Suez Canal Crisis

12 Key excerpts on "Suez Canal Crisis"

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  The Arab-Israeli Conflict

  A Ringside View

  • P.R. Kumaraswamy(Author)
  • 2023(Publication Date)
  • Routledge India

    (Publisher)

  9   Suez Crisis of 1956

  DOI: 10.4324/9781003317197-9

  The Suez crisis, a time when Israel cooperated and collaborated with erstwhile and declining colonial powers, marked a major shift in the Middle East. At one level, it formalised Israel’s image of being a Western country in the Middle East; on another level, it set the tone for British marginalisation in and withdrawal from the Middle East. By adopting a tougher stand on the crisis, especially over the military invasion of the European powers, the US cemented its presence in the Middle East, and this presence continues until today. Many factors and calculations contributed to the Israeli decision to piggyback on the tension between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the West and to initiate the Suez War. Its swift military victory that ensured UN peacekeeping force along the border with Egypt, however, could not be converted into a political asset, though the war provided a decade of stability and peace to Israel.

  Road to the Suez War

  The backdrop of the Suez crisis and, indeed, all the subsequent Israeli conflicts with its Arab neighbours can be traced to how the previous round of hostilities ended. While this trend began in 1956, there was also a host of other factors that contributed to the Suez War.

  Suez Canal

  The Suez Canal, which extends 101 km from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, was inaugurated on 17 November 1869. The Anglo-French Universal Company of the Maritime Canal of Suez built the artificial link during 1859–1869 and operated it until the Suez crisis. Though initially reluctant, Britain emerged as its primary user and beneficiary, as the canal reduced the distance, travel time and cost of transportation to its colonies in Southeast Asia and India. Following its invasion and occupation of Egypt in 1882, the British took over control, finances and operation of the canal. The major maritime powers of the day concluded the Convention of Constantinople, which was signed on 29 October 1888. Its signatories were the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the British Empire, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and Spain. Egypt, where the canal is located, was not a direct party to the Convention.

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  Crises in the Atlantic Alliance

  Affect and Relations among NATO Members

  • L. Eznack(Author)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  C h a p t e r 3 The Suez Crisis The Suez crisis took place in late 1956, and opposed the United States to both France and Britain. After Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, Britain and France decided to recover control of this canal, using whatever means necessary, including the use of force. 1 For their US ally, the priority was to avoid a military conflict. J. F. Dulles, the US secretary of state, was sent to London, and Washington organized a series of conferences in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem. 2 While the French and British agreed to participate in the US diplomatic effort, they also secretly prepared for a military operation, along with Israel, to restore control of the Suez Canal by force. The plan was that Israel would attack Egypt, after which France and Britain would issue an ultimatum to both countries, threatening to intervene if they did not withdraw from the Canal area. As Egypt would refuse to comply with the Franco-British ultimatum, France and Britain would intervene. 3 As negotiations with Egypt failed, France, Britain, and Israel decided to put their plan into action. Israel invaded Egypt on October 29, 1956, and France and Britain issued their ultimatum the next day. This cre- ated anger in Washington, for two main reasons. First, the United States had been very clear about its opposition to the use of force. 4 Second, France and Britain had deliberately kept their ally in the dark about their plan. 5 Moreover, according to Washington, the timing of the Franco- British operation was extremely bad. The American presidential elections, in which President Eisenhower was competing for reelection, were only a few days away, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was facing an uprising in Hungary. 6 In this chapter, I present a detailed narrative of the interactions that took place between the United States and Britain, and also between the United States and France, during this crisis.

