Politics & International Relations
Legislative Veto
A legislative veto is a mechanism that allows a legislative body to override or nullify a specific action taken by the executive branch, such as a regulation or decision. This gives the legislature a check on the power of the executive, ensuring a system of checks and balances. However, the constitutionality of legislative vetoes has been a subject of debate and legal challenge.
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eBook - PDFThe Power of Separation
American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto
- Jessica Korn(Author)
- 2020(Publication Date)
- Princeton University Press(Publisher)
CHAPTER THREE forceful continuing expression of the congressional resurgence against executive power that began in the early 1970s. 4 Tracing the political controversies that grew up around the legisla-tive veto shows that there was good reason why analysts of American politics expected it to have profound consequences for the balance of power between the branches. But empirical analysis of the veto provi-sions that were actually enacted into law reveals that these expecta-tions were ill-founded. These expectations overlooked the extensive oversight powers, all perfectly constitutional, possessed by Congress. These expectations also exaggerated the capacity of the Legislative Veto to actually affect policy outcomes. To determine the real political significance of the innovative constitutional shortcut requires empiri-cal analysis that, unlike existing studies, is free of distorted assump-tions about how the separation of powers system works. Most impor-tantly, it demands that scholars reject the mistaken assumption that the constitutional system restricts Congress's policy making power solely to the formal authority to pass laws. THE POLITICS OF THE Legislative Veto'S CONSTITUTIONALITY The majority in Chadha invalidated the Legislative Veto based on a straightforward reading of the constitutional requirements for legisla-tive action. 5 The Legislative Veto was unconstitutional, Chief Justice Burger reasoned, because it authorized members of Congress to by-pass the bicameralism and presentment clauses of Article I. 6 But to Justice White, the Legislative Veto was a welcome example of constitutional evolution. The extraordinary twentieth-century growth in the complexity and size of the Federal Government's re-sponsibilities had made the Legislative Veto, in White's mind, the most effective if not the only means to insure [Congress's] role as the Nation's lawmaker.
eBook - ePubThe Legislative Veto
Congressional Control Of Regulation
- Barbara Craig(Author)
- 2019(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
- Military and domestic public works projects involving real estate transactions and construction projects were also targeted for Legislative Veto review during World War II, but in these instances the review power was lodged at the committee level. Similar Legislative Veto power over public works projects has been added in subsequent decades up to and including the present.
- During the 1970s, Legislative Veto scrutiny was extended to presidential initiatives in the domestic arena in reaction to the "imperial presidency. "
- The major surge in new Legislative Veto provisions during the seventies was in the area of agency-level action, i.e., agency-developed rules, regulations, plans, schedules, forms, and guidelines.
While constitutional concerns have not served so far to inhibit the spread of Legislative Veto provisions, it is nonetheless important to address the substance of the constitutional challenges. Such an assessment is especially critical in light of the number of court cases that are currently winding their way through the courts.Constitutional Issues of the Legislative Veto
In fashioning a government intended to preserve and protect the liberty of its citizens, the Founding Fathers relied on the principle of separation of powers and the countervailing principle of checks and balances. Power was to be divided among the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches, and as a check against its misuse, each branch was given some power over the others.The Constitution of the United States vests legislative power in the Congress (Article 1, Section 1), the power to execute the laws passed by Congress in the executive (Article 2, Sections 1, 4), and judicial power in the judiciary (Article 3, Sections 1, 2). Each of these grants of power is limited by other constitutional requirements. Provisions of the so-called Presentation Clause (Article 1, Section 7) make the legislative power subject to the restraint of a presidential veto--a power that is in turn restrained by allowing for two-thirds of both houses of Congress to override a presidential veto. A requirement for the advice and consent of the Senate (Article 2, Section 2) restrains the constitutional authority of the president to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, justices of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States (Article 2, Section 2). The president's role in presenting measures for legislative consideration is constitutionally assured as well (Article 2, Section 3).
