The UN General Assembly

11 Key excerpts on "The UN General Assembly"

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  Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on International Law

  How States Use the UN General Assembly to Create International Obligations

  • Rossana Deplano(Author)
  • 2022(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  1 Unpacking the Practice of the General Assembly 1.1 Introduction The General Assembly is an institution with unique features. Designed to give representation to each member of the United Nations, 1 effectively it acts as the representative body of the international community of states. This distinctive character stems from the universal mandate and quasi- universal membership of the United Nations. 2 At the same time, the insti- tutional role of the General Assembly as the plenary organ of the United Nations makes it an institution able to give genuine expression to world opinion, in particular through its decision-making process. Descriptions of the General Assembly abound. Scholars, delegates and journalists alike have variously referred to it as ‘the world meeting place’, 3 ‘the world’s leading forum for political discussion’ 4 and ‘the main delibera- tive, policymaking, and representative organ of the United Nations’. 5 Others see it as a world parliament 6 or, at least, as an institution with similar features. 7 For instance, some scholars argue that the General Assembly is the repository of the peoples’ entitlement to decide on issues of global concern that may affect them directly. 8 The World Summit Outcome 1 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI Art 9 para 1 (‘The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations’). 2 The membership of the General Assembly consists of the 193 UN member states. Data available at: www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-un-membership/index.html (accessed 31 May 2021). 3 J Kaufmann, United Nations Decision Making (Sijthoff & Nordhoof International Publishers 1980) 25. 4 R Higgins et al (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law: United Nations, vol I (Oxford University Press 2017) 14. 5 www.un.org/en/ga/revitalization/ (accessed 31 May 2021) (referring to the General Assembly as ‘a true, universal parliament of Nations’).

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  Global Governance and the Emergence of Global Institutions for the 21st Century

  • Augusto Lopez-Claros, Arthur L. Dahl, Maja Groff(Authors)
  • 2020(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  1 217 (III). International Bill of Human Rights, 183rd plenary meeting, December 10, 1948. 2 UN General Assembly. 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome. Resolution A/RES/60/1 adopted September 16. New York, United Nations, paragraph 135. www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/RES/60/1 paragraph 135. 3 Schwartzberg, Joseph E. 2013. Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World. Tokyo, United Nations University Press. 81 key achievements and weaknesses It is possible to have a lively debate about how representative the UNGA is, including the reasons why the founders of the United Nations embedded in the Charter the principle of one-country-one-vote for the General Assembly (Article 18 (1)); indeed, in Chapter 2 we presented the likely most plausible explanation, reflecting the rather uneven distribution of political power at the time and the desire of the Big Four to ensure a UN that would not challenge their national prerogatives. Article 18(2) identifies a number of questions on which decisions of the General Assembly are to be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, including “recommendations with respect to the maintenance of inter- national peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Coun- cil, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members” and, of course, questions relating to the budget. Other Articles of Chapter IV of the Charter on the General Assembly envisage a dual role; it shall be a body for high-level deliberation, but it will also have adminis- trative oversight of the UN system.

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  The UN General Assembly

  • M.J. Peterson(Author)
  • 2006(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  4 The General Assembly, the member states, and the rest of the UN system

  When delegates in the General Assembly adopt resolutions and decisions they are asking others to conduct themselves in particular ways. Most often these addressees are member states or elements of the UN system, but sometimes they are other intergovernmental organizations, international, national, or local NGOs, business firms or individuals. Since the assembly has no administrative machinery and lacks the resources to create material incentives or disincentives, its resolutions and decisions affect world politics only if enough of the addressees decide for their own reasons to act as the assembly suggests. It can be hard to trace the effect of assembly resolutions on NGOs, firms, and individuals because their relation is so distant. Much closer are the connections between the assembly and UN member states or other UN bodies. Examining how assembly resolutions affect their choices and conduct permits elucidating the major part of the General Assembly’s political significance.

  The General Assembly and the member states

  UN member states are the most significant addressees of assembly resolutions because governments possess most of the capabilities needed for implementing them. Unlike the League of Nations, the UN has always included all of the great powers,1 and today counts nearly all states in the world among its members. Thus it appears to have greater potential for influencing world poli-tics than did the League Assembly. Like it, however, the General Assembly does not have the same influence as a legislature in a national system. Much of the assembly’s influence arises more indirectly, through organizational decisions or influence on domestic-level political actors.

