Politics & International Relations
Individual Rights in the Constitution
Individual rights in the Constitution refer to the fundamental liberties and protections guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution. These rights include freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, as well as protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right to due process. The Constitution serves as a safeguard for individual rights and ensures that the government respects and upholds these rights.
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8 Key excerpts on "Individual Rights in the Constitution"
eBook - PDF- R. Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin, Andrew J. Nathan(Authors)
- 2019(Publication Date)
- Columbia University Press(Publisher)
Finally, political rights in any society are affected by arrangements Political Rights 83 for interpretation and enforcement of the constitution. In the United States, for example, the doctrine of judicial review has proven crucial for protecting rights. I will describe where each Chinese constitution placed the power to interpret rights. Rights in constitutions are not coterminous with rights in practice. Some of the most oppressive political systems in history have been founded on beautiful-sounding and well-argued theories of rights. Some of the societies where rights are most vital lack clear constitutional or legal theories to support them. In England rights are established mainly by the force of legal tradition and public opinion. Rights were mentioned only in passing in the French constitution of 1958, but were well articulated in other widely accepted political and legal writings. 5 In the American constitution rights were an afterthought. Similarly, the institutions that defend rights—courts, procuracies, legislatures, private associations, po-litical parties, trade unions—may be elaborately described in a constitution but weak in practice, or may be vigorous without clear constitutional sanction, as in the case of political parties and ju-dicial review in the United States. Still further, the accepted content of a given right changes in response to political pressures and tides of public belief. The meaning of equal protection of the law, for example, has expanded vastly in recent decades in the United States. 6 judges, politicians, and the public decide what a particular right means in a particular case, and say when it has to give way to an overriding social interest. Constitutions may or may not ac-commodate such legal and political developments either in pros-pect, leaving room for rights to evolve or be restricted in the future, or in retrospect, incorporating changes through amendment or revision.
eBook - PDF- B Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, B Guy Peters, Jon Pierre(Authors)
- 2006(Publication Date)
- SAGE Publications Ltd(Publisher)
Rights come in all shapes and sizes. For example, the constitution of the United Nations includes a Universal Declaration of Human Rights which itself articulates into international agreements on five types of rights: civil, politi-cal, economic, social and cultural. 6 At one level, constitutions and rights com-prise a basic field of policy attention, and this is clearly evident when new nations debate precisely what sort of constitution and what range of rights are appropriate for their cir-cumstances. Older nations also revisit the policy design of constitutions and rights, often reforming either the explicit legal provisions or the spirit of the laws to bring out new policy possibilities from old legal instruments. Over CONSTITUTIONS AND RIGHTS 171 the last half century we have also seen that nation-states can agree to submit to various international constitutions, either loose arrange-ments like the United Nations or tighter arrangements like the European Union. At whatever level, constitutions and rights can restrain the policy process when policy partic-ipants feel constrained to modify their conduct and their policy ambitions consistent with the legal norms associated with constitutions and rights. In this sense, constitutions and rights are thought to be ‘off limits’ to the policy process, providing the boundaries of accept-able policy for those engaged in the political contest over policy options. At yet another level, the democratic policy process is never really locked down by unchangeable legal con-straints and is best understood as a work in progress, with few limits to the policy implica-tions capable of being derived – by executive, legislative or judicial institutions – from con-stitutions and rights. Even in the absence of formal change, constitutions and rights are used in new ways to reflect changing commu-nity standards by policy actors across the system of government.