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  US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Truman to Kennedy

  Responses to International Challenges

  • A. Hybel(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  Chapter 4 Dwight Eisenhower and the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 Introduction

  On October 24, representatives of the governments of Israel, France, and Great Britain held a secret meeting in Paris, where they decided to attack Egypt to reverse President Gamal Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. At the meeting, the three parties agreed that Israeli forces would advance toward the Suez Canal Zone, after which France and Britain would issue an ultimatum demanding that Israel and Egypt stop fighting and accept the occupation of the canal zone by forces from the two European countries. Certain that Cairo would reject the demand, Britain and France would then launch an air attack on Egypt, followed by an invasion. On that same day, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan decided that, if one of them were to be attacked, it would be understood as an attack upon all three. Were such a situation to unfold, the three would form a unified command to repulse the attack. As these two separate covenants were being settled, the Soviet Union ordered tens of thousands of its troops to march into Budapest to end the student demonstrations that had started the day before against the Hungarian government and its Moscow-imposed policies.1

  Israel, Britain, and France carried out the attacks on Egypt as planned. By November 2, Egypt’s air force had been destroyed, and thousands of Egyptians had been either killed or captured. Three days later, French and British forces landed in Egypt. Soon thereafter, Moscow warned British, French, and Israeli leaders that it was prepared to send Soviet air and naval forces to protect Egypt and restore peace. Moscow simultaneously proposed to Washington that the Soviet Union and the United States join forces “to restore peace and tranquility” in the Middle East and cautioned that continued fighting could lead to another world war.

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  Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis

  Reluctant Gamble

  • Jonathan Pearson(Author)
  • 2002(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  20 1 Nationalisation of the Canal: 26 July–3 August Expropriation of the Canal, the First Ministerial Meetings and the Search for a Solution The period from 26 July to 3 August 1956 comprised the initial stage of the Suez Crisis. Started by Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, during these eight days there was a flurry of diplomatic activity, particularly in Britain. Abhorring war and politically astute, Eden sought a peaceful solution, although he was unsure exactly how this could be achieved. Fearing the results of an escalation of tension, the Prime Minister attempted to win international support for condemnation of Nasser and his actions. Extensive support did not arrive instantaneously, and, in particular, US support was uncertain and slow. However, Eden continued to explore all possible solutions, exploiting political and economic sanctions backed from a position of strength with the possibility of military involvement in the background. He endorsed the NATO principle of ‘peace through strength’, hoping to employ a threat to Egypt alongside mediation with Nasser through the UN Security Council. However, misunderstandings of intention developed between the British and the Americans. This has clouded events both then and now. Confusion was increased by Cabinet’s eventual decision to employ a dual-track policy, whereby a peaceful solution of the crisis would be sought, although, in the last resort, if this failed then force might have to be employed. 1 Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 shocked Eden and the world. Less than two months before, on 10 June, the Egyptian Government had recognised the continuing validity of the concession made by the Khedive, which was to expire in 1968. 2 However, the Prime Minister remained calm despite the culmination of all his fears. He heard of the Egyptian action during dinner at Downing Street, in honour of King Feisal of Iraq, on the evening of the 26th.

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  Why Leaders Choose War

  The Psychology of Prevention

  • Jonathan Renshon(Author)
  • 2006(Publication Date)
  • Praeger

    (Publisher)

  2 Preventing What? The Suez Canal Crisis On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai. This action followed months of negotiations between Egypt, France, England, and the United States over Egyptian president Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. It is now known that Britain secretly colluded with France and Israel to wage a pre- ventive war against Egypt. The plan called for Israel to launch an attack on Egypt at a prescribed time, and England and France to send troops to Egypt in the guise of ‘‘peacekeepers’’ in order to reestablish control over the canal. However, economic pressure by the United States soon forced Britain and France out of Egypt in a rather humiliating fashion. Henry Kissinger later wrote, ‘‘by the time the smoke cleared, the Suez Crisis had destroyed the Great Power status of both Great Britain and France.’’ 1 This case study focuses on British decision-making during the crisis. It examines the Suez crisis from the nationalization of the canal through the ensuing months, and ends at the Sevres Conference, where Israel, Britain, and France made the final decision to use force. However, in order to analyze that decision, it is also necessary to trace the origins of the crises in the British policy from the early 1950s, through the building of the canal, and, finally, to the sequence of events that led British leaders to conclude that the use of force was the only option left to them. This case highlights the importance of perception in decisions regarding preventive war. The British decided to take preventive action after Egypt’s nationalization because of their perception of both Egypt’s intentions, and their own capabilities. British decision-makers, and in particular, Anthony Eden, had locked into the idea of Nasser as an ‘‘enemy’’ with evil intentions, who would try to humiliate Britain and/or blackmail it through control of the transportation of oil through the canal. Simultaneously, British leaders