  Direct influence on member states

  Article 10 of the Charter specifies that most assembly resolutions and decisions are recommendations. Despite the scattered arguments among international lawyers that the General Assembly has acquired some legislative or quasi-legislative authority over member states noted in Chapter 1 , governments continue to regard assembly resolutions as recommendations to be followed or ignored as they chose. They can, and occasionally have, specified at the time of adoption that they regard the terms of a particular resolution as expressing legal obligations.2

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  International Organization

  Theories and Institutions

  • J. Barkin(Author)
  • 2006(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  The GA includes both the plenary body (the GA proper) and several permanent commit- tees, each of which, like the plenary GA, includes all countries that are members of the UN. It is in these committees that much of the actual negotiating and crafting of resolutions is done. The GA elects a new president and seventeen vice presidents each year from among the members of the national delegations. It thus has no sen- ior bureaucrats of its own; its senior management is drawn from within the ranks of the national delegations. The GA is therefore best seen as a forum, as a regime, rather than as an institu- tional actor. It is a place for the community of states to discuss issues of common concern, and is a creature of those states rather than an independent actor on the international stage. It does not have an executive function, although many of its subsidiary organizations do. It does, however, have significant budgetary powers (although in practice, it is the staff of the Secretariat that proposes budgets, sub- ject to the approval of the GA). The structure of the GA, with its emphasis on equal representation and majority voting, yields a voting majority for developing countries, particularly the Group of 77 (G-77), a caucus of third-world countries. 5 This gives the G-77 effective control over the distribution of much of the UN’s budget. This control, however, only matters insofar as the countries with the biggest assessments of UN dues pay up. In practice, the largest donor countries, particularly the United States, have been able to restrain the growth of UN budg- ets, and force a decline in the size of the UN’s bureaucracy, by threatening to (and, for much of the 1990s, actually proceeding to) withhold the payment of assessed dues. The GA, therefore, is in practice more democratic as a forum than as man- ager of the UN’s budget. 58 ● International Organization: Theories and Institutions

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  Second Generation United Nations

  • Guido De Marco, Michael Bartolo, De_Marco(Authors)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  The fundamental function the General Assembly performs is indeed to make all more conscious of the attitudes and interests of others and so more inclined to take account of them. The Assembly is above all what its name implies: a meeting-place, where the nations can assemble and talk and discuss their problems with each other, and together deliberate and decide upon issues instead of each pursuing their own private destinies in total isolation as once they did.

  The General Assembly would benefit if it were to meet throughout the year. There could be a first session (September to December), dealing exclusively with political and security matters; a second session on economic and related issues, a third annual session on humanitarian issues, a fourth one on human rights and related issues, and a fifth session on administration and finance.

  Such a general framework would reduce the need for global conferences, which have tended to proliferate. We would not propose their elimination, however, as at times they still have a catalytic effect on the Assembly and its decision-making process.

  The Assembly should regularly meet at two different levels: at the working level on a continuous basis; it would then be composed of permanent representatives; and at the ministerial level in order to define the general orientations and tasks assigned to the other United Nations organs. This would need to be supplemented by a brief decennial summit (as discussed above) to give it the political will and legitimacy at the highest level.

  At the working level, the permanent meeting of the Assembly could be decided, as in the case of the Ministerial sessions, by a simple resolution correcting or modifying the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure.8 Further, this change would only go in the direction that the Assembly has taken in practice. Indeed, it was originally thought that this institution would be able to complete its work in a five-or six-week session. These hopes were soon dashed. Under its own present rules, the Assembly is required at the beginning of each session to fix a closing date, but often has failed to finish its work within the prescribed time and has recessed, taking up at a resumed session those agenda items still not acted upon. Certainly, the drafters of the Charter did not intend that the Assembly should be in continuous session. However: ‘There is nothing in the Charter or in the Assembly’s Rules of Procedures to prevent one session of the Assembly from continuing until the next;’9 and this has occasionally happened;10

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  Legitimacy and Force: State Papers and Current Perspectives

  Volume 1: Political and Moral Dimensions

  • Jeane J. Kirkpatrick(Author)
  • 2018(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  Last year, appearing before this Subcommittee, I presented a kind of report card on my first sixteen months at the United Nations, in the course of which I tried to make four major points. These were:

  The UN is an important body, worthy of our attention. The UN today is not at all the institution its American founders hoped for. The UN does not reflect or represent the world in the way representative bodies usually do.

  The question for the U.S. and for all countries committed to democracy and self-determination is whether the UN can be made a more effective instrument for problem-solving and peace-making among nations, an institution which helps resolve differences rather than exacerbate them.

