1 Disenchantment revisited
Formations of the âsecularâ and âreligiousâ in the technological discourse of modernity
One of the most damaging ideas that has swept the social sciences and humanities has been the idea of a disenchanting modernity.
(Nigel Thrift 2007: 65)
Introduction
As alluded to in the Introduction, in the confines of contemporary academic discourse, but also in the greater landscape of public debate, a peculiar sense of wonderment is often produced when the basic tenets and assumptions of modernity, its âmetaphysicsâ as Heidegger once said, are challenged. It is a bizarre dance, an exercise in self-deception to a certain extent. What I mean is that many people, not just scholars, understand âmodernity,â that troubling word which we have inherited, to be something to the tune of what Anthony Giddens has called âliving in a post-traditional worldâ (Beck et al. 1994, emphasis added), that is, beyond tradition. But when they attain visibility, the remnants of so-called traditional life put the modern into sharp relief. A feigning of curiosity results, taking on a distinctly ethnographic flavor. It is as if after the onset of modernity (whenever this may be â sixteenth century and beyond according to many accounts), âthe traditional,â an ever more elusive term, was wiped away completely.
This bewilderment is nowhere exemplified better than when the technological aspects of contemporary life are juxtaposed with leftover phenomena of our supposedly traditional past, especially religion. Take, for instance, a photograph made popular by the columnist Thomas Friedman. There stands an orthodox Jewish man pressing a mobile phone against the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. The caption reads: âShimon Biton places his cellular phone up to the Western Wall so a relative in France can say a prayer at the holy site.â The book that made this photo popular, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, is one which pits two overarching social forces against one another in the era of globalization. There is modernization, on the one hand, symbolized by the Lexus, and tradition, on the other, symbolized by the olive tree:
half the world seemed to be emerging from the Cold War intent on building a better Lexus, dedicated to modernizing, streamlining and privatizing their economies in order to thrive in the system of globalization. And half of the world â sometimes half of the same country, sometimes half the same person â was still caught up in the fight over who owns which olive tree. Olive trees ⊠represent everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us and locates us in this world â whether it be belonging to a family, a community, a tribe, a nation, a religion, or, most of all, a place called home. Olive trees are what give us the warmth of family, the joy of individuality, the intimacy of personal rituals, the depth of private relationships, as well as the confidence and security to reach out and encounter others.
(Friedman 2000: 31)
The photoâs semiotic contradiction acts as visual leitmotif for the story that Friedman wishes to tell. The man holding the mobile is not just Jewish, but orthodox. He is clad in the traditional clothing of a particular strand of ultra-Orthodox Judaism, black hat and coat; he is donned with thick, curled sideburns, called payots, and a beard. All of these details do the work of conveying to the audience that this man is not simply a man of faith but devout. He is at one of the holiest sites of the Abrahamic religions praying with not exactly the most holy of objects, a cellular phone. It is this juxtaposition of the ancient (even Biblical) and the modern, which has given this particular photograph such poignancy. This type of response represents a âfalse normâ (Habermas 1985), which in this instance is really a false dichotomy between âreligionâ (the olive tree) and âtechnology,â the latter serving as a proxy for âmodernityâ (the Lexus). The photograph becomes the perfect illustrative vehicle for Friedmanâs argument in the book, which is that, at various times, âthe Lexus and the olive treeâ turns into the Lexus versus the olive tree.
The thinking exhibited in Friedmanâs dichotomous thematization of globalization is none other than, I would argue, a popularized secularization theory for the global age, which, after Jeremy Stolow, I call the âmyth of modernization.â
This is the myth which credits modern media â beginning with the printing press â with a key role in the world-historical disembedding of religion from public life, and its relocation within the private walls of bourgeois domesticity, or deeper still, the interior silent universe of individual readers and their infinitely replicable activities of decoding texts. For some, this is a tale about loss of meaning and moral crisis that comes with the dematerialization of palpable structures of religious authority. For others, it is a heroic story about the empowerment of social groups to challenge the repressive apparatuses of Church and Court ⊠This metanarrative is structured around the assumption that the mere expansion of modern communication technologies is somehow commensurate with a dissolution of religious authority and a fragmentation of its markers of affiliations and identity.
