Mossadegh

10 Key excerpts on "Mossadegh"

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  Iran

  At War With History

  • John W. Limbert, John Limbert(Authors)
  • 2016(Publication Date)
  • Taylor & Francis

    (Publisher)

  The National Front gradually focused its attention on the oil question and a broad power struggle with the shah. In 1950, the government submitted proposals to the Sixteenth Majles for a revision of the 1933 agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but, under Mossadegh's leadership, the small National Front delegation successfully blocked their approval. Frustrated by Prime Minister Ali Mansur's ineffectiveness, the shah replaced him with the strong-minded General Ali Razmara, who was determined to push for political and economic reforms and for approval of the oil legislation. Both conservatives and nationalists disliked the new prime minister's policies, and by late fall, the oil nationalization issue had become a rallying cry uniting his opponents. Razmara's assassination in March 1951 by a member of the Fedayan-e-Eslam brought the crisis to a head. The murder set off a wave of public rejoicing, and a frightened Majles quickly approved an oil nationalization bill. When Hosein Ala, the new prime minister, refused to implement the new law, the Majles nominated, and the shah named, Mossadegh—then chairman of the joint parliamentary oil committee directing the government's negotiations with the British—prime minister on April 29, 1951.

  A member of the old Qajar landowning aristocracy with a long, distinguished political record, Mossadegh seemed an unlikely charismatic leader. Although variously portrayed in the West as unstable, xenophobic, erratic, and emotional, he did what few Iranian leaders had ever done: He united the modern and traditional classes under the banner of Iranian national pride. Mossadegh attracted wide support because of his incorruptibility, consistent adherence to nationalist principles, and independence from foreign influence at a time when almost all Iranian leaders were tainted by association with Russians, British, or Americans.

  Except for a brief interval in July 1952, Mossadegh served as prime minister until his overthrow in an August 1953 coup. He initially enjoyed the support of both nationalists and royalists, the latter hoping he could solve the oil dispute with Britain and eliminate it as a cause of domestic opposition to the shah and his allies. But inflexibility on both sides kept the crisis at a stalemate and at the center of the political stage throughout Mossadegh's time as prime minister. Despite his prestige and well-known independence, Mossadegh became a captive of his followers' extremism. Any solution he could have achieved—short of complete British capitulation—would have been attacked as surrender to the foreign imperialists. The British referred the dispute to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, but the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction, by implication favoring the Iranian argument that this question fell under Iranian law. Although the Iranians could operate their nationalized oil fields and related facilities without expatriate employees, they were unable, to sell their production because of a British-inspired international boycott. The United States tried unsuccessfully to mediate the dispute but would not break ranks with Britain over the boycott. A hoped-for U.S. loan failed to materialize, and with few customers for the country's oil, the Iranian government was without revenue and beset by shortages, debt, and inflation.

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  The State of Resistance

  Politics, Culture, and Identity in Modern Iran

  • Assal Rad(Author)
  • 2022(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  The most direct example of his ignorance was expressed by the shah’s interpretation of events leading to the downfall of Prime Minister Mossadeq. As Ervand Abrahamian argues, 1953 was a watershed moment in modern Iranian history. 36 In his research on this period, Abrahamian posits two main points. First he rejects the narrative iterated by the shah and other scholars that Mossadeq’s psychology made an agreement with Britain over oil impossible – in fact the core issue was control of oil. Second, he contends that the coup should be understood in the context of the conflict between imperialism and nationalism rather than the conventional Cold War context. Thus, in his analysis, Mossadeq became a national hero as he worked to break free from British control and struggled for Iran’s independence. At the same time, 35 “Shah of Iran Criticizing Britain,” YouTube video, last accessed July 23, 2018, www.youtube.com/watch?v=imil1iIpIYA. 36 Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.- Iranian Relations (New York: The New Press, 2013). 2.3 The Shah’s Naiveté 33 the shah became associated with British control of Iran’s oil and was seen as a pawn to foreign power. Despite the shah’s conflicts with Mossadeq, he was compelled to appoint Mossadeq as prime minister because of his overwhelming popularity among Iranian people. As prime minister, Mossadeq launched a campaign to nationalize Iranian oil that put him in direct confrontation with Britain. This was seen by the Iranian masses as a battle for Iran’s independence. It forged a new nationalism based on principles of democracy and freedom from external forces, as Abrahamian explains: In a ceremony potent with symbolism and similar to dramatic shifts of power in newly independent countries throughout the world, the national flag was hoisted up as the company insignia was taken down . . . For some in Britain, the lowering of the insignia marked another step in the dissolution of the Empire.

