Chapter I
Genesis of Pickettâs Charge: Evolution of a Brilliant Tactical Plan
When the summer sun broke over South Mountain at 4:50 a.m. on July 3, 1863, it illuminated the carnage of the killing fields around Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
By the third summer of Americaâs most murderous war, it was abundantly clear that the Confederacy was slowly dying. Consequently, after the first two days of combat at Gettysburg, General Robert Edward Leeâs battle plan for the afternoon of July 3 was based upon a host of urgent political, military, and economic requirements. Because the manpower-short South was trapped in a fatal war of attrition that guaranteed decisive defeat, Lee was determined to rearrange this cruel equation to end the Confederacyâs death spiral by delivering a decisive knockout blow upon the Army of the Potomac in Adams County, Pennsylvania.1 Lee felt confident of victory because his troops had reaped âpartial successesâ during their attacks on July 2 that he was determined to fully exploit on the third day.2
With everything now at stake, Lee needed a winning tactical plan that maximized his limited available resources to deliver a powerful blow. The tantalizing concept of achieving the perfect victory was the long-sought, but rarely achieved, ambition of military commanders from time immemorial. As long taught in military schools, only one battle was defined as tactically perfect: the Battle of Cannae on the Italian Peninsula on August 2, 216 BC, that resulted in Carthageâs greatest victory over Rome. Since that time, no commander had matched Hannibalâs tactical brilliance in vanquishing sixteen Roman legions during the greatest battle of ancient times. Hannibalâs innovative tactic of a double envelopment with his experienced multiethnic army was a masterpiece.
A careful student of history, Lee knew that Hannibal had utilized all of his troops in an innovative way at Cannae. With the Romans pressured in front by Carthaginian (or Punic) infantry of north Africa in the center and cavalry attacking both flanks, the turning point of this decisive battle resulted when Hannibalâs Numidian (north Africa) cavalry, as well as Spanish and Gallic horsemen, rode around the Roman flank and attacked in the center of their rear. Hannibal delivered his masterstroke to inflict the greatest defeat ever suffered by the Roman Republic, annihilating an army of about 75,000 men. Lee hoped to achieve his own Cannae at Gettysburg on July 3 to win it all.3
Of course, few of the Army of Northern Virginiaâs common soldiers knew anything about the victory at Cannae, Italy, so long ago. Young Lieutenant George Williamson Finley, Company K, 56th Virginia Infantry, Major General George Edward Pickettâs division, Lieutenant General James Longstreetâs 1st Corps, described the situation on Gettysburgâs third day in fundamental tactical terms: â[W]ith food running low and ammunition running low, General Lee [now] decided to risk it all on one throw of the dice. He had tried the Union right, and he hadnât broken it. He had tried the Union left, and he hadnât broken it, so he reasoned that the only place left to strike was the Union [right] center.â4
Thanks to the benefit of hindsight, generations of armchair historians have widely denounced Leeâs final decision to launch a massive assault against General George Gordon Meadeâs right-center on Cemetery Ridge. However, for the most part, these modern historians had merely projected the folly of the Army of the Potomacâs assault on Fredericksburgâs Maryeâs Heights and Leeâs attacks on Malvern Hill onto Pickettâs Charge with a generalized, broad brushstroke. These two 1862 attacks were doomed because of tactical breakdowns, especially the lack of coordination, rather than the assumed inherent folly of the tactical offensive. Nevertheless, an enduring myth has been created by historians: the unchallenged axiom that the tactical defensive always decisively prevailed regardless of the tactical situation. This exaggeration of the superiority of the tactical defensive has fostered the myth of the alleged folly of Pickettâs Charge.