  Today, I would like to talk about a phenomenon that underlies these considerations, an activity which detemines whether the United Nations becomes involved in conflict resolution or conflict exacerbation. I want to talk about voting behavior in the UN, and I will try to explain why we seem so often to be on the wrong side of lopsided votes, and what this tells us about ourselves and about the UN.

  From the very earliest days of the UN, we here in the United States have had a fundamentally flawed mental picture of how issues are decided at the United Nations. We have imagined that the General Assembly, or whatever UN body is under consideration is made up of individual voting members who listen carefully to the arguments pro and con, decide what is right and just and in their country’s interest, and vote accordingly. This is what political scientists call the “rational activist” view of voting behavior.

  Why we should have believed that anything in this imperfect world would operate on a totally rational basis, is an interesting question. After all, legislatures do not behave in this way. With all respect, I may suggest it is open to question whether the Congress of the United States operates on so pure a basis of absolute rationality.

  Yet somehow, we expected that the United Nations would behave in this manner. Indeed, we profess surprise and disappointment that it does not.

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  International Law and Diplomacy

  • Charles Chatterjee(Author)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  Interestingly enough, at the time the Charter was drafted, two broad issues, among others, received the attention of the drafters: (a) the issue of international peace and security; and (b) socio-economic issues, including development and human rights. In so far as the first issue is concerned, the stronger military powers, led by the United States, placed much emphasis on the Security Council and provided that it would have enforcement powers, which, in effect, stands for conferring powers on it to issue legally binding resolutions.

  The General Assembly, on the other hand, was thought to be a forum for discussion generally, of all matters; thus the question of endowing it with the power to adopt binding resolutions would not arise9 . This perception still prevails, in general, without appreciating that the General Assembly has adopted binding resolutions, namely, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 1950 or the Resolution entitled Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 196210 . The controversy surrounding the legal effect of the resolutions passed by The UN General Assembly may be considered from several points of view: (a) nowhere in the UN Charter has it been mentioned that the General Assembly resolutions will be devoid of any legal effect; (b) if one maintains the significance of hierarchy of institutions in law, then it may be argued that in so far as non-military or non-security issues are concerned, the General Assembly is the highest organ; furthermore, under Article 15 all other organs of the UN, including the Security Council, are required to submit their reports to the General Assembly. Article 15 of the UN Charter provides that:

  “1.The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

  2.The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.”

  This does evidence the fact that the other Organs of the UN are accountable to the General Assembly. This is how the hierarchy issue may be settled. In reality, however, the perception against the General Assembly’s law-making power or the power to adopt legally binding resolutions remains.

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  The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General

  Making The Most Impossible Job in the World Possible

  • Leon Gordenker, Benjamin Rivlin(Authors)
  • 1993(Publication Date)
  • Praeger

    (Publisher)

  The Organization he serves has acquired a standing on the international scene that is rather tenuous from some angles and from others remarkable. All states make obeisance to the principles for which the United Nations stands, and, to almost all intents and purposes, all the world's sovereign states are members of the Organization. More- over, in a telling contrast with the UN predecessor—the League of Na- tions—virtually none of the UN members has ever shown any serious disposition to leave. In one form or another, the United Nations is in continuous session and has an agenda more or less coterminous with that of the international society of which it is such a notable part. It must always be remembered that in no worthwhile sense can the United Nations be seen as the world's governing body, and that it is in bilateral and small multilateral relationships that states tend to handle their core concerns. The United Nations is undoubtedly the forum in or at which an appre- ciable amount of what is deemed the world's important business is done. 28 The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General The fact that in every diplomatic service the post of Representative to the United Nations is now a very senior one is a sufficient indication of the position that the United Nations has come to hold. Accordingly, the holder of the office of head of the UN Secretariat, the Secretary-General, necessarily commands attention. He does indeed lack executive power, but he is the top official of an extremely high-profile organization. And, in a way that is unusual for such officials, and to a greater extent than is common even among those who attract it, the UN Secretary-General is seen as standing for the institution that he serves, as the guardian of its constitution, as, in a sense, the institution's living em- bodiment. He is the "higher" United Nations, the aspirational United Nations, made flesh.