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  Oil Crisis in Iran

  From Nationalism to Coup d'Etat

  • Ervand Abrahamian(Author)
  • 2021(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  2 It argued Mossadeq 1 H. Miers, Pamphlet by Ahmad Ghotbi circulated at the Labour Party Conference (15 October 1978), FCO 8/3187–8. 2 Frances Grier, The Mossadegh Period (13 October 1978), FCO 8/3187. This was written by the Middle East Section of the Research Department at the request of the head of the Middle East Department. 155 had “come to power in a wave of nationalism,” but had been “ousted by a military coup led by General Zahedi” because his “obduracy,” “inepti- tude,” and “unconstitutional behavior” had sabotaged oil negotiations, deteriorated the economy, alienated former allies, and even led to a break with the communists. The young intern, in the search into the files, somehow had over- looked numerous opaque mentions of the coup. Over the years, offi- cials had meticulously avoided direct references to British – and even American – involvement in the actual coup. But they had occasionally dropped side remarks about the “events of 1953,” “Zahedi’s success,” the shah’s “counter-revolution,” Mossadeq’s “difficulties with his Majlis,” or his erratic policies causing his own “demise.” Soon after the coup, one diplomat even cryptically remarked: “The Shah seems to be living in a dream world. He seems to think that his restoration was due entirely to his popularity with his people and resents suggestion that any particular groups assisted in the process.” 3 Moreover, a senior Foreign Office official, in a note handwritten immediately after the coup, had advised colleagues interested in know- ing what had happened to read a series of articles in the Times of India. 4 He explained that the author, G. Reddy, although an “unscrupulous socialist not very well disposed to us,” was “astute” enough to have produced articles “well worth reading.” Middleton, the previous chargé d’affaires, added that the articles were “very objective by local standards.” Reddy had clearly kept his eyes and ears open while staying with his friend the Indian ambassador.

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  Iran and the CIA

  The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited

  • D. Bayandor(Author)
  • 2010(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  44 The group, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, became a part of the anti-Mosaddeq cabal. The internal political scene during the first year of Mosaddeq’s gov- ernment, while agitated, was otherwise marked by a certain degree of cohesiveness among the main political poles, including the Shiite cleri- cal hierarchy in Qom. If some lesser figures deserted the National Front, 40 Iran and the CIA Mosaddeq’s main allies, namely the charismatic Kashani, the popular Majles deputy Hossein Makki as well as the enigmatic and plucky Mozafar Baqa’ei remained loyal. 45 All three were elected to seventeenth session of the Majles. The Shah had supported Mosaddeq and his oil policy in spite of the misgivings and reservations we discussed earlier. 46 Initially he was sceptical about the Mosaddeq government’s durability. Shortly there- after the Shah realized that the nationalization of oil was irreversible and Mosaddeq too popular to be replaced. This realization underpinned the Shah’s attitude towards his prime minister until nearly the end, disrupted only by spasmodic temptations that were often inspired by foreign diplomats or his immediate family and entourage. 47 One such episode followed the collapse of the oil talks with Lord Stokes, dis- cussed in the next section. When in September 1951 Mosaddeq decided to end the contracts of British employees of the AIOC, the British cabinet bristled. Atlee attempted to elicit the support of Truman, not just for opposing Mosaddeq’s move but also to join Britain in pres- suring the Shah to remove Mosaddeq. 48 The United States agreed to help with the first request, but refused to make common cause with Britain to remove Mosaddeq. Undeterred, Ambassador Shepherd was formally instructed to see the Shah, using intimidation and persuasion tactics to persuade him to dismiss Mosaddeq.