(Stolow 2005: 122)
From Stolow, we can say that lodged in the concept of secular modernity is an implicit theory of media and technology, one that equates not only their internal logic as commensurate with the ratio of formal rationality but also their proliferation and wide use as indicative of the decline of tradition, including religion.
Secularization theory, at least in its recent sociological articulation, maintains that secularization âhas been a phenomenon concomitant with modernization,â as Bryan Wilson, one of its chief proponents, puts it (Wilson 1998: 52). Of the three areas that he argues are the core concerns of the secularization thesis â authority, knowledge, and rationality, it is the âpowerful imprintâ of the changing nature of the second â knowledge â that he claims, âno aspect of social change has escaped.â He points specifically to the role of science and technology in â[rendering] otiose supernaturalist dogmas and theological speculations about the nature of life and creation. Religionists have been entirely displaced in the interpretation of such matters, their earlier theories and prescriptions have not only lost their cogency but have been shown to be hollow, ignorant and falseâ (Wilson 1998: 50). As Talal Asad notes, ââthe secularâ [in the discourse of modernity] presents itself as the ground from which theological discourse was generated (as a form of false consciousness) and from which it gradually emancipated itself in its march to freedomâ (Asad 2003: 192). Thus, we can say Friedman basically adopts this understanding, that is, of modernization as rationalization, which is, in turn, set in opposition to non-rational, traditional thinking, which amounts to, in the Marxist parlance used sardonically by Asad, âfalse consciousness.â
But it must be said that Friedman is not alone when it comes to the cheap adoption of secularization theory. His is not a simple case of a journalist wading into academic waters, hacking away complexity and nuance along the way. As sociologists John Evans and Michael Evans note, a similar logic exists in academic studies of religion and science, sociology among them. They identify an âepistemological conflict narrative,â which they write is âan assumption ⊠built into the history of Western academic thoughtâ (Evans and Evans 2008: 87). Put simply, this narrative views the conflict between religion and science as âover competing truth about the worldâ (Evans and Evans 2008: 88). In their critical unearthing of it in a variety of scholarly literatures, they make note of the wide reach of the influence of Weber, especially the famed notion of âdisenchantment.â Specifically, in secularization theory, they diagnose a specific form of the epistemological conflict narrative, which they describe as âsymbolic.â The symbolic epistemological conflict narrative sees as parallel the growth of a modern technoscientific rationality with secularity. âMysterious forces and powers have been replaced by the calculation and technical means embodied in modern science,â they write (Evans and Evans 2008: 91), leaving âreligionâ and, more specifically, religious thinking marginalized. Evans and Evans show that this conflict narrative places âreligionâ and âscienceâ in a deadlock. They rightly point out that it renders religion and technoscience as mere ways of âknowing about the worldâ and nothing else.1 The conflict narrative makes religion only âsymbolicâ not material. It is rendered a category of thought and stripped of any other kind of influence or action. The conflict narrative maintains a view of religion as well as science and technology as largely fighting over Truth, which in this instance is singular and uncomplicated. It follows then that scholarly literature which assumes the logic of conflict in disenchantment understands âthe secularâ to also then simply be a âmindset.â Pace epistemological conflict, the story of disenchantment (and hence secularization and modernization), is one wherein a set of ideas (traditional/religious) replaces another (modern/rational).