- Mark Van Hoecke(Author)
- 2004(Publication Date)
- Hart Publishing(Publisher)
For these interpretations we look not only to courts, polit-ical parties, and statesmen, but also to writers on constitutional law and jurisprudence, and to the more enduring writings of all kind that bear on a society’s political society’ ( Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, § 7.2). 145 In our introduction we highlighted some basic political texts, such as the German Constitution and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that were centered around the notion of person. However, not all rights and liberties are linked to the notion of person (some protect the ‘human being’ or ‘everyone’), and not all basic texts in the Western world have the same ethical content, as the German one, drafted after Word-War II, with the atrocities of Hitler in mind. It is amusing in this regard to look at the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Some of Rawls’ intuitive ideas find a strong echo in the Preamble stating that ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. Nevertheless, there is talk of ‘human beings’ not ‘persons’ in the opening articles. Cf Article 1: ‘ All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’. Article 2: ‘ Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, with-out distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty’.
eBook - PDFBeyond Human Rights
The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law
- Anne Peters, Jonathan Huston(Authors)
- 2016(Publication Date)
- Cambridge University Press(Publisher)
17 The International Individual Right The term of the international individual right encapsulates the legal status of the individual in international law, where that legal status is not based purely on the consensus of States. The term of the interna- tional individual right is meant to encode the primary international legal personality of the individual. “Primary” is here meant in an ethical and doctrinal sense. I will in the following use the word subjective interna- tional right as a synonym, because in some legal traditions the term of the subjective right is well known. The concept of an international individual right is not unknown to international law. 1 It is found in international case law and decisions of regional human rights courts as “individual right” 2 or “personal right”, 3 without detailed explanation or questioning of these terms. On various occasions, EU courts 4 (i.e., the 1 See for a discussion of “droits ‘subjectifs’” of the individual in international law Emmanuel Roucounas, Facteurs privés et droit international public, Recueil des Cours 299 (2002), 9–419 (42–48), with further references. 2 ICJ, LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2001, 466, para- graph 77 (“individual rights”); ICJ, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2004, 12, paragraph 40 (“individual rights”); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1 October 1999, paragraph 84 (“individual rights”). 3 ECtHR, Emine Araç v. Turkey, No. 9907/02, 23 December 2008, paragraph 24 (education as a “personal right” and accordingly a “civil right” as referred to in Article 6 ECHR); ECtHR, Enea v. Italy, No. 74912/01, 23 September 2008, paragraph 103 (social contact of a prisoner as a “personal right” and accordingly a “civil right” as referred to in Article 6 ECHR).
eBook - PDF- Roger Trigg(Author)
- 2008(Publication Date)
- Wiley-Blackwell(Publisher)
3 Human rights The Political Context Views about natural law have become closely connected with talk of ‘natural rights’, which was given great impetus by the English philosopher of the seventeenth century, John Locke. He in turn is often credited with having provided the philosophical basis for the American Declaration of Independ-ence. Such talk gets its cogency from the implication that ‘rights’ are deeply ingrained in the nature of things. Above all, of course, they are then linked to our own nature as human beings. Yet this is not just of historical interest, since appeals to rights form a large part of contemporary moral language. ‘Human rights’ are the currency of much contemporary moral discourse, and form a potent weapon in international relations. People get particularly indignant when they feel their rights have not been met. Moral campaigns are often couched in the language of human rights. At a time when natural law itself is often neglected, this may seem curious. Yet in politics the language of rights, both within nations and in relations between them, has its effect. It can empower victims, and give them an opportunity to appeal to standards beyond their own social context. What precisely is being appealed to? What are human rights, and how can they be enforced? What are they grounded in (if anything) and how can we tell the difference between a legitimate and a spurious right? ‘Rights’ are often appealed to in a vague way. Increasingly the laws of various countries are required to take notice of human rights, and there is a major question of interpretation. Often the rights are underspecified. The United States has always allowed judges to veto legislation on the ground that it trans-gresses basic constitutional rights. In the United Kingdom the doctrine was always that Parliament was sovereign, but in recent years judicial review of legislation has become increasingly common.