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  Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran

  Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks

  • Ali Rahnema(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  1 The British reaction to Mosaddeq in power: “Mossie grabs Britain’s oil – but Navy to the rescue” (Daily Express) With fury, the British had closely observed how Mosaddeq, as the Chair of the 18-man Parliamentary Committee in charge of reviewing and studying the 1949 Supplemental Oil Agreement (better known among Iranians as the “Gass–Golshayan Agreement”), had gradually steered the parliament towards not only rejecting the Supplemental Agreement but also preparing the legal ground for nationalizing Iran’s oil industry. With Mosaddeq in power, the British were no longer dealing with a politician whom they could impress, pressure, intimidate or bribe into accepting their terms. The British suddenly felt that they had a politician in power with whom they could not talk in a familiar language. As such, Mosaddeq was a wild card in a country that had been under the politico-economic influence of the British and in which they felt deeply invested. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), 51 per cent of which belonged to the British government, was a highly lucrative business that contributed significantly to the British economy, and its loss could not be taken lightly. The British considered their investment in Abadan as the “greatest single overseas enterprise in British commerce”, making a profit of £170,000,000 in 1950. 1 Furthermore, Mosaddeq had four characteristics that made him abhorrent to the British. He was a true patriot and believed in placing Iran’s benefit above all else, irrespective of the risks. He was inflexible, relentless and stubborn. He was Western-educated, Westernized and familiar with Western ways of doing politics, yet, contrary to most in his position, he was not in awe of everything Western – he was rather firmly against foreign intervention in the affairs of his country. Finally, he believed that as long as the Iranian people supported him, he could move mountains without the help of colonial powers.

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  A Dynastic History of Iran

  From the Qajars to the Pahlavis

  • Mehran Kamrava(Author)
  • 2022(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  His tenure in the prime minister’s office was perilous and brief. However, his impact – on the monarchy, on Iran, and on global politics – was anything but. The Mosaddeq Interregnum Becoming prime minister in April 1951, Mosaddeq’s term in office was anything but tranquil. In addition to heightened tensions with both the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the British in the lead up to the nationalization of the oil industry, Mosaddeq feared domestic challenges as well. The Majles was beset by squabbles among deputies, and there were frequent cabinet reshuffles and resignations by cabinet ministers. 8 Wm. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Overthrow of the Mosaddeq Government,” in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds., p. 127. Figure 6.1 Mohammad Reza Shah meeting with tribal leaders, circa 1940s. (Photo by Popperfoto via Getty Images/Getty Images) 108 Dynasty Consolidated Mosaddeq also had uneasy relations with army and police command- ers, few of whom liked or trusted the veteran politician. Relations with Britain, meanwhile, went from bad to worse, both sides becoming increasingly intransigent with time. From the very beginning, officials in London had no patience with the Iranian prime minister: “To the British, Mosaddeq was anathema, his becoming a prime minister a cata- clysmic event.” 9 Tense and acrimonious negotiations over the precise terms of oil nationalization kept breaking down, with Churchill convinc- ing Truman to offer Iran a joint proposal regarding AIOC assets and compensation for its nationalization, and a $10 million US aid pack- age “to the Persian Government to assist in the budgetary problem.” 10 Mosaddeq rejected the proposal outright. In March 1951, Iran passed the oil nationalization law and estab- lished the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in place of the AIOC. 9 Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 125. 10 Quoted in ibid., pp. 143–144. Figure 6.2 Mosaddeq speaking to a crowd in Tehran, 1951.