This becomes rather clear not only in secularization theory and studies of religion but also in modernity theory, where the correlation of modernity with technology (Thompson 1995) is nearly unquestionable. Technology has not only âmade modernity possible,â as Philip Brey writes, but it is also âa creation of modernityâ (Brey 2004: 33). The institutions and culture of modernity are not merely âshaped or influenced by technology,â they are also âconstituted by itâ (Brey 2004: 54). But as the critical theorist of technology Andrew Feenberg notes, modernity theory depends on a specific definition of rationalization as a âspontaneous consequence of the pursuit of efficiency once customary and ideological obstructions are removedâ (Feenberg 2010: 134â135). This definition of rationalization reflects the influence of Weber, Feenberg contends, specifically, the concept of âbureaucratic rationality,â which sees rationalization as becoming efficient through the parsing out, or âdisaggregationâ of various spheres. For instance, at the level of social structures, âthe state, the market, religion, law, art, science, technologyâ become âdistinct social domains with their own logic and institutional identityâ (Feenberg 2010: 136). Hence, modernization-qua-rationalization-qua-differentiation relies upon a view of technological rationality as streamlining, through the eradication of customs and ideologies in order to create distinct, rule-following âbureausâ or offices. Scientific-technological rationality, in Weberâs thinking, purifies all that it encounters from âreligiousâŠelementsâ (Feenberg 2010: 136, emphasis added). But these âreligious elementsâ are clearly meant to refer to superstition and what Asad earlier calls âtheological discourse.â Scientific-technological rationality does not necessarily remove ritual per se but replaces its source, its reason. Hence, as Feenberg notes, in modernity theory one also finds an emphasis on the rationality of technology (viz. efficiency), not necessarily the dynamics of technology itself. Therefore, analysis of the modernizing effect of technology remains at the level of thought. Technology loses its material weight.
In this chapter, I aim to analyze the Weberian concept of âdisenchantmentâ beyond the epistemological conflict narrative by exploring its ontological aspects. I argue that that disenchantment is not merely just another term for rationalization and intellectualization but a descriptor for a revolution in the traditional layout of the relations between humans, nature, and God, or what I call âonto-cosmology.â Unlike its traditional antecedent, the modern world viewed âthe humanâ as its fulcrum, with its operative key words being Progress and history. Disenchantment, in the reading that Iâm offering here, is not simply intellectual but environmental. I proceed in three steps: First, I present an âinterpretive genealogyâ of technological rationality in discourses about modernity, and suggest that even while they contain a Weberian substrate, they nevertheless display an internal conflict, especially in how they formulate âreligion,â âsecular,â and âtechnology.â More strongly, I argue that the lack of conceptual consistency in the invocation of these terms is a symptom of a deeper unresolved ontological (or, onto-cosmological) tension in modern thought. This tension revolves around the relational status of the figures of âthe human,â ânature,â and âGod.â I use these terms not as definitions of extant, transhistorical realities but as concepts that are forged and maintained continuously. Following Bruno Latour, I use these terms as markers of an ontological shift specific to modernity that allows us to hone in the notion of disenchantment. Second, after having established this ontological aporia, I offer a rereading of Weberâs original concept of disenchantment, drawing from media scholar Jeremy Stolow and political scientist Gilbert Germain, and suggest that when looked at more closely, religion and technology occupy similar âonto-cosmologicalâ positions vis-Ă -vis nature, as they are both attempts to effect control over it. Lastly, I tease out some of the implications of this argument for the understanding of religion and technology in contemporary times.
The permutations of âtechnological rationalityâ in the discourse of modernity
In this section, I demonstrate a brief âinterpretive genealogyâ of âtechnical rationalityâ in modernity discourses. Due to constraints of time and space, I cannot claim to offer an exhaustive critical assessment of technology-informed works on modernity but, following Aronowitz (1993), I instead provide a âreadingâ of certain influential thinkers and present conceptual clarifications while highlighting a cluster of relevant aspects of their work. As Aronowitz notes, an âinterpretive genealogyâ differs from other approaches because âthe objectâ is not taken as given, with a âdefinite history, cast of characters and well-defined mode of intellectual interventions within a fairly well established field of academic knowledgeâ (Aronowitz 1993: 7). It allows for the study of tendencies, âto tease out what is left unsaidâ (Aronowitz 1993: 8). I do so here to point out not only the inconsistency in the way that not only âtechnologyâ is deployed but also how ârationalizationâ is understood, is symptomatic of a deeper unresolved ontological (or, onto-cosmological) conflict.
