Leaving Terrorism Behind

Individual and Collective Disengagement

Tore Bjorgo, John G. Horgan, Tore Bjorgo, John G. Horgan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• Print ISBN: 9780415776684
• eBook ISBN: 9781135971052
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This new edited volume expands our understanding of the processes by which individuals and groups disengage from terrorism.

While there has been a growing awareness of the need to understand and prevent processes of radicalization into terrorism, disengagement and deradicalization from terrorism have long been neglected areas in research on terrorism. This book uses empirical data to explore how and why individuals and groups disengage from terrorism, and what can be done to facilitate it. The work also presents a series of case studies of disengagement programmes, from Colombia, northern Europe, Italy, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, comparing and assessing their various strengths and weaknesses. In light of the lessons learned from these cases, this book describes and explains the potential for new developments in counter-terrorism.

This book will be of great interest to all students of terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, international security and politics in general, as well as professionals in the field of counter-terrorism.

1 Introduction

Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan

‘Once a terrorist, always a terrorist.’ So goes conventional wisdom. In reality, however, most individuals involved in terrorism eventually disengage from it in one way or another. Similarly, few terrorist movements last more than a few months, in rare cases years, before coming to an end. The chapters in this book seek to explain how and why this happens and what we might be able to do in order to speed up that process. In addition, these chapters seek to answer the following questions. How and why do participants in terrorist groups decide to leave the group and the path of terrorism? Why do sometimes entire groups involved in terrorism decide to abandon this strategy and opt for non-violent courses of action? What could governments and other actors do to make this disengagement from terrorism happen – sooner rather than later, before they have caused so much violence and suffering? And why is it important and useful to promote disengagement as an element in a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy? This chapter presents some background and context to these questions, and sets the scene for the contributions to follow.

Background

If we consider the focus and scope of various counter-terrorism strategies and policies of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, Great Britain and most other countries, there is increasing emphasis on preventing radicalization into terrorism. However, until recently, very little attention has been paid to the idea of getting terrorists to disengage from terrorism, except perhaps by the traditional means of using physical force or imprisonment. Whereas Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) are considered core elements in bringing societies torn by civil war to peace and stability, these elements remain curiously absent from counterterrorism strategies.

Despite this, some countries with direct experiences of terrorism have started to think and act about counter-terrorism in new and innovative ways. These countries, which have had in common growing populations of prisoners held for terrorist offences, have realized that they cannot solve their terrorist problems with force and detention alone. They have also realized that relying solely on repressive means alone may actually cause more problems than it solves. Additionally, they have understood that there needs to be a more systematic way of understanding and managing the risk of individuals re-entering the terrorist movement, and that there is a need to explore methods aimed at resocializing and reintegrating (at least some) former terrorists back into society. In turn, there is a growing realization that these repentant former terrorists may also play important roles in reducing new recruitment into terrorism.

Disengagement from terrorism has been a neglected area not only in counter-terrorism policies but also in research on terrorism. This is despite the fact that disengagement remains potentially as complex a process as initial radicalization and recruitment to terrorism,¹ and the issues raised by it provoke a number of interesting theoretical and empirical questions. Research-based knowledge and theoretical understanding about these processes is not only of academic value but may also provide a basis for developing more effective as well as more humane counter-terrorist policies. Furthermore, there is a great need for evaluation research on the rapid development of country-specific disengagement programmes in many regions.

While some work has been conducted on the broader issues of how terrorism ends, we felt that there was an opportunity not only to engage in a critical examination of what disengagement means, but how it has emerged in different contexts and applied to very different kinds of movements. By bringing together relevant experts on disengagement, we wanted to develop case studies of disengagement from particular groups, or on particular policies (past or present) directed at facilitating disengagement from such groups. In each case study presented in this volume, it has been important to achieve a sense of the complexity, uniqueness and nuance associated with each group. If terrorism is truly a product of its own time and place, it thus follows that an effort to understand the factors that drive or facilitate disengagement for each group will necessarily be based in, or derive from, a particular context.² Although a further objective of this volume is to achieve a sense of the lessons learned from past experiences, caution will surround any effort to over-generalize from individual case studies. The same should apply to case studies in which policy initiatives are the principal focus. While the strengths of particular policy initiatives ought to be identified, so too must the unique and context-bound limitations of these initiatives.

