Abyssinian Crisis
The Abyssinian Crisis, also known as the Italo-Ethiopian War, was a conflict between Italy and Ethiopia in 1935-1936. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia led to international condemnation and highlighted the weaknesses of the League of Nations in preventing aggression. The crisis ultimately contributed to the erosion of the League's authority and the onset of World War II.
6 Key excerpts on "Abyssinian Crisis"
eBook - ePubCollision of Empires
Italy's Invasion of Ethiopia and its International Impact
- G. Bruce Strang, G. Bruce Strang(Authors)
- 2016(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
...Both men pointed out that the conflict was liable to morph into a protracted insurgency against Italian occupation. 63 Described this way the Ethiopian War comes into focus as an African tragedy with appalling human costs rather than merely the latest in a seemingly unending series of European diplomatic crises. 64 While it may be laudable to excise the European strategic dimension from the crisis the better to highlight the African suffering occasioned by the War, this was never the central preoccupation among French – or, indeed, British – policymakers. As so often with Africa’s twentieth century wars, only the wider strategic ramifications of the conflict, specifically the greater likelihood of additional clashes between competing European colonial interests, made the Ethiopian War a genuinely international ‘crisis’. Shifting our attention from Europe to Africa by analysing French empire security concerns brings this point home. 62 Alberto Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935–1941 (Lawrenceville, N.J., 1997), pp. 55–86; Bahru Zewde, ‘The Ethiopian Intelligentsia and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1941’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 26/2 (1993): pp. 280–83. 63 Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Nantes, Rome Embassy file 496, nos. 102 and 136, Bodard, Addis Ababa telegrams to Foreign Ministry, 24 March and 18 May 1936; no. 77, Colonel Guillon, ‘Rapport au sujet des effectifs de l’armée italienne en Afrique orientale’, 3 March 1936; Alain Rouaud, ‘Les Contacts Secrets Italo-Éthiopiens du Printemps 1936 d’après les Archives Françaises’, Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente 37/4 (1982): pp. 400–411. 64 Colonial populations in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, and African-Americans were, as Jason Parker puts it, ‘galvanized’ by the conflict, see: Jason C. Parker, Brother’s Keeper...
eBook - ePub- George Padmore(Author)
- 2019(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
...Chapter IV Abyssinia—A Pawn in European Diplomacy “The people of Abyssinia are anxious to do right … but throughout their history they have seldom met with foreigners who did not desire to possess themselves of Abyssinian territory and to destroy their independence.”—E MPEROR H AILE S ELASSIE in a note to the League of Nations, dated June 9, 1926. B EFORE discussing the political circumstances which made it possible for Italy to launch her barbarous attack upon Abyssinia, it is necessary to review the historical relations of this ancient African kingdom with Western Europe. Such a background is essential for a clear understanding of how it came about that England and France, the so-called defenders and champions of “Collective Security”, betrayed this country to a Fascist Power. The answer is that Abyssinia, as we shall show, has always been a pawn in European diplomacy, and, as such, has been sacrificed in the interests of Imperialism. Although Abyssinia had had contact with Europe as early as the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese came to its aid, in its struggle against Islamic invaders, 1 it was only during the ’nineties of the last century, when the great European Powers were scrambling for territories in Africa, that the West began to take a great interest in Abyssinia. 1 1 C. R. Markham: A History of the Abyssinian Expedition. 1 In 1869, England despatched an expedition under Napier against King Theodore, who killed himself rather than fall into the hands of the British. See Markham: A History of the Abyssinian Expedition. It was during this period that Italy, thwarted in her first attempt to obtain a footing in North Africa, thanks to the annexation of Tunis by France, turned towards Abyssinia. The Italians first established themselves at Assab on the Red Sea...
...The war itself was a predictable Fascist adventure in Africa, designed both to demonstrate Mussolini’s military power and to right the perceived injustice of the 1919 settlement which denied Italy substantial colonial gains. The memory of Italy’s humiliating defeat at Adowa at the hands of the Ethiopians in 1896 was also a strong motivating factor in Mussolini’s desire to annex the backward African kingdom and please the nationalist wing of Fascism. The end of the old diplomacy, 1932–35 A more traditional view of Mussolini’s foreign policy is that he attempted in the period before the Ethiopian War to balance Italy between the Anglo-French bloc and Germany. The de Felice school of historians takes this view and highlights the importance of the abortive Four Power Pact (the four powers being Italy, Germany, France and Britain), known in Italy as ‘Mussolini’s pact’ and the result of an Italian initiative in 1933. 2 Designed to achieve a general European settlement and a recognition of Italy’s status as a great power, the Pact was never ratified. But ‘there does seem to be much that is classically Italian’ 3 about the Pact, as one of Mussolini’s biographers has suggested. As the weakest of the European Great Powers, it was logical for Italy to press for a general settlement that would redress both German and Italian grievances without causing a major readjustment which would unduly strengthen any of these powers (Mussolini would certainly oppose any change in Austria’s status). Whether it can be claimed, as de Felice does, that Mussolini continued to seek a policy of balance after the Ethiopian War is another matter entirely, however. The Austrian crisis The appointment of Adolf Hitler as German Chancellor in January 1933 carried with it the threat that Germany might seek to alter the status of Austria, which was forbidden by the Versailles Treaty from unifying with Germany...
eBook - ePubBetween the Wars 1919-1939
The Cartoonists' Vision
- Dr Roy Douglas, Roy Douglas(Authors)
- 2016(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
...14 Abyssinia, 1935–6 Even before the Stresa Conference of April 1935, there were indications that the Italian government had some sort of designs on Abyssinia – or, as it is now known, Ethiopia. We may speculate as to how far the eventual attack was planned at that stage, and how much of this was a reaction to the very limited achievements at Stresa, and concern to prove to Germany that Italy was a strong power with whose interests it would be unwise to tamper. Italy had two east African colonies, Italian Somaliland and Eritrea, which bordered Abyssinia. During the spring and summer of 1935, Italian warlike preparations developed, although several attempts were made to secure a compromise arrangement between the two countries. No attack could be made with any hope of success until the end of the rainy season. When the attack came, on 2 October, nobody was taken by surprise. The League of Nations promptly condemned the Italian aggression, and soon began to apply a policy of economic sanctions against Italy. Sanctions, however, were always somewhat half-hearted, and the oil sanctions which might have been effective against the Italian operations were never applied. The roles of Britain and France were of critical importance, for they were acknowledged great powers, with enormous overseas possessions and interests, but they were also the leading members of the League of Nations. The two governments deplored the Italian attack, and agreed to support sanctions; but they did not see matters in an identical light. On the whole, the British were more disposed to favour a strong line, even though the Cabinet reacted rather nervously when naval advisers pointed out the danger of a surprise Italian attack in the Mediterranean...
eBook - ePubSudan
The Reconquest Reappraised
- Edward M. Spiers, Edward M. Spiers(Authors)
- 2013(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
...6 Italy, Abyssinia and the Sudan, 1885-98 JOHN GOOCH Italy's presence in the Red Sea, signalled with her acquisition of the port of Assab as a trading post in 1882 and confirmed with the appearance of a military force at Massowah on 5 February 1885, had much to do with the collapse of Egypt's hold over the Sudan in the face of the Mahdia which broke out in 1881. Italian ambitions were fuelled no less by the prospect of carving out a sphere of influence in East Africa, with British consent and at the cost of a weakened Egypt, than they were by the hope that assisting London in a time of difficulty would lead to a partnership which would safeguard Italy's interests in the Mediterranean, From these beginnings, an Italian colonial policy of expansion on to the altopiano of Eritrea developed which brought Italy into collision with the most powerful native forces in Africa. Abyssinia had already shown its military teeth: in the face of an expansionist policy begun by Khedive Ismail in 1871, Emperor Johannes IV had smashed two military expeditions against him at the battle of Gundet in 1875 and then at the battle of Gura in 1876. 1 However, the tempting opportunity which the Italians mistakenly thought they perceived in the currents of Abyssinian tribal politics was reinforced by the fact that the Abyssinian Empire was intermittently under dervish attack. Likewise, military successes against the dervishes encouraged the Italians to believe that they could master the Abyssinian forces. The outcome of Italy's military adventuring, her disastrous defeat at Adowa on 1 March 1896, was to see the entire relationship with London turned on its head and, in the process, launch Kitchener's reconquest of the Sudan. Italy had missed out on an important opportunity to involve itself in Egyptian affairs alongside Great Britain in 1882: formally invited to join with Britain and France in the protection of the Suez Canal on 27 July, foreign minister Mancini had declined...
eBook - ePub- Ruth Henig(Author)
- 2010(Publication Date)
- Haus Publishing(Publisher)
...For Britain, eliminating a naval race with Germany for the next few years would give her the time to deal with the threat from Japan and seemed to make good, pragmatic sense, but to France the agreement signalled British betrayal and an obvious breach in the anti-German ‘front’ which Laval was working so hard to try to construct. Once again the two leading Geneva powers were seriously divided, just as Mussolini began to put into effect his plans for Italian expansion in north-east Africa. Italy had pursued colonial ambitions in this region since the late 19th century, but had the unenviable distinction of being the only European power to have suffered serious military defeat there, at the hands of Abyssinian warriors armed with modern French rifles at the Battle of Adowa in 1896. Since that time, the Italian government had sought agreements with Britain and France to adjust their respective colonial claims in North Africa and to establish an Italian sphere of economic interest covering the western part of Abyssinia. Abyssinia’s application for League membership in 1923 had been contentious because of the prevalence of domestic slavery there and evidence of the active involvement of many of its inhabitants in the North African slave trade and in raiding neighbouring areas for booty and for slaves...