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  NATO and the UN

  A Peculiar Relationship

  • Lawrence S. Kaplan(Author)
  • 2010(Publication Date)
  • University of Missouri

    (Publisher)

  The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt exposed fault lines in the Atlantic alliance that extended far beyond the Suez Canal. The canal was not only Britain’s connection to Asia—and to the oil of the Persian Gulf—it also symbolized Britain’s role as a global leader. The canal itself was a product of Anglo-French entrepreneurship and engineering and one of the crowning achievements of Britain’s imperial years during the Victorian era.

  For the United States, British control of the canal was an irritating relic of colonialism, standing in the way of America’s developing relations with the Arab Middle East. There was a perception in both Washington and London that the United States intended to replace Britain as the paramount power in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The powerful American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was an earnest of this intention. Historian Steven Freiberger attributed the final demise of British domination in the Middle East to President Eisenhower’s pressuring Prime Minister Anthony Eden from office. By January 1957 it was the Eisenhower Doctrine that committed the United States to providing military and economic aid to any country in the area that felt threatened by communism.4

  When Egyptian nationalists led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser took control of the Suez Canal in July 1956, it not only set in motion a series of events that culminated in an abortive Anglo-French effort to retake the canal and overthrow Nasser. It was also the ultimate humiliation in Britain’s post–World War II retreat from empire. By 1947 Britain had removed its presence from India, Palestine, and Greece but still maintained its position in Egypt, though this turned out to be short-lived. Instability in Egypt followed its defeat in the Arab war against Israel in 1948, and the repercussions were expressed in nationalist anger against the ruling elite and its British master.

  Britain’s refusal in 1950 to countenance Egyptian demands for evacuation of its Suez base led to Egypt’s abrogation in 1952 of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, the basis for Britain’s presence in that country. Britain’s hope—and that of the United States as well—was that troubles with Egypt could be subsumed under a new regional defense alliance directed against possible communist interference in the region. Such an arrangement could allow British troops to remain in the canal zone. This hope was not realized as riots shook Egypt in 1951, culminating with the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952.

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  The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956

  Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War

  • Peter L. Hahn(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • The University of North Carolina Press

    (Publisher)

  10: American Policy during the Suez Crisis, July–December 1956

  The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company seriously threatened the American quest to stabilize the Middle East by undermining Western interests in the region, significantly increasing Nasser’s prestige, and portending the spread of neutralist sentiment to the benefit of the Soviet Union. Worse, nationalization provoked a sharp tactical divergence between the United States and Britain. Embittered by Nasser’s past attacks on their diminishing position in the Middle East and alarmed by his seizure of the canal company, the British decided to use force to topple him from power. American officials continued to view Nasser as a danger to Western interests but believed that the use of force against him would only facilitate Soviet infiltration of the region. Despite American objections, frustrated British leaders, in conjunction with France and Israel, ultimately attacked Egypt. That assault ruined the Anglo-American initiative to arrange an Egyptian-Israeli peace, embittered Egypt and other Arab powers toward the West, exposed the Middle East to Soviet influence, and produced a grave schism in the Anglo-American alliance.

  The Divergence of American and BritishPolicy toward Egypt, July-October 1956

  British and American officials reacted differently to Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Prime Minister Anthony Eden and others in London viewed nationalization as a threat to their economic, strategic, and political interests in the Middle East and concluded that Nasser’s overall defiant posture justified taking steps to remove him from power. They immediately decided to use force to recapture control of the canal company and to topple Nasser. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, though regretting Nasser’s action and disturbed by his neutralist diplomacy, believed that the use of force against him would be more damaging to Western interests than nationalization. Force, they predicted, would intensify nationalism throughout the developing world and provide the Soviet Union an opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East. Calculating that the likelihood of force would dimmish as time passed, American officials implemented diplomatic initiatives that were designed to resolve the canal dispute peacefully and especially to prevent the British from resorting to hostilities.