More to the point, in the genealogy I sketch below, the effects of technology and the aspects of technological rationality are defined in a rather contrasting manner in spite of the clear influence of Weber. In what I label âmodernity as massification,â technology becomes a disindividualizing force, effectively âmechanizingâ humans. The language used by these authors suggests that technology is not only a modernizing force but also one that reduces or takes away some vague human spiritual essence. In contrast, âmodernity as technological atomizationâ formulates technology as an isolating force, separating humans from one another, leaving them with a communality deficit. Thus, on the one hand, technology and modernity come together to produce mass conformity, while on the other, they come together resulting in anomie.
The theme of âmassâ is particularly evident in a strain of existential philosophy associated with Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel. What is significant about their work is not only the use of theological language, but the shared diagnosis of modernity: the technological mechanization of individual personality. Whereas traditional times allowed for âmanâ [sic] to have a stable knowledge of himself in relation to the world, modernity has ripped the rug from underneath him, throwing him into a seemingly never-ending Heraclitean flux of movement, a consequence of âdespiritualization.â Or, as Marcel puts it, âMan is in his death-throesâ (Marcel 1962: 13â14). Technological modernity, in this line of thinking, is always degrading to the human spirit. But for these thinkers, the âspiritâ they speak of is always an individual one. In terms that prefigure the Frankfurt School, especially Marcuse (Marcuse 2002), Marcel argues that âman becomes dependent on gadgets whose smooth functioning assures him a tolerable life at the material level, the more estranged he becomes from an awareness of his inner realityâ (Marcel 1962: 55), calling this âtechnical manâ (Marcel 1962: 75). But this ânew man,â as he alternatively puts it, suffers from a spiritual â a word favored by both him and Jaspers â defect: âhe loses touch with himselfâ (Marcel 1962: 18). Hence, the âuprooting of manâ by âadvanced techniqueâ (Jaspers 1957: 21) is not only a metaphor of detachment but also, most critically, of its â[absorption] into the social,â leading to a âdanger to manâs selfhoodâ (Jaspers 1957: 47). In sum, the individual is no longer a self but rather a âfunction.â Jacques Ellul describes the unstoppable, amoeba-like integrative-function of technique technology in a similar manner when he writes, âTechnique attacks man, impairs the sources of his vitality, and takes away his mysteryâ (Ellul 1964: 413).
The idea that modernity with its complex of techniques, characterized by their impersonal bureaucratic nature, has chipped away at the metaphysics of human beings through the process of rationalization is clearly reminiscent of Weber. Technologyâs cold and calculating character undermines the enchanted mystery of humanityâs Being, his individuality.
A nearly opposite tact comes from the philosopher Albert Borgmann (2003). For him, technology does not provide enough communality, leaving the individual atomized in an anomic state. The information technologies of today are the exemplars of what have been the worst tendencies of technological rationality since the end of World War II; they intensify the âdrift away from public and civic engagementâ thanks to an overdevelopment of convenience after which âall the world is at oneâs call and beckon, and hence to venture out into the world begins to feel like a waste and a painâ (Borgmann 2003: 77). Invoking Robert Putnam, Borgmann argues that contemporary technologies have exacerbated the fragmentation and atomization of society. This is most clear, he suggests, in the rewriting of the public/private distinctions in advanced industrial societies. The public sphere, in his words, âhas become both hypertrophied and atrophied,â while the private sphere has become utterly closed off. âAs public space has been taken over by instrumentality (i.e., production and administration),â he writes, âfinality (i.e., consumption) has passed into the private realmâ (Borgmann 2003: 40).
What we have then is a culture wherein legitimate forms of âcommunal celebrationâ are extremely rare. Borgmann bemoans the televising of public sporting events s...