eBook - ePub- Emiliano Grossman, Nicolas Sauger(Authors)
- 2013(Publication Date)
- Taylor & Francis(Publisher)
It is worth noting that the different types of texts scrutinised by the council have not been equally vetoed in number and proportion between 1959 and the end of the Villepin government in 2007. The lowest level of veto is associated with the constitutional laws. The Constitutional Court has always refused to rule on any constitutional amendments. The organic laws and parliamentary rules have been vetoed once out of every five times (21.6 and 22.4 per cent respectively). Ten international agreements have been referred and 60 per cent of them were ruled unconstitutional. Finally, more than one ordinary law in every two (51.6 per cent) has been vetoed at least partially. If this proportion is lower than the previous one, it applies to a very large set of texts: 188 ordinary laws out of 363 have failed to avoid a constitutional veto. Thus, constitutional vetoes are closely associated with ordinary laws. Since 1974, the increasing council scrutiny on laws has been associated with both a high number and proportion of vetoes. Nevertheless, the meaning of a constitutional veto of a law depends greatly on its timing. A high rate (but low number) of vetoes characterises the old constitutional politics. Partial veto was the outcome of eight out of nine referred ordinary laws during 1959–74. But the main portion of these vetoes (five out of eight) was not at the expense of the government. In fact, the prime minister triggered referrals to avoid some policies preferred by the legislative majority. And the Constitutional Council protected the executive powers by vetoing the referred laws. In 1961 and 1963, its rulings acknowledged the inadmissibility of amendments increasing expenses or reducing revenues as a motive of its veto on a part of both laws. In 1960, 1964 and 1970, laws were partially vetoed according to the principle that they did not comply with the distinction between law and regulation in the French Constitution (arts.34 and 37). In these five cases, the veto is against the legislative majority and in favour of the government. Conversely, the only ruling of conformity in 1968 was de facto a defeat of the government. The prime minister did not succeed in erasing a parliamentary amendment that limited the government's ability to affect the resources of local governments. At that time, by using its veto, the Constitutional Council enforced the rationalised parliamentarianism. The two exceptions were both laws referred by the president of the Senate at the end of the old constitutional politics period, in 1971 and 1973. Both vetoes were clearly a defeat for the legislative majority and the government. For the first time, constitutional veto meant a victory for a legislative minority. At the end of 1974, the first referral drafted by the parliamentary minority followed this same logic. Since then, this has been the meaning of the constitutional vetoes. A constitutional veto means that the Constitutional Council rejects some policies adopted by the legislative majority. Thus the meaning of a constitutional veto has changed dramatically: from the protection of government against the legislative majority to the invalidation of policies supported by the legislative majority and the government following the claims of a legislative minority.Thus, new and old constitutional politics differ in terms of the initiators, the intensity, the content and the outcomes of the constitutional review. The meaning of the council's vetoes has also radically changed. Highly visible and frequent, constitutional vetoes are one of the key features of the new constitutional politics in France. So, explaining veto politics is crucial to understand new constitutional politics in France and its impact on the French political system. The next section of the article reviews the traditional explanations of veto politics in order to understand the French patterns.
eBook - PDFThe American Governor
Power, Constraint, and Leadership in The States
- David P. Redlawsk(Author)
- 2015(Publication Date)
- Palgrave Macmillan(Publisher)
More generally, we assess how the specifics of gover- nors’ veto powers condition their influence over the legislative process. Few political institutions are as consequential for lawmaking as the executive veto. All current governors share the president’s prerogative to veto unfavorable legislation. The sequence is roughly the same for 32 ● Robert J. McGrath, Jon C. Rogowski, and Josh M. Ryan governors as for presidents—after each legislative chamber passes the same version of a bill, it goes to the executive for signature. A gover- nor can assent, veto, or remain silent, with the latter leading to bill passage or failure, depending on the specific “pocket veto” rules and time remaining in the legislative session. This ability to negate legisla- tive action is among a governor’s few formal legislative powers. Yet, the influence the veto affords is constrained by the legislature’s ability to override vetoes with the support of a specified proportion of each chamber. Although there are many nuances to state veto rules, we are primarily interested in how variation in these override thresholds affects gubernatorial influence over the legislative process. We view this question through the lens of institutional design and speak to historical and ongoing attempts to reform particular override thresholds in the states. Much research has demonstrated that the rules governing political organization and policymaking are important pre- cisely because they affect political outcomes. Reformers attempt, often successfully, to change the “rules of the game,” with a sense of the con- sequences of their proposed reforms. It was in this tradition that Bruce Rauner sought to increase the Illinois governor’s legislative influence. 2 This type of exercise is not new. The framers of the federal and early state constitutions all engaged in thought experiments about how par- ticular institutional arrangements might play out in time.
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