One obvious objection to the comparative aspect of this project is that each terrorist movement, or at least each general type of terrorist movement (left-wing, right-wing, Jihadist, etc.), is unique and subsequently there is no basis for transferring what might legitimately be conceived as sui generis experiences of disengagement from one type of movement to another. A plausible hypothesis, however, is that although the political and ideological content may be very different, the social and psychological processes involved may well be rather similar, or at least comparable.³ Our empirical research across a wide range of militant movements and countries as well as our review of relevant literature later in this chapter lends support to this understanding. A basic point we are keen to assert, therefore, is that the differences that undoubtedly are there should be treated as variables for comparison rather than as obstacles to analysis. Thus, the purpose of this book is to explore the relevant processes inherent in disengagement at both individual and collective levels. In parallel, we engage in a critical examination of the existing disengagement programmes in order to discover if these programmes are informed by a realistic and evidence-based knowledge of the relevant processes.

Critical distinctions

How individuals become involved in terrorism has been one of the recurring core topics of terrorism research. After the London bombings in 2005, in particular, there has been an increasing political and academic interest in understanding the processes of radicalization into violent activism and terrorism, and specifically by young Muslims. More recently, deradicalization has become a new buzzword at conferences and in policy documents.⁴

However, having worked on these issues for a number of years, we find the lack of conceptual clarity in the emerging discourse on deradicalization striking. Deradicalization often appears to be understood as any effort aimed at preventing radicalization from taking place. There is also a lack of distinction between the cognitive and behavioural aspects of (de-)radicalization, as if holding radical views necessarily will predict expressions of radical or violent behaviour. It is also often taken for granted that changes in values precede changes in behaviour, and that we therefore first need to address people’s values before we can influence their behaviours. However, in our own research as well as in social science literature⁵ we have found strong evidence that the link between views and behaviour is far more complex. We have observed that individuals do not necessarily join extremist groups because they hold extremist views; they sometimes acquire extremist views because they have joined such a group for other reasons.⁶ When they leave terrorist or other extremist groups and behaviours, some individuals are stripped of their radical views as a consequence of having left the group rather than that being a cause for leaving. Thus, people often re-adjust their value system in order to make it in accordance with their new patterns of behaviour.⁷

However, there are also some individuals who distance themselves from the extremist group and its violent means, but retain their extremist views on society. In our view, it is still far more important to change violent behaviour than change radical attitudes. Thus, we believe there is much to be gained conceptually from separating the cognitive and behavioural aspects. These distinctions should also have some relevance for the way deradicalization or disengagement programmes are designed. Initially, there should be at least as much emphasis on changing behaviour and the relationship with the militant group as on changing the ideological values of the extremists. A one-sided focus on changing ideology alone (e.g. only through theological debate with Jihadis) is unlikely to work unless it is also combined with influencing their behaviour and addressing their social ties to the militant group, family members, friends and others. Some of the most successful programmes studied by our research group, e.g. in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, have combined addressing these different dimensions of attitudes, behaviour and social ties in very creative and clever ways. More will be said about this in following chapters.

Furthermore, we find it important to distinguish between individual and collective disengagement from terrorism. Individuals may decide to leave a terrorist group or end their involvement with violent activism. Groups may abandon their use of terrorist methods or end their terrorist campaign.

