Does Religious Education Have a Future?

Pedagogical and Policy Prospects

Mark Chater, Clive Erricker

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415681698
• eBook ISBN: 9781136305283
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

The place of religion in the modern world has changed significantly over the past two decades. This has been partially reflected in the academic study of religion, but little, if at all, in religious education. In addition, the place of RE in schools has been the subject of intense debate due to changes to the curriculum and school structure, as well as being part of wider debates on religion in the public sphere.

Written by two highly experienced leading practitioners of RE, Does Religious Education have a Future? argues for a radical reform of the subject based on principles of pedagogy set free from religious concerns. It challenges teachers, researchers and educators to rethink their approaches to, and assumptions about, religious education, and enables them to see their work in a larger context that includes pedagogical ideas and political forces.

The book offers readers fresh, provocative and expertly informed critical perspectives on:

• the global context of RE, debates about religion in public places, religion's response to modernity, violent extremism, science and secularism;
• the evolving educational rationale for RE in schools;
• the legal arrangements for RE and their impact on the teaching of the subject;
• the pedagogy of teaching approaches in RE and their effect on standards and perceptions of the subject;
• the educational commitment of faith/belief communities, and how this influences the performance of RE.

Does Religious Education have a Future? proposes a new attitude to the subject of religious education, and a new configuration of both its role and content. This book is essential reading for academics, advisers and policy makers, as well as teachers of RE at primary and secondary levels and trainee and newly qualified teachers.

Part 1
Representations of religion and education: critical enquiries

Chapter 1
The global context of religion and belief

Clive Erricker

Opening story

What is the problem with hypocrisy and why is it so difficult to avoid when we recognize it so readily? Hari’s problem is our problem but it does not exist on just a personal level but a global level. When we seek to avoid contradictions, controversy and complexity in the way we organize education we invite criticisms of hypocrisy from our pupils. This chapter deals with the contradictions that exist between religions, ideologies and democracies that then permeate into our curriculum and affect the attitudes of our pupils. In other words we need to seek to challenge the hypocrisies inherent and implicit in the way we teach our pupils. In the teaching of religion this relates to the way in which we represent it and defend that representation.

Introduction

This chapter considers effects of globalization on religion and belief and examines the extent to which religion as ideology has increasingly played its part in shaping affairs in the modern world. The chapter also considers how religions can seek to evade regulation in order to undermine the jurisdiction of nation states in relation to the former’s aims and practices. I refer to this below by showing how religions can be understood as acting analogously to the way in which the financial sector escapes regulation by claiming ‘offshore’ status or challenging the jurisdiction of nation states and international rights legislation, which itself is not free of problems. This is related to the idea of capital, and different forms of capital which, it is argued, concerns the way in which religions and other ideologies do or do not contribute to the overall social fabric and democratic goals as opposed to seeking their own specific and exclusive aims.¹

Religious resurgence: religious ideology and religion as a reactionary force

The resurgence of religion has reaffirmed its significance in the affairs of the modern world. In particular this phenomenon is bound up with questions concerning legitimacy, power and influence, jurisdiction, conflicts in values and worldviews, and religions as political agents.

This resurgence is attested to in the sociology of religion, where the long affirmed thesis of secularization is now contested, thus influencing the trajectory of the discipline.² In the nineteenth century religion declined in influence largely because its influence waned as a form of social utility within Europe and the UK. The Methodist dissenters used literacy as a means to their cause; the Salvation Army used the practice of addressing dissolute behaviour as a means to theirs. Today these issues are addressed by other means. However, the repair of the social fabric by religious means is alive and well in other areas of the world. In Iran it brought about the revolution in 1979. In parts of Africa it is entwined with post-colonial renewal. Meanwhile, suspicion of imperialist intentions by the democratic West is also resurgent because of its alignment with capitalism creating a narrative of continuing post-colonial exploitation. This has to be taken seriously since, for example, the evidence reveals that ‘offshore’ and deregulated financial activity exceeds by tenfold the amount in aid that is given to Africa.³ It is in this context that a resurgence of militant religious movements across the world needs to be understood partly as a response to the rapacious activity of some Western interests. It is also in this respect that the policy of Western states with regard to the Middle East, the criticism of terrorist activity, the actions of al-Qaida, the war on Iraq and military activity against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the attempt to democratize the country need to be understood in relation to a contra-narrative that benefits violent or threatening movements that oppose the Western interests. Just as, in the twentieth century, fascism’s and communism’s political prominence and subsequent demise were central to the script of that century, so will religious resurgence and militancy be in that of the twenty-first. The tensions reside not just in the material issues of democratic rights, human rights, women’s rights, homophobia and other often reported incidents but in what gives rise to the possibility of and justification for the contranarrative. There is an antagonism toward the hegemony of Western capitalist hubris and exploitation and scepticism toward the democratic narrative. Anti-democratic nation states and religious systems wish to prevent themselves being subjected to Western democratic-capitalist regulation that is likely to interfere with their own authority, interests and practices.

As examples of these, if we examine Vatican Roman Catholicism and Iranian Shia Islam, we can recognize that they