But in fact, the true situation as presented to Lee on July 3 was the very antithesis of this alleged folly. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Leeâs planned assault was in fact the best tactical recipe for achieving a decisive success calculated to reverse the warâs course with one blow. An officer who served under Napoleon Bonaparte described the Corsicanâs secret of success: âThe emperorâs favourite tactic of attacking the enemy in the centre, splitting it in two and paralysing both flanks.â5
Lee knew that a âproper concert of actionâ had denied him success on bloody Thursday, July 2.6 From his vantage point of Seminary Ridgeâs crest and with the trained eye of a West Pointâtrained engineer whose tactical brilliance and reconnaissance skills were legendary in two wars, Lee searched for an Achillesâ heel in Meadeâs Cemetery Ridge line with a trained eye. He was convinced that a weak point, even along the high-ground, could be taken by storm if a larger and more coordinated offensive effort was launched. Lee had originally planned to exploit previous tactical gains by hitting both Union flanks simultaneously. Lee and Lieutenant General Richard Stoddert Ewell, commanding the 2nd Corps, had decided that Culpâs Hill, just southeast of Gettysburg and the anchor of the northeastern corner of Meadeâs line, and its stubborn defenders, could be overwhelmed on the morning of July 3. Likewise, with his units already in frontline positions on the right, Longstreet was ordered to continue his assault on Meadeâs left (with John Bell Hoodâs division) and left-center (with General Lafayette McLawsâs division) as on July 2, while Pickettâs division played only a supporting role. Therefore, the initial battle plan for July 3 was unchanged, with Ewell and Longstreet ordered to attack simultaneously on the early morning of the third day.
However, Leeâs original plan on the north was spoiled early on July 3, when Union troops launched an early morning counterattack along Ewellâs front at Culpâs Hill. Ewell was now tactically thwarted. But the escalating gunfire echoing over heavily timbered Culpâs Hill correctly convinced the tactically flexible Lee that Meadeâs right flank, and certainly his left flank as well, was now certainly stronger than he originally thought. The astute Lee was convinced that Meade had considerably strengthened his flanks at his centerâs expense. Indeed, Meade had rushed thousands of troops to face Longstreetâs hard-hitting echelon assaults and strengthened his battered position on the far south on July 2, including with the 6th Corps now occupying a reserve position on his left. Meadeâs right and left flanks, situated on high ground and reinforced, were now impregnable.
Therefore, Lee was now forced to compensate because his original plan of attack on Meadeâs right flank at Culpâs Hill had been spoiled early and Pickettâs division was still not up to playing a support role for Longstreetâs morning attack. Longstreet was not able to unleash an attack on that morning as ordered, because of Pickettâs absence. Lee, therefore, had been forced to create a new battle plan. Hoping to overcome the twin setbacks of Ewellâs failure to achieve gains and Pickettâs belatedness, Lee became more tactically innovative out of urgent necessity. After carefully surveying Cemetery Ridgeâs lengthy expanse, he finally discovered a glaring tactical weakness in Meadeâs position. He was now determined to break Meadeâs right-center with a concentrated blow at a weak point along an overextended line. Indeed, Meadeâs right-center was now even more vulnerable than ever before with reinforcements having bolstered the Union lineâs northern and southern ends. If his attacking units would only act in âproper concert of actionââas at Chancellorsville in May 1863 and unlike on July 2, when dramatic Confederate breakthroughs were not supported by reinforcementsâthen Lee was convinced that decisive victory could be won.7
As emphasized by Lee, if Pickettâs division was fully available early on July 3, âI will strike them between the eyes [as] I have tonight [July 2] been reinforced by Pickettâs division, the flower of my army [and the only division yet to see combat at Gettysburg], and by [Jeb] Stuartâs cavalry.â8 Indeed, Pickettâs three brigades of Virginia troops were âthe freshest, strongest, and most eagerâ troops available.9 Even more, the three brigade commanders of Pickettâs division (consisting of around 5,830 infantrymen and more than 400 Virginia artillerymen of the attached âlong armâ battalion) were experienced and capable.10
More confident with Pickettâs and James Ewell Brown (Jeb) Stuartâs dual availability for the first time at Gettysburg, Lee now possessed his best tactical opportunity to achieve a decisive result. Lee was encouraged by the previous dayâs success of General Ambrose Ransom Wrightâs Georgia brigade, although unsupported, in attacking so near Cemetery Ridgeâs crest on the right-center. Therefore, a decisive success seemed most probable at this same point if a far larger number of troops struck this weak spot on the battered right-center. The tactical opinion of General Wright, whose Georgians had allegedly penetrated Meadeâs right-center (which Lee had watched through his binoculars), now coincided with Leeâs newly formed tactical view: âIt is not as hard to get there as it looks.â11
Enduring Myths
Certainly the greatest myth about Gettysburg was that what Lee launched was nothing more than a doomed offensive effort. In hindsight, the basis of this myth has been founded on the concept that Cemetery Ridge and the defenders were simply too strong (by nature and numbers of infantry defenders and artillery) to be overwhelmed. In later years, to explain their dismal failure, Confederate veterans described Meadeâs right-center as far more formidable than was actually the case. In contrast to the myth of impregnability, Meadeâs stretched-thin right-center was much weaker and more vulnerable than has been generally recognized by historians.