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  Merrills' International Dispute Settlement

  • John Merrills, Eric De Brabandere(Authors)
  • 2022(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  Like any human institution, its organisation and procedures are imperfect and could be improved. 82 At root, however, its activities – successes as well as failures – are less a matter of institutional arrangements than a reflection of the statesmanship, or otherwise, of those responsible for the direction of affairs. 12.6 Further Reading 12.6.1 General References on the United Nations Blokker, Niels M., Saving Succeeding Generations from the Scourge of War, Leiden, 2020. Ratner, Steven R., ‘Image and reality in the UN’s peaceful settlement of disputes’ (1995) 6 European Journal of International Law, 426–44. Schermers, H. G., and N. Blokker, International Institutional Law 6th ed., Leiden, 2018, Chs 1 (‘Introduction’), 3 (‘Rules for international organs’), 9 (‘Interpretation and settlement of disputes’). Simma, Bruno, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus and Nikolai Wessendorf, The Charter of the United Nations, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2012. Viñuales, J.E., The UN Friendly Relations Declaration at 50: An Assessment of the Fundamental Principles of International Law, Cambridge, 2020. 12.6.2 Treaties, Official Documents and Collections of Documents Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, especially paras. 87 and 138–42. Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, 1964, UN Doc A/5746, 82. UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV). UN General Assembly, Definition of Aggression, 14 December 1974, A/RES/3314. UN General Assembly, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 15 November 1982, UNGA Res 37/10.

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  The EU in UN Politics

  Actors, Processes and Performances

  • Spyros Blavoukos, Dimitrios Bourantonis, Spyros Blavoukos, Dimitrios Bourantonis(Authors)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  In that respect, the danger of repetitiveness hovered over a UNSC-focused contribution. Other treatises of this topic have well cap- tured the dynamics of this relationship and little has changed throughout the years (Drieskens et al. 2014; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2013, THE EU IN UN POLITICS: ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES 13 Table 1.2 Main Committees of The UN General Assembly UNGA Committees Thematic areas Cooperation with other UN bodies First Committee (Disarmament & International Security Issues) Disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace UN Disarmament Commission, Conference on Disarmament Second Committee (Economic & Financial Issues) Financing for development, sustainable development, human settlements, globalisation and interdependence, eradication of poverty, food security and nutrition, and information and communications technologies for development Economic and Social Council Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues) Human rights, advancement of women, protection of children, indigenous issues, treatment of refugees, promotion of fundamental freedoms through the elimination of racism and racial discrimination, right to self-determination, issues related to youth, family, ageing, persons with disabilities, crime prevention, criminal justice, and international drug control Human Rights Council Fourth Committee (Special Issues, Political Issues & Decolonization) Subjects related to decolonisation, Palestinian refugees and human rights, peacekeeping, mine action, outer space, public information, atomic radiation and University for Peace Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Committee on Information Fifth Committee (Administrative & Budgetary Issues) Administration and budgetary matters, urgent matters relating to the financing of a peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council at any of its sessions Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) 14 S.

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  The Future of the International Legal Order, Volume 1

  Trends and Patterns

  • Cyril E. Black, Cyril Black(Authors)
  • 2015(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  Hence, contrary to intentions, no new constitutional powers were bestowed on the General Assembly. The Uniting for Peace Res- olution languished from disuse. As a second unforeseen consequence, however, the Secretary-General assumed prominence in the collective security issue area. With the Security Council deadlocked and the Gen- eral Assembly unwilling or unable to act rapidly, the Secretary- General, in dispute after dispute after 1956, assumed the initiative in organizing UN collective measures with a certain measure of autonomy. 23 The role of the General Assembly in making new international law illustrates a deceptive trend toward functional adaptation. As part of cold war and anticolonialist propaganda, various states at various times assumed the responsibility for having the General Assembly adopt declarations on human rights. Whatever the original intent, these dec- larations were soon used by other countries to press for changes in na- 23 For a penetrating treatment of this theme, see Ruth B. Russell, "Changing Patterns of Constitutional Development," in Padelford and Goodrich, 410-28. She argues convincingly that "real" constitutional adjustments occur as a result of political bargaining which results from changing environmental impulses, whereas institutionally derived constitutional changes tend to be ignored. E R N S T HAAS · 249 tional policy, often in political contexts which had not been in the minds of the original sponsors. Some even argued that these declara- tions possess the force of law, if and when invoked often enough and respected in state practice. In short, as an unintended consequence of an immediate and expediential motive, new comprehensive interna- tional law is said to come into existence. 24 In fact, the reluctance of states to ratify conventions which result from the process—indeed the insistence that the declarations be transformed into conventions—sug- gests that the claim is hardly realistic.

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