Politics & International Relations
The Federalist Papers
"The Federalist Papers" is a collection of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to promote the ratification of the United States Constitution. The essays address the structure and function of the government, the need for a strong central authority, and the importance of checks and balances. They remain a significant source for understanding the intentions of the framers of the Constitution.
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6 Key excerpts on "The Federalist Papers"
- eBook - ePub
- (Author)
- 2017(Publication Date)
- Canterbury Classics(Publisher)
(1787–88)FEDERALIST NO. 1.GENERAL INTRODUCTION For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787 ALEXANDER HAMILTONTo encourage New York to ratify the U.S. Constitution, Founding Fathers Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote The Federalist Papers, eighty-five essays and articles that explained the need for a Constitution and discussed many other political issues. At the time, the essays were published anonymously under the pseudonym “Publius,” a popular Latin name in ancient Rome that also gave us the word “populous.” The Federalist Papers became the premier companion to the U.S. Constitution and are still used by federal courts today, including the U.S. Supreme Court, to interpret that document. Several of the most important papers are included here.T o the People of the State of New York:After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Federal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the Union, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind. - eBook - PDF
- Jack N. Rakove, Colleen A. Sheehan(Authors)
- 2020(Publication Date)
- Cambridge University Press(Publisher)
Jay’s five essays fit seamlessly into the broader plan, and it is largely through our knowledge of his authorship that we may discern his distinct contribution to the series. His first four essays (Fed. 2–5) appeared between October 31 and November 10 in the Independent Journal, the New York City daily in which most of The Federalist Papers initially appeared. In the first bound volume of the complete series, Jay’s four numbers fall under the heading of “Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence” and constitute a subset of “The Utility of the UNION to your Political Prosperity” (Fed. 2–14). In the lead essay, Hamilton had already linked the fate of the American Union to that of the proposed Constitution, an ingenious if disputable equation that raised the stakes of the ratification contest dramatically. For “Publius,” the people were not being asked to choose between the Constitution and the existing government, but between “an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union” (Fed. 1, 7). Adopting the Constitution meant preserving the Union, “the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your . happiness” (Fed. 1, 6). Rejecting it meant courting danger, disunion, and the loss of freedom. Was it not then “superfluous to prove” the truth of this syllo- gism when “the utility of the Union” is engraved upon the hearts of “the great body of the people in every State” (Fed. 1, 7)? Sadly, Hamilton observes, the debate over the Constitution will unleash “[a] torrent of angry and malignant passion” (Fed. 1, 5) “little favorable to the discovery of truth” (Fed. 1, 4). The proposed plan of government simply “affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions” to expect a calm and candid examination of its merits. - eBook - ePub
The Accessible Federalist
A Modern English Translation of 16 Key Federalist Papers
- S. Adam Seagrave(Author)
- 2017(Publication Date)
- Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.(Publisher)
The Federalist PapersFederalist 1[Hamilton]After a clear experience of the inefficiency of the existing federal government, you are now called upon to consider a new Constitution for the United States of America. The importance of this task is obvious. The very existence of the Union, the safety and welfare of the parts composing it, and the fate of the developing American empire depend upon it. It has often been said that the conduct and example of the American people may answer an important question for mankind: Are societies capable of establishing good government from their own reflection and choice, or are they forever destined to have governments imposed upon them through chance and violence?1 If there is any truth to this opinion, now is the time when our answer will be given. If we fail to make the right choice, our failure may deserve to be considered the general misfortune of mankind.This adds the motive of philanthropy to that of patriotism in leading responsible and good citizens to care deeply about this task of considering the Constitution. Although I hope that our decision will be guided by a balanced estimate of our true interests, this is more a wish than an expectation. The proposed Constitution affects too many particular interests and changes too many local institutions. As a result of this, discussions of the proposed Constitution will often involve a variety of topics irrelevant to its merits, and will reflect many views, passions, and prejudices opposed to the discovery of truth.One of the most difficult obstacles the new Constitution will encounter will be the obvious interest of many state-level politicians and officials in resisting any change which might diminish their power. Then there is also the misguided ambition of those who will try to take advantage of general political instability for their own gain, or try to encourage the formation of partial confederacies of states in the hope of wielding more political power than they would within a single, larger Union. - eBook - PDF
- A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay(Authors)
- 2009(Publication Date)
- Palgrave Macmillan(Publisher)
Part I Selected Federalist Papers: Critique of the Articles of the Confederation Chapter One Federalist No. 1 General Introduction For the Independent Journal Saturday, October 27, 1787 Alexander Hamilton T o the People of the State of New York: AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind. This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unper- plexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. - eBook - PDF