The processes involved when individuals leave a terrorist group and break off their involvement in terrorism is not necessarily the same as when an entire terrorist organization abandons terrorism as a strategy. However, there may be a relationship between these distinctive processes at individual and collective levels. For example, if a high rate of individual disengagement (e.g. due to arrests) is offset by a similar influx of new recruits, the survival of the group is not necessarily threatened. However, if the ranks are not replenished, the resulting negative demographic balance may facilitate the group’s demise. An increasing rate of defections among individual members, for instance due to disillusionment with the group and its failure to reach its goals, may influence leaders to change to a non-violent strategy or to give up the struggle altogether. However, there are also cases when leaders of terrorist organizations have decided to abandon the path of terrorism in favour of joining a political process of negotiations – over the heads of unprepared members, as happened with the IRA during the process leading up to the 1998 ‘Good Friday Agreement’. These different processes and the relationships between them need to be more fully explored.

At both individual and group levels, disengagement from terrorism may essentially be a voluntary process, an involuntary process, or something in between.⁸ On one extreme, militant activists have no choice but to end their involvement with terrorism. For individuals, involuntary disengagement from terrorism may happen when they are arrested or deported, separating them from their group and the militant activities. Terrorist groups may be defeated or forced to surrender when their leaders or members are killed or arrested. Effective anti-terrorist interventions provide pressure on terrorist groups and put them on the defensive. Terrorist groups and individuals are more likely to look for an exit when they feel they are losing than when they believe they can win. On the other extreme, individuals or groups may voluntarily decide to abandon the armed struggle, due to ethical, political or ideological considerations, or due to disillusionment with the group or its methods. Individual members may be arrested and offered the option of taking part in rehabilitation programmes involving some form of amnesty, as will be described in several of the following chapters. Then they may choose to be defiant and refuse to take part, or they may decide to accept the offer of participating in a programme. In Italy during the 1980s, activists arrested for terrorist offences committed while part of the Red Brigades were offered a variety of alternatives for reduced sentencing, depending on their degree of dissociation from the armed struggle and the degree of collaboration with the investigations (see chapter 5).

Before moving on, we should make one final distinction here. In this volume, we speak about ‘programmes’ as a general term for describing a wide variety of policies to facilitate disengagement. Many of these are programmes in the strict sense: they have designated titles, associated organizations; they have operational budgets and procedures of operation towards set goals. This is the case for some. Others tend to have more ad hoc ways of working, sometimes through different agencies and with more loosely defined goals. This is almost certainly the case with the Indonesian ‘deradicalization programme’ (see chapter 12). Alternatively, what constitutes a ‘programme’ may essentially just be a legal framework for facilitating reduced sentencing in exchange for repentance and collaboration with the authorities, as was the case with the Italian ‘repentance programme’ (see chapter 5). Despite the heterogeneity of these initiatives, most programmes have individual (ex-)extremists as their primary target groups, and attempt to facilitate the reintegration of individual terrorists back into society. There are also programmes that adopt a more collective approach, usually in the context of entire movements laying down their weapons. This is the case with the Colombian Reincorporation Programme (see chapter 9 and several others discussed in chapter 10). However, these two approaches may be seen as the extremes of a continuum, as predominantly ‘collective’ programmes usually involve elements of individual reintegration, whereas predominantly ‘individual’ programmes sometimes make use of group sessions, bringing together individuals from the same movement (and sometimes others) facing similar experiences.

What do we already know?

To date, a number of studies have addressed various aspects of how individuals join and leave different types of clandestine, reclusive and stigmatized groups. Some of them have also specifically discussed violent or terrorist groups. However, the analytical interest has tended to focus on the processes of recruitment and radicalization rather than on disengagement or deradicalization. Many of the factors and processes involved in leaving terrorist organizations, religious ‘cults’, racist groups and criminal youth gangs appear strikingly similar in spite of the great differences in ideological content, background and aspirations. Thus, progress made in respective analytical approaches and in the findings from such studies can to some extent be transferred and applied to the study of terrorist groups.

The primary anal...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Other Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Foreword by David C. Rapoport
• Preface
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• 1 Introduction
• Part I Processes
• Part II Programmes
• Part III Conclusions
• Notes
• Index