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  Modern Iran

  • Jerome Kagan(Author)
  • 1988(Publication Date)
  • Yale University Press

    (Publisher)

  The religious revival forces of the leader of the majles ulama, Ayatollah Kashani, who had a long record of opposition to Western, and particularly British, incursions in Iran, also became stronger. Oil negotiations were stalled. The British and Americans in-volved were unwilling to allow Iranians really to control their own oil, while the Mosaddeq government would not settle for less. In late February 1953, General Fazlollah Zahedi, a former collabora-tor with Nazi Germany, was arrested for plotting with foreigners to overthrow the government. In March there were serious conflicts be-tween Mosaddeq and the shah in which Mosaddeq emerged victorious after large popular demonstrations in his favor. The government released Zahedi as a conciliatory gesture, but there continued to be apparent military and foreign-inspired plots against the government. In the first half of 1953, relations became increasingly embittered between Iran and the United States government. In January Mosaddeq wrote to President Dwight Eisenhower saying that the United States had supported the British in the AIOC controversy, had withheld aid from Iran, and had helped the British enforce an economic blockade. After a letter from Mosaddeq requesting economic aid, Eisenhower responded in June that the American people felt: ‘‘it would not be fair to the Ameri-can taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any consider-able amount of economic aid to Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its oil and oil products if a reasonable agreement were reached. . . . Similarly, many American citizens would be deeply opposed to the purchase by the United States Government of Iranian oil in the absence of an oil settlement.’’ ∏π Although many Iranians knew from the first that the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in the overthrow of Mosaddeq in August 1953, only gradually did details of these events become available in the Western world.

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  The History of Iran

  • Elton L. Daniel(Author)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • Greenwood

    (Publisher)

  After Mosaddeq’s referendum, the shah rather reluctantly gave his approval for the covert operation. He withdrew to a resort on the Caspian and, on August 16, signed decrees dismissing Mosaddeq as prime minister, which he had a constitutional right to do, and appointing Zahedi in his place. Mosaddeq received advance intelligence of this and had the army officer delivering the dismissal document arrested. He tried to suppress news of the dismissal decree and used radio broadcasts to depict the incident as an abortive coup (his opponents, however, managed to circulate copies of the decrees in Tehran to show that Mosaddeq was exercising power illegally). Either to dramatize the situation or for fear the plot had failed, the shah immediately left the country. The National Front began an obvious move to abolish the monarchy; Fatemi even called for the “traitor” shah to be hanged. On August 17 and 18, crowds of Tudeh demonstrators tore down statues of Reza Shah and demanded the creation of a republic. It is alleged that the mobs were augmented by provocateurs sent by the conspirators, but their numbers were certainly small compared to the number of genuine communists involved. Fearful that a Tudeh revolution was in the making, Mosaddeq ordered the police and army to clear the streets, thus removing from the scene the group most likely to have shielded him from what was coming next. On August 19, a large and rowdy crowd shouting pro-shah slogans marched on the Tehran bazaar, attacking pro-Mosaddeq institutions such as the offices of the national radio along the way. They were led by professional roughnecks from the poorer districts of Tehran (including a particularly colorful character known as Jafar the Brainless), who had been recruited by Kashani and the royalists and financed at least in part by funds from the CIA. Simultaneously, units of the army led by Zahedi surrounded Mosaddeq’s residence and, after a fierce battle, forced him to surrender. This paved the way for the shah’s return to Iran on August 22. Zahedi became prime minister, holding the office until 1955. Mosaddeq was convicted of treason, imprisoned, and then placed under house arrest until his death in 1967; Fatemi was captured, despite Tudeh efforts to protect him, tried, and executed.