The Federalist Papers
A Reader's Guide
- Kyle Scott(Author)
- 2013(Publication Date)
- Bloomsbury Academic(Publisher)
122 The Federalist Papers the protection against the passions of the majority provided by the Senate. The Senate, by being somewhat isolated from the will of the majority, will prevent the nation from being swept away by some immediate passion which is contrary to the general good. However, with the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913 1 which provided for the direct election of citizens, the entire system of checks and balances with regard to insulating the government from the passions of the majority was thrown off kilter. Acknowledging the tension between our values and the founders’ and between our amended Constitution and the original, we must raise the question as to whom, if anyone, got it right. Of course because it is the dominant opinion we are likely to say that a democracy is superior to a republic. After all, who is willing to say that we have regressed rather than progressed from 1789 to the present? But such courage is necessary if we are to examine the question with intellectual integrity. Therefore, one more reason to read The Federalist Papers is that it challenges our modern notions of what we think about the best means of governance. It forces us to question our foundational assumptions that might otherwise lie hidden from view. Paper 62 begins the discussion of the Senate. There has already been some reference to this paper above, but it deserves its own discussion as well. Publius intends to discuss, in order, the qualifica-tions of Senators, the appointment of them by the state legislatures, the equality of representation in the Senate, the number of Senators and their term for which they are to be elected, and finally the powers vested in the Senate. This paper takes the first four and leaves the fifth to be addressed by later papers. Publius does not face much opposition on the first three points and therefore dispatches them fairly quickly. - eBook - ePub
The Federalist Papers
A Reader's Guide
- Kyle Scott(Author)
- 2013(Publication Date)
- Bloomsbury Academic(Publisher)
In #64 Publius takes on the difficult task of defending the power of treaty making given to the President and the Senate. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, is given the authority to make treaties, and treaties are to have the force of law, thus binding the people to a decision made in a manner isolated from public influence. Publius begins by stating that making treaties in this way and giving them the force of law is a matter of practicality. In international relations and negotiations there is no time for deliberation and to wait for Congress to take action. The President must be able to act swiftly. In addition, because treaties are pacts made with other countries, there may be a need to keep things from public view that may either embarrass or threaten one of the involved countries. However, the argument seems to boil down to the simple fact that the people, viewed by the framers of the Constitution, were simply not sophisticated enough to be relied on in matters of high diplomacy. This is one of the fundamental principles of republican government that often goes unspoken but remains present within most arguments that favor republican government over democracy. Remember: the President and Senate were not directly accountable to the people, so putting the power of treaty making into the hands of these two entities was even further removed from the people, and thus democracy, in the eighteenth century than it is today. Publius tries to invoke the system of checks and balances as a safeguard against the President’s and Senate’s abuse of treaty-making power, but that check seems insufficient, even to Publius. Publius argues, as in earlier papers, that this power is justified in their hands, rather than in the people’s or in the House, and will not be abused, because, “As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as we as the State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens” (#64: 389). Yet “enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm” is what Publius taught us in #10, which is why there need to be institutional and legal restraints. So the reason, Publius argued in the earlier essays, is that this new Constitution does not rely on chance or enlightened statesmen to produce good government, but rather a rational calculation of man’s nature that informs the institutional structure. Yet here in #64 we get just the reverse, a system that needs enlightened statesmen. Perhaps Publius was hoping his readers had bad memories and would not recognize the contradiction, but such a contradiction might force us to question the fundamental tenets upon which Publius rests his argument.It is an interesting historical aside that John Jay was at the center of one of the greatest international controversies around the time The Federalist Papers were published. The Treaty of Paris ended the American Revolution in 1783 once Great Britain and the U.S.A. signed; but there were still some loose ends and unfulfilled promises a few years later. Jay’s Treaty, as it was known, was signed in November 1794, passed through the Senate in June 1795, and took effect in 1796 after the British government and the American President gave their approval. The general terms of the treaty stipulated that British forces would withdraw from pre-Revolutionary forts in the Northwest Territory to which it had agreed in the Treaty of Paris but had continued to occupy in the following years, war time debts were to be sent to arbitration, and America was given trade access to British possession in the Caribbean, India, and elsewhere. While the Treaty did provide many advantages to the Americans, it caused a rift between the Jeffersonians and the Federalists that helped give rise to the first political parties. Jeffersonians favored the French and thought Jay’s Treaty tied the U.S.A. too closely with their former oppressor and enemy. Furthermore, James Madison argued that the Treaty should have been ratified by the House as well since it dealt with commerce and revenue. Madison and Jay stood on opposite sides of this dispute which took place only a few years after they collaborated on The Federalist Papers
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