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  Reassessing Suez 1956

  New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath

  • Simon C. Smith(Author)
  • 2016(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  At the time, Nasser spoke encouragingly of the dawn of ‘a new era of co-operation and mutual understanding’. His creation of a Suez Canal Committee the same month as the agreement was concluded commenced the planning that would lead to 26 July 1956, the start of the Suez crisis. ‘Britain’, Nasser declared in his Alexandria speech:

  is not to interfere in our affairs. She nationalised iron, steel, transport and maritime transport. Nobody asked her why she is nationalising them. She is free regarding her joint-stock companies and we are free regarding our joint stock companies, to nationalise what we want, to nationalise and leave alone what we want to leave alone. England has nothing to do with us and England is causing a clamour. Does she believe that we are part of the British Crown or that we belong to British imperialists? Egypt today is a free and independent state. She will guard her independence and will guard her freedom.90

  The charismatic Egyptian leader was determined to achieve true independence for his country, which meant gaining and keeping control of the famous waterway built by Egyptian labour once the last British troops left the Canal Zone, which they did on 13 June 1956. After nationalization, against a backdrop of over seventy years of subservience to the British, Nasser remained resolute in parrying any diplomatic solutions which smacked of colonialism. Throughout the summer, the Egyptians rejected all attempts to form an international administration, leading Britain and France, in collusion with Israel, to seek a military solution. In the process, the British nightmare of a Canal blocked for months91 finally came to pass with the Egyptians sinking ships (ironically, largely owned by the Canal Company) in retaliation for the Anglo-French invasion.

  1 J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800–1953

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  Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC, 1952-1957

  • Ennio Di Nolfo(Author)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • De Gruyter

    (Publisher)

  It was therefore important that it should be able to show that 'all practicable steps to secure a satisfactory settlement by peaceful means' had been taken before resorting to force. 20 An identical division of opinion in the cabinet took place a fortnight later, on 11 September 1956. 21 The importance of these debates is twofold. In the first place they clearly demonstrate those issues which the decision-makers felt to be at stake in the Suez crisis. Secondly, however, they also reveal that, whatever the attitude of the United States, world opinion, or the Labour party opposition in Britain, the advocates of a military solution inside the British government were virtually compelled to 'go slow' in order to carry the rest of their colleagues with them. Indeed, it could be argued, as Guy Millard did in his classified report on the crisis, that the government came close at the end of September and beginning of October to abandoning its twin objective of restoring international control over the Canal and toppling Colonel Nasser's regime when it gave serious consideration to an Indian proposal for agreed international supervision of 20 C. M. (56) 62nd Conclusions, Minute 2, CAB 128/30, Part II, PRO. 2 ' C. M. (56) 64th Conclusions, Minute 4, CAB 128/30, Part II, PRO. Aspects of the Suez Crisis 53 Egyptian management of the Canal under the auspices of the United Nations. What killed this plan, however, was the absence of effective sanctions in the event of Egypt's defaulting upon its obligations. 22 2. Relations with France Since the Suez Canal Company, which managed the Canal before its nation-alisation, was registered in France, it was inevitable that the French government would have been concerned with the outcome of the crisis, even if it had not had other grounds for dispute with Colonel Nasser's regime: viz.

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  The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine

  The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57

  • R. Takeyh(Author)
  • 2000(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  6 The Suez Crisis 124 Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal led both Washington and London to question their approach to the Middle East conundrum. In the United States, Egypt’s act further diminished the hope of guiding Cairo in a direction conducive to the containment doctrine. Although Omega’s initial two stages had failed, the US still saw much value in the plan. By exerting economic and political pressure on Egypt, the Americans hoped to erode the standing of the uncooperative Egyptian regime and build the walls of containment through alternative centers of power. In this sense, the Eisenhower team continued to under- estimate the ability of Egypt to condition the political climate of the Arab world. Since 1953, on various occasions, Britain acted in a manner that complicated US objectives. The British actions once again became a consideration and altered American policy in a significant manner. Whitehall saw the latest Egyptian move as an intolerable act designed to undermine its position in the Middle East and, with it, its aspira- tions for global strength. These impulses eventually propelled Britain toward collusion with France and Israel, and an actual invasion of Egypt. This contrasted with Eisenhower’s penchant for a deliberate policy that would not elevate Nasser’s prestige thus undermining the overall aim of US policy. The aim of this chapter is not to reconstruct the Suez Crisis; there are already many insightful accounts. 1 The objectives here are more mod- est, limited to an examination of US diplomacy as it sought to prevent the outbreak of a conflict that was bound to have an adverse impact on its preferred approach with the Omega Plan. Accordingly, the chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section analyzes the initial American and British views of the nationalization of the canal, and the differing perceptions about the best manner to reverse Nasser’s action.

