconomical to employ specially trained troops on non-specialist tasks; and on the other, even more uneconomical to keep such troops in idleness during a battle or campaign.

(b) Battle Experience and Morale

The morale of troops kept in idleness while others are fighting will suffer and they will lack battle experience. On the other hand prolonged intensive action is likely to result in the loss of so many natural leaders and personalities that a unit becomes incapable of special operations.

(c) Availability when required

If commandos become deeply committed as infantry they may not be available for commando type operations when the opportunity for them arises.

(d) Re-inforcements

In distant theatres of war, re-inforcements for commandos may be difficult to provide.

(e) Organisation and Equipment

The organisation and equipment of commando units differ from normal infantry and consequently may have to be supplemented for infantry tasks. In particular the commando lacks carriers and anti-tank guns.

5.It would be too much to expect that commandos should be able to pick and choose the precise degree to which they are committed. What should however be understood is that commandos neither need to be nor thrive if kept in cotton wool; but, if opportunities arise or are foreseen: for their employment in their distinctive roles, or roles, which approximate to them, then it is commonsense to have commandos available and ready.

Outline Organisation. (See Diagram 1).

6.The basic unit is the “commando” comprising 641 all ranks and 81 vehicles at full strength, as compared with 936 all ranks and 128 vehicles in the Higher Establishment of an infantry battalion. A commando is organised as:—

Commando Headquarters
Headquarters Troop
Support Troop	4 Officers and 84 Other Ranks with 4.3in. mortars and 2 MMGs.2
Five Fighting Troops	each of 3 Officers and 68 Other Ranks.

The fighting troops contain officers and other ranks specially trained as landing craft helmsmen, parachutists, cliff assault leaders and guerrilla warfare specialists, in addition to their normal troop duties.

7.A Commando Brigade comprises:—

Brigade Headquarters
Headquarters Unit	Signal Troop.
	Light Aid Detachment. Defence Section. Commando Stores Park.
Three or four commandos.

8.The present organisation of commandos differs from that of World War II in that all existing commando units are Royal Marines.3

CHAPTER 2—COMMANDO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN GENERAL

General

9.Commando Amphibious operations may be of two types:—

(a) Normal assault landings by methods similar to those described in the Manual of Amphibious Warfare.

(b) Difficult assault landings under conditions of shipping, terrain or weather calling for specialised skill.

In the former type of operation commandos will have an advantage over normal infantry when light scales or transport are imposed, or where time and facilities are lacking to train the infantry in amphibious technique. The latter type require commandos or other specially trained troops.

10.Difficult assault landings may be made to obtain surprise, to force the enemy to deploy troops on a wide front, to attack objectives which cannot otherwise be reached or to create a diversion. They differ from normal assault landings in one or more of the following aspects:—

(a) Landing may be made on difficult coastlines—the most common form being rocky shores and cliffs-or in rough weather.

(b) Special or improvised landing craft and carrying ships may be used either to gain some particular advantage such as speed in approach or seaworthiness, or because they are the best that is available.

(c) Landings will usually be comparatively weak in numbers and support, relying on surprise and speed rather than on numbers and weight of support.

Naval and Air Situation

11.The naval and air situation in the area to be attacked will play an extremely important part in planning. In areas in which the enemy has local sea or air superiority, landings may only be practicable from submarine or disguised surface craft. The use of darkness and surprise may make it possible for fast surface craft to drop a small landing force, but withdrawal after the enemy is aware of its presence is likely to be difficult unless the plan can be such that the enemy remains in doubt as to the place or time of withdrawal.

Choice between Seaborne and Airborne Attack

12.Difficult landing operations have much in common with airborne operations. Ideally, once a target has been chosen the commanders and planners should be free to decide which is the best method of attack. In practice the availability of troops, shipping and aircraft may decide the matter. Other important factors are likely to be the naval and air situation, the practicability of terrain for sea and air landing, ...