Introduction
In 2015, the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall campaigns at South African universities brought about renewed calls for the decolonisation (and Africanisation) of the content and pedagogies in higher education. So, what does it mean to decolonise South African universities from the primary role from the universitiesâ point of view, that is, in terms of the promotion of scholarship? More importantly, do philosophers of education have anything to offer to the decolonisation of higher education in post-apartheid South Africa in particular and the world in general? As a starting point, building on African philosophy as an academic discipline and not as collective, spontaneous and unconscious beliefs, the author maintains that the clarification of general (every day), often vague (ill-defined), uncritical and unargued (collective singular) concepts like decolonisation that idle in our minds is a categorical imperative. The author shows that decolonisation is not only compatible with but also intimately and reciprocally linked to the notion of endogeneityâknowledge of Africans, generated by Africans and for Africans in higher education institutions. The author calls for a continual struggle by (or for) students against colonial neo-liberal universities in South Africa and beyond. In the end, I argue that education for decolonisation that fosters âknowledge democracy â is not only feasible and desirableâbut realistic in the context of South Africaâs constitutional democracy.
African
philosophy is an academic discipline that âclarifies concepts, for the purpose of b) the critical evaluation of [general] beliefsâ (Raphael
1990, 8).
As an epistemic project, decolonialisation âevokes the origin of the kind of knowledge identified as an internal productâââan autonomous, self-reliant tradition of research and knowledge that addresses problems and issues directly or indirectly posed by African [scholars]â. (Hountondji 1990, 1, 1997, 17)
The contemporary university has turned into springboard for neo-liberal ideology, governance, and policies âhence the increasing calls for the decolonisation of our universitiesâ (Hall and Tandon 2017, 7) this is âthe next stage of struggle ⊠whose battle must be waged [by African scholars]â. (Gordon 2016, 177)
Education for decolonisation that fosters âknowledge democracyâ is feasible, desirable and realistic âin post-1994 South Africa universities and the world at largeâ. (Jansen 2017, 162â171)
It is clear that
neo-liberalismâand by implication a neo-liberal
universityâis the ânew demonâ (Torres
2009, 2) of modern-day societies. Against this background, the
decolonisation of universities has become âa necessary task that remain[ed] unfinishedâ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni
2013, 1). It is not difficult to understand why this is so, as âthe celebration of juridical-political
decolonisation obscure[d] the continuities between the colonial
past and
colonialityâ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni
2013, 6). The struggle for
decolonisation and decolonisation of universities is âfought for, won, lost, and won againâ (Christie
2010, 6). If one thinks in these terms, the struggle for decolonisation of universities calls for the thorniest theoretical questions that account for the reality of coloniality on a global scale. It is therefore reasonable to say that, if African
philosophy is conceived as an academic discipline, asking for the meaning, defence and justification of decolonisation as an epistemic struggle is its subtext. I submit that South Africaâs
anti-apartheid struggle that gave rise to diverse
knowledge systems in
higher education is now out of view. In this chapter, the author argues that:
decolonisation is first and foremost a knowledge project rooted in African philosophy as a self-conscious discipline;
decolonisation is tied to endogeneity,1 that is, knowledge of the people, by the people and for the people;
decolonisation is part of the ongoing struggle by decolonialist scholars against colonial neo-liberal universities in post-apartheid South Africa and
in the context of South Africaâs constitutional democracy, the appropriate concept of education for decolonisationâphilosophically, epistemologically and politicallyâwould be âknowledge democracyâ that goes beyond ânarrow provincialismâ and âWestern triumphalismâ.
What Is Philosophy? What Is Western Philosophy? What Is African Philosophy?
As a point of departure, the term âphilosophyâ comes from the ancient Greek words
philo meaning love and
sophia meaning wisdomâthe love of wisdom (Akinpelu
1987, 1; Kanu
2014, 87; Lacey
1976, 59; Plato
1994, 190; Runes
1960, 234; Scruton
2007, 522). The concept is attributed to Pythagoras (575â495
bc), a Greek philosopher, scientist and religious scholar. In Platoâs
dialogue,
Protagoras (
1991), Socrates describes Protagoras to his friend as âthe wisest man aliveâ (
1991, 1). Socratesâ friend concurs, âhe is the only man who is wise ⊠one who is knowledgeable in learned mattersâ (
1991, 2â4). Protagorasâs love for wisdom is neatly encapsulated in this Pythagorean public statement:
Philosophy is indeed, it seems, is a road ⊠chose that philosophy and that road to wisdom ⊠the philosophy which progresses through immaterial eternal intelligible objects that always remain the same and do not admit in themselves of destruction or change, like its subject-matter, is unerring and firm, producing grounded and unswerving proof. (OâMeara 1989, 42â43)
Interpreting Protagorasâ quote, we can see that philosophy is âa kind of agonyâ (extreme mental suffering) (Stangroom and Garvey 2012, 76). The above metaphor of philosophy as a road takes one to the âintelligible world of truth postulated by the objects of knowledge, which are perfect, eternal and unchangingâ (DuprĂ© 2007, 9). Since then, Protagorasâ philosophy has passed into common usage. Recently, it has been given two meanings: a science of questions (asking wise and foolish questions) and a general set of beliefs (general outlook on the world) (Luthuli 1982, 19; Scruton 2007, 552; Standish 2014, 6; Waghid 2016, 455). As the reader will see in the next section, decolonisation of universities as an epistemic project in post-apartheid South Africa rests on a confusion between the popular (that which we believe), on the one hand, and strict (that which we know), on the other.
For our purpose, Raphael (1990, 8) interprets âthe main tradition of Western philosophy as having had two connected aims: the clarification of concepts, for the purpose of the critical evaluation of beliefsâ. In trying to clarify general, vague and uncritical concepts, such as decolonisation, three related purposes worth considering are analysis, synthesis and improvement of the word (decolonisation) itself. First, our analysis of decolonisation consists of a conceptual definition and specifying its central features (e.g. one can analyse or define decolonisation as a âtrue democratisation of knowledgeâ and specify the elements that make up the concept). Second, our synthesis of decolonisation shows the logical relationships whereby the concept (as a unity of knowledge) implies or is implied by another (e.g. one can show a logical relationship between decolonisation and its obligation to transcend the seemingly particular, opposite and irreconcilable Eurocentred and Afrocentred schools of thought). Third, our improvement of decolonisation involves recommending a definition or use that will assist to clarify the meaning of the concept (e.g. one can recommend, as the author does, that the concept âdecolonisationâ should be used in a strict theoretical sense, and not in the popular, ideological sense).
Hountondji (1996, 33) defines African philosophy as âa set of texts, especially the set of texts written by Africans and described as philosophy b...