Routledge Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia

Sten Widmalm, Sten Widmalm

• Verlag: Routledge
• Jahr: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000486629
• Auflage: 1
• Thema: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Thema: Politica asiatica

This handbook offers a comprehensive analysis of the processes and actors contributing to autocratization in South Asia. It provides an enhanced understanding of the interconnectedness of the different states in the region, and how that may be related to autocratization.

The book analyzes issues of state power, the support for political parties, questions relating to economic actors and sustainable economic development, the role of civil society, questions of equality and political culture, political mobilization, the role of education and the media, as well as topical issues such as the Covid pandemic, environmental issues, migration, and military and international security. Structured in five sections, contributions by international experts describe and explain outcomes at the national level in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The final section analyzes conditions for democracy and autocratization and how they are affected by the interplay of political forces at the international level in this region.

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• India – building an ethnic state?

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• Pakistan – the decline of civil liberties

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• Bangladesh – towards one-party rule

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• Sri Lanka – the resilience of the ethnic state

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• How to comprehend autocratization in South Asia – three broad perspectives

This innovative handbook is the first to describe and to explain ongoing trends of autocratization in South Asia, demonstrating that drivers of political change also work across boundaries. It is an important reference work for students and researchers of South Asian Studies, Asian Studies, Area Studies and Political Science.

The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

Part IIndiaBuilding an ethnic state?

DOI: 10.4324/9781003042211-3

2Neo-authoritarianism in India under Narendra ModiGrowing force or critical discourse?

Devin K. Joshi

DOI: 10.4324/9781003042211-4

As the world’s largest electoral democracy in terms of population, India not only symbolizes the democratic potential of developing and post-colonial states, but also serves as a crucial test case for assessing the global influence of neo-authoritarianism. As India’s current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has pointed out: “India is the largest democracy on earth. If you add up the next forty democratic countries you will just about reach the total of the electorate in India” (quoted in Price 2015: 14).

Within the Indian context, with its proud democratic heritage dating back to independence from British rule in the mid-twentieth century, the idea of authoritarianism is generally associated either with foreign countries, the pre-Independence colonial raj under which India was under the control of the British Empire, or the Emergency Decree of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1975–77). While the period of Congress Party dominance in Indian politics over much of the period from the 1950s to the mid-1990s was seen by its critics as a one-party monopoly (and even a one-family monopoly), the rise of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) as the major opponent of Congress on the national stage since the 1990s has ushered in an era of increased political competition. However, the BJP itself has an ambivalent relationship with democracy. As Amrita Basu (2013: 81) notes, “the BJP’s relationship to democracy has been double edged. While it has deepened democracy in some respects, it has also undermined it through its explicit commitment to Hindu majoritarianism, its periodic engagement in anti-minority violence, and its close ties to non-elected undemocratic civil society organizations.” The leadership style of Narendra Modi has also been characterized as “authoritarian populism” which “seeks to harness popular discontent against elite corruption with majoritarianism to create an antagonism between the ‘Hindu people’ and a ‘corrupt elite’ that panders to minorities” (Chacko 2018: 1).

Addressing these claims, this chapter examines whether neo-authoritarianism is truly on the rise in India or whether this is merely a claim made by critics. This chapter proceeds as follows. After first exploring the concept of neo-authoritarianism, it then focuses on media coverage of Narendra Modi’s centralizing leadership style, his control of other government institutions, relationship with civil society, and the transformation of state–media relations with attention to his rule as Chief Minister of Gujarat state, the transition period in 2014 when Modi first became India’s Prime Minister, and Modi’s re-election to that post in 2019. Noting how a sizeable number of democratic deficits were already present under previous Indian governments, the study nevertheless concludes that since 2014 neo-authoritarianism has been not only a critical discourse but also a growing force in India.

Neo-authoritarianism

Although multi-party elections are still regularly held in India, critics have questioned the democratic credentials of a country whose governing practices look increasingly authoritarian. To take just one indicator, India’s low ranking on the 2019 World Press Freedom Index (140th out of 180 nations) is hardly suggestive of a strong commitment to democratic flows of information and communication (Reporters Without Borders 2020). But does this reflect a more systematic shift towards neo-authoritarianism? Answering this question requires us to unpack the concept of neo-authoritarianism. While traditional authoritarianism has been around for centuries and has legitimated its rule via historical myths and traditions, neo-authoritarian regimes are marked by the following four elements.

Firstly, they seek public legitimacy through ‘development’ and ‘nationalism’ (Sahlin 1977). The concept of neo-authoritarianism itself first emerged alongside decolonization in the 1970s from analyses of dictatorial regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, but this idea soon became prominent during the 1980s and 1990s in post-Maoist China where neo-authoritarianism was conceptualized as a vehicle for modernization under which single-party rule and limits on political pluralism could accompany a focus on rapid economic growth and industrialization for an interim period of time in order to later set up a foundation for establishing a functioning democracy (Petracca and Xiong 1990; Perry 1993). By emphasizing state authority over society plus political stability while seeking to advance “the simultaneous construction of a free enterprise system and centralized state power” (Sautman 1992: 76), neo-authoritarianism is politically conservative on the one hand yet economically market-oriented on the other hand (Fu and Chu 1996).

A second component of neo-authoritarianism is the role of strong leadership. As Chinese scholar Wu Jiaxiang has argued, “neo-authoritarians do not stress political structure, but the political leader” who is an “authoritative,” “brilliant,” and “far-sighted” strongman who takes “resolute and decisive actions” to “enhance capital accumulation, dispose of resources effectively and provide the law and order necessary for commodity trade” (Sautman 1992: 79). Leaders of this ilk embrace scientific and technological modernization while simultaneously resisting intrusions of Western cultural norms by identifying with traditional values “as the foundation of national spirit” (Petracca and Xiong 1990: 1106). To achieve these goals, the leader works to strengthen the bureaucracy and military and the leader applies severely coercive means to suppress crime and corruption and to mute political opposition (Sautman 1992: 86).