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  Why War?

  The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez

  • Philip Smith(Author)
  • 2010(Publication Date)
  • University of Chicago Press

    (Publisher)

  T H R E E T H E S U E Z C R I S I S O F 1 9 5 6 Largely forgotten today, the Suez Crisis of 1956 should be remembered not only as one of the most significant and perplexing events in the cold war but also as an object lesson in genre politics. The unexpected outcomes and para-doxes of the episode graphically demonstrate how interpretative frameworks influence policy choices and systems of accountability. We need to begin by outlining what happened. Performing this task is not so easy as it might seem. An implicit irony is unleashed when a text about the seemingly arbitrary rep-resentation of history proffers its own version of events. We cannot stand outside of genre choice here but we do have the benefit of hindsight and the advantage of a relatively disinterested, time-distant gaze. Some kind of story is required in order to set the ball rolling, to introduce the historical sequence, and to allow the narrative accounts more endemic to events to be subsequently played off one another. So here as in the other empirical chapters I offer a brief history. It attempts to sit squarely in the low mimetic genre, providing some relatively uncontroversial facts and event information to allow readers to make sense of the diverse native interpretations that follow. In the early 1950 s a military junta overthrew the administration of Egypt’s King Farouk, whose regime was widely thought of at the time as corrupt and decadent. A prime mover in this coup d’état was a charismatic young officer named Gamal Abdel Nasser. The ensuing military government promoted a strange hybrid of socialist, pan-Arab, populist, and neutralist policy. Over the next few years Nasser’s personal power grew and he soon became his na-tion’s leader. In foreign policy Nasser assumed the role of tertius gaudens, t h e s u e z c r i s i s o f 1956 57 courting both East and West and playing off their respective advances.

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  The Middle East Between the Great Powers

  Anglo-American Conflict and Cooperation, 1952-7

  • T. Petersen(Author)
  • 2000(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  VI Prelude to Disaster: the Suez Crisis, 26 July to 29 October 1956 Eden was dining with the King of Iraq and the King’s closest advisers when he received news that Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal. His visitors left early and the Prime Minister immediately called key members of his cabinet together, and invited the French Ambassador and the American Chargé d’Affairs to participate. While technically legal, the Cabinet considered Nasser’s nationalization the last in a long series of provocations, which had to be rectified, by force if necessary. Soon, alarming messages were reaching the United States. The American reaction, however, was at first muted. Eisenhower had a series of meetings with his top advisers, but would singledhandedly determine American policy, a policy that was clear and consistent through the Suez crisis. The President would only accept the use of force under the most extreme circumstances: if American citizens or the United States were attacked. Although Dulles would sometimes ‘ad lib’ the allies, the Eisenhower administration never gave a green light for military action. Eisenhower’s initial response was far more concerned about Nasser’s inflammatory rhetoric against the United States and Hoover was instructed to lodge a strong protest to the Egyptian ambassador. While not sharing London’s alarm, Eisenhower still wanted to find a common Anglo-American response to Nasser, excluding military action. He believed that ‘Egypt was within its rights, and that until its operation of the Canal was proven incom- petent, unjust, etc., there was nothing to do’. 1 The British had requested the presence of a high-ranking American official in order to coordinate policy over Suez. With Dulles in Latin America, and unwilling to send the State Department’s second ranking officer, Hoover, Eisenhower instructed Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Robert Murphy, to go to London.

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