  The importance of the events of 1953 in shaping Iranian perceptions of the Pahlavi regime and of U.S. involvement in Iranian affairs can hardly be exaggerated. For a segment of the Iranian population, the revered Dr. Mosaddeq was a true patriot and a political martyr, and the collapse of the National Front nothing less than a political catastrophe for the country. U.S. involvement in the coup is invariably cited as a prime example of its harmful meddling, either through malevolence or stupidity, in the affairs of other countries. These ideas have been so deeply embedded in the Iranian psyche that it is probably useless to try to point out their many defects or the harsher realities they serve to conceal, but some effort should be made to put them in a broader historical context. In most respects, Mosaddeq’s adventure was flawed from the beginning and probably doomed to failure under any conceivable circumstances; there are certainly many reasons to doubt it would have led to the utopia his enthusiasts have envisaged.

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  Representing Iran in East Germany

  Ideology and the Media in the German Democratic Republic

  • Edgar Klüsener(Author)
  • 2021(Publication Date)
  • I.B. Tauris

    (Publisher)

  This view was not unique to the GDR’s press, either, since American and British media had begun to portray Mossadegh as the Iranian politician who was about to lead Iran into Moscow’s arms (Keddie 2003, 111). Iran’s confrontation with the West continued to dominate the reporting throughout 1951. The articles emphasized the strong support Mossadegh enjoyed from both Parliament and population ( Neues Deutschland 1951e, 6) and expressed a notion of schadenfreude about Anthony Eden’s warning, issued in a speech to the British lower house, that the loss of Iranian oil would lead to dramatic consequences for Europe’s defence capabilities ( Neues Deutschland 1951f, 6). The same article, the source of which was possibly Neues Deutschland ’s London correspondent, also stated that the British military was preparing for a grand offensive against Iran. 11 A further narrative evolving was that of David (Iran) against Goliath (Britain/United States), underdog versus villain. Initially, Mossadegh was portrayed as a kind of modern Robin Hood who, very much like the mythical figure, enjoyed the undivided support of the majority of common Iranians regardless of their class or political background ( Neues Deutschland 1951g, 2) for his stance against the mighty imperialist powers ( Neues Deutschland 1951a, 6). In the summer of 1951, GDR interest in Iran reached beyond the oil question, too. On 28 June 1951, Neues Deutschland informed its readers that Iran’s youth were preparing for the III World Youth Festival in Berlin and announced that the Iranian delegation would showcase examples of traditional Iranian folk-art, which had a tradition stretching back thousands of years ( Neues Deutschland 1951h, 4). The primary focus, however, remained firmly on Iran’s quarrels with the West.

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  Modern Iran since 1797

  Reform and Revolution

  • Ali Ansari(Author)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  10 The consolidation of power, 1953–60 The coup d’état of 28 Mordad (19 August), which resulted in the overthrow of the Mosaddeq government, is often seen as one of the turning points in modern Iranian political history. It brought to an end a period of political pluralism and social dynamism, which, while occasionally chaotic, had undoubtedly left its mark on the political consciousness of the nation. It expanded and helped define the politicisation of society which had begun tentatively during the Constitutional Revolution. In this respect it complemented the development of the state which had occurred under Reza Shah. While in terms of international relations it did witness the replacement of Britain by America as the major power in Iran, 1 its immediate domestic impact remained unclear. It did not see the immediate return of the Pahlavi autocracy. British assessments of the Shah’s attitude to his reversal of fortune pointedly referred to his failure to accurately read the political runes: After leaving Tehran last August with what must have been little hope of returning he [the Shah] suddenly found himself swept back on a wave of popular enthusiasm. Almost all experienced observers here, both Persian and foreign, are agreed that this enthusiasm was generated more by the Persians’ deep rooted feelings for the institution of the monarchy than by any strong sentiments in favour of the person of the present Shah. Unfortunately His Majesty has, I understand, interpreted it largely as a demonstration of per- sonal affection. This and the doubtful quality of much of the advice he receives from his court have not made it easy for him to make an accurate appraisal of the present state of the country. 2 Yet, Mohammad Reza Shah, for all his enthusiasm about his perceived popularity, was acutely aware of his political weakness and, while he was anxious to insti- tutionalise himself and his dynasty, he recognised that this would require time and considerable patience.

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