However, the invincibility (a postwar creation that transformed Cemetery Ridge in the popular imagination into another impregnable Maryeâs Heights) of Meadeâs right-center has become a common assumption. But ample evidence of nineteenth-century warfare on both sides of the Atlantic revealed how massive frontal assaults were often successful against high-ground positions defended by veterans with modern weaponry. As Lee fully understood, decisive victory could only be won by offensive tactics because any âcollapse at all was likely to be total and disastrous.â12
Smashing through Meadeâs right-center meant that âUncl. Sam would recognize his nephew and give us peace.â13 One of Longstreetâs men penned to his wife that âI think we will end the war [with] this campaign [and] I hope I will be able to write to my dear from Baltimore or Philadelphia [and] I would pray to God that this war would end soon [or] both nations [will be] ruined forever.â14 In the words of a 71st Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, now defending Cemetery Ridge: âA sort of fatality had [descended and we] must depend Only on [our]selves for fighting out an honorable peace.â15 Quite simply, the Southâs peace could only come with decisive victory on July 3.
Most of all, Lee knew that time was not on his side. President Abraham Lincoln was gearing up for total war on a scale never before, in American history, to totally eliminate the Confederacy. On June 15, 1863, Lincoln issued a call for another 100,000 troops. As he fully realized, Lee now needed to secure a decisive victory on July 3 before another 50,000 men for federal service from Pennsylvania, 30,000 troops from Ohio, 10,000 soldiers from Maryland, and another 10,000 men from West Virginia (which broke away from Virginia in 1862) joined the great crusade. Additionally to meet Leeâs invasion, state governors were directed by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to raise nearly fifty state militia regiments from New York and Pennsylvania, for the defense of the Pennsylvania capital of Harrisburg and other major northeastern cities.16
Gettysburgâs third day was the final showdown that had been long and eagerly awaited. General William Dorsey Pender, who fell mortally wounded at Gettysburg, had recently penned in a letter, âI wish we could meet [the Army of the Potomac in a final showdown] and have the matter settled at once.â17 But securing the Northâs recognition as an independent nation now called for the Army of the Potomacâs destruction on Pennsylvania soil. Only vanquishing Meadeâs army by an overpowering blow on July 3 and then marching on major northern cities, such as Philadelphia and especially Washington, DC, could now transform the great dream of conquering a peace into a reality.18 With this goal in mind, Lee was presented with a âunique opportunityâ on July 3 to defeat the only slightly larger Army of the Potomac that had suffered devastating losses on the first two days: a long-sought favorable equation.19
Lee had emphasized his central objective to General Isaac Ridgeway Trimble while on the road to Gettysburg: âdestroy the armyâ now mostly aligned on Cemetery Ridge.20 However, innovative tactics were now needed for decisive success, because of Meadeâs high-ground advantage. Lee now thought much like Lincoln, who had recently ordered General Joseph Hooker (the army commander before being recently replaced by Meade): âFight him [Lee] when opportunity offers.â21 Leeâs tactical objective was revealed in full when he pointed to Cemetery Ridge: âThe enemy is there, I am going to strike him.â22 Ascertaining a shortcut to decisive victory, Lee planned to strike Meade with a powerful blow right âbetween the eyes.â23
However, Leeâs offensive-mindedness on July 3 has been viewed by modern historians as emotion driven and entirely reckless without careful tactical calculationâthe epitome of tactical folly, if not stupidity, which had become one of the great myths of the Civil War. But Leeâs men knew better, because their commanderâs tactical astuteness and aggressiveness had led to so many past victories. One of General John Bell Hoodâs soldiers concluded that Lee âwas in temperament a gamecock [known for] his pugnacity.â24 John Singleton ...