Thirdly, while the advent of neo-authoritarianism is often associated with ex-totalitarian regimes softening their degree of authoritarianism as in post-Communist Russia (Becker 2004; Umland 2012), neo-authoritarianism can also emerge in reverse fashion when democratically elected leaders introduce creeping centralization and strong-armed measures to neutralize opponents (e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Either way, the primary legitimation of neo-authoritarian governance rests on prospective economic outcomes as opposed to a democratic procedural basis and it often appears to be driven by a logic of late industrialization since it is difficult for post-colonial states to enter the ranks of “first world” nations given intense international competition vis-à-vis a large number of already advanced economies (e.g., Kohli 2004). For example, Rodan’s (1989) study of Singapore found its leaders were incentivized to adopt an economic strategy reliant upon high levels of state autonomy, civil servant loyalty, inducements to foreign capital, control over labour unions, and minimization of welfare expenditures. Yet, while economic objectives may be its primary drivers, a neo-authoritarian political state is compatible with either neo-liberal or developmental state approaches to capital accumulation.

A fourth significant feature of neo-authoritarianism is that the state’s prioritization of rapid capital accumulation inhibits its commitment to competitive political pluralism. Thus, neo-authoritarian regimes allow some space for civil society associations to organize independently and occasionally critique the government but they also use an array of direct and indirect means to limit the political capacity of autonomous organizations from being able to dislodge or challenge the ruling clique or coalition (Petracca and Xiong 1990). This involves both muting domestic rivals and going after foreign-funded non-government organizations who are depicted as “agents of influence” and portrayed as interfering in domestic politics (Umland 2012: 30). When it comes to the media, neo-authoritarian states also tend to use drift-net laws, libel and defamation suits, denial of press credentials, intrusive auditing, and condoning or tolerating violence against opposition journalists and editors to bring about “self-censorship, the most common and important limit on journalistic activity” (Becker 2004: 150). Neo-authoritarians also usually place stronger controls over electronic and broadcast media than print media which may be independently owned as well as “relatively autonomous, accessible to the population and highly critical of the regime” (ibid.: 150).

To sum up, neo-authoritarianism is a system that combines media management and intimidation, civil society curtailment, centralization of state power, and prioritization of market-based economic growth over the promotion of social equality. Under this system, there is a limited degree of political pluralism combined with an unbalanced playing field as common under hybrid regimes featuring ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006) or ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way 2010). The neo-authoritarian justification for this imbalance, however, is that a meaningful democracy requires “a high standard of living and experienced officials” and that neo-authoritarianism is a means to eventually achieving this state (Sautman 1992: 94).

Chief Minister Modi

We now begin to address the question of whether neo-authoritarianism is on the rise in India under Narendra Modi by examining his leadership style during his long tenure from 2001 to 2014 as the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat. Modi, a career politician who earned correspondence Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in political science from Delhi University and Gujarat University respectively, had been involved with the state’s politics dating back to the 1970s. Formerly a full-time missionary (pracharak) for the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which is one of the most important organizations promoting Hindu nationalism in India, Modi ended up developing a reputation as a formidable behind the scenes political organizer. For instance, during Indira Gandhi’s 1975 Emergency decree, when

Tens of thousands of opposition leaders and activists were imprisoned and the RSS was again banned. Modi narrowly avoided going to jail himself and took to wearing elaborate disguises as he travelled around distributing clandestine propaganda and helping to organize peaceful protests demanding the restoration of democracy.

(Price 2015: 33)

[Modi] set about compiling lists of contacts who could be trusted to carry out clandestine tasks and then used their knowledge of another wider circle of sympathizers and democrats to arrange accommodation for activists who needed places to hide. He also began raising money to pay living expenses of political refugees and activists, and arranged for disbursement of funds.

(Marino 2014: 42)

Continuing his work as a key operative for the BJP, Modi developed a “growing reputation as a back-room genius” (Price 2015: 37) and in October 2001 was appointed interim chief minister of Gujarat. A few months later in early 2002, Gujarat became engulfed in massive rioting and violence after a train with Hindus aboard was set on fire resulting in about two thousand people (mostly Muslims) being killed in retaliatory communal violence across the state of Gujarat (see Yagnik and Sheth 2005). Modi was repeatedly blamed by NGOs, politicians, and the media for not taking swifter and more decisive action to stop the violence and prosecute the perpetrators. As a result, for the next 12 years he “was refused entry to the United States as a religious extremist and frozen out diplomatically by Britain, the European Union and many other western countries” (Price 2015: 1). Yet, despite heightened controversy over Modi’s role during the carnage, a reputation for being anti-Muslim, and a perceived willingness to condone communal violence as a strategy to gain political popularity, Modi’s charismatic leadership style brought him repeated electoral victories in 2002, 2007, and 2012 sustaining him in the position of chief minister.

Whereas a growing number of supporters viewed him as a champion of vikas (development) referring to improved standards of living, Modi was labelled an authoritarian ruler and schemer by critics who alleged that under his rule land was being “sold to industrialists at throwaway prices” with life “a daily struggle for many Muslims still living in closed, segregated communities twelve years after the riots” (Marino 2014: 210, 223). In response, Modi’s supporters sought to reframe him not as a demon but as demonized. As one of his biographers noted,

Modi is an uncomfortable example for the Congress and other ‘secular’ parties like the SP, BSP, JD(U), and the Left. His programme of empowerment is a challenge to their own model of entitlement and an alternative development path for India…Few Muslims had voted for him in December 2002. But i...