eBook - PDFA Sociology of Transnational Constitutions
Social Foundations of the Post-National Legal Structure
- Chris Thornhill(Author)
- 2019(Publication Date)
- Cambridge University Press(Publisher)
In this process, notably, internationally constructed rights were usually defined as rights held individually, by singular persons. To be sure, early human rights documents were never solely focused on a lib- eral, singular construction of rights, and they made clear provisions for social rights. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) established some advanced social rights, including the right to work and the right to a decent standard of living. International instruments then placed greater emphasis on social rights from 1960s onwards. This began with the approval of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). As dis- cussed further, human rights instruments in Latin America and Africa ultimately gave very extensive recognition to social rights. Generally, however, the international human rights instruments devised after 1945 placed primary emphasis on individual rights; social rights were orig- inally only weakly enforceable, and of questionable legal status (see Vierdag 1978: 105). Even in international courts giving high salience to social rights, some such rights have not easily proved justiciable. 5 At different points in the post-war political system, therefore, neither national sovereignty, nor constituent power, nor collective interests, but single international human rights began to form the basic consti- tutional mainstay for acts of legal/political inclusion. In different con- texts, singular rights slowly became the primary normative premise for the legitimacy of legal and political functions. This chapter examines this progressive shift from national sovereignty to international human rights in the constitutional fabric of the emerging global society, or the emerging global political system, after 1945, and it outlines the main changes in global normative order at this time.
- Miriam Aziz(Author)
- 2004(Publication Date)
- Hart Publishing(Publisher)
Once upon a time, political rights existed as part of the exclusive relationship between the state and its subjects. Moreover, once upon a time, rights could be neatly compartmentalised in terms of ‘political’, ‘social’ and ‘civil’ rights. 38 With the rise of globalisation and the growth of suprana-tional and international organisations, both were called into question. However, it was not so much a case of being confined to the annals of his-tory, but rather, both were recalibrated as part of the overall process of the reconfiguration of state sovereignty. The amendments introduced as part of the Maastricht Treaty did, how-ever, usher the concept of rights back into the fray of European integration, rather like a phoenix which rose from the ashes of a citizenship debate which had been crippled by years of theoretical exhaustion. An implication of the rights critique developed by inter alia the Critical Legal Studies movement 39 was that exhaustion very soon developed into a state of chronic fatigue, for which there was very little motivation to snap out of until the 1980s. 40 The return of rights from exile from the common fray of the pursuit of ideas meant that citizenship was also, to some extent, rehabilitated and viewed not only in a more favourable light 41 but also as having potential, 42 albeit for citizens only. This served to perpetuate the perennial link between citi-zenship and rights forged foremost during the era of state formation. This 19 th century legacy has also influenced the ways in which rights are both conceived and perceived. Thus, for example, the influence of classical state theory informed much of the initial response to EU citizenship. Political Rights 73 35 Se UK Preuß, ‘Problems of a Concept of European Citizenship’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 267. 36 TH Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950). 37 As Harold MacMillan viewed the privatisation of public services.
- Günter Hoog, Angela Steinmetz, Günter Hoog, Angela Steinmetz(Authors)
- 2020(Publication Date)
- De Gruyter(Publisher)
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights December 19, 1966 BGB1 1973 II, 1534; 999 U.N.T.S. 171 Preamble THE STATES PARTIES T O THE PRESENT C O V E N A N T , CONSIDERING that, in a c c o r d a n c e with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, rec-ognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all m e m b e r s of the h u m a n family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, R E C O G N I Z I N G that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the h u m a n person, RECOGNIZING that, in a c c o r d a n c e with the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights, the ideal of f r e e h u m a n beings e n j o y i n g civil and po-litical freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions a r e created w h e r e b y e v e r y -one may e n j o y his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights, CONSIDERING the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to p r o m o t e universal respect lor, and o b s e r v a n c e of, h u m a n rights and freedoms, REALIZING that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he be-longs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and ob-s e r v a n c e of the rights recognized in the present C o v e n a n t , AGREE upon the following articles: Part I A r t i c l e 1 1. All peoples h a v e the right of sell-determination. By virtue of that right they freely d e t e r m i n e their po-litical status and freely p u r s u e iheir economic, social and cultural develop-ment. 2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural weallh and resources without pre-judice to any obligations arising out of international o i o n o m i c i o -o p e r a -tion, based upon the principle ol mutual benelit, and international law. In no c a s e may a people be deprived of its o w n m e a n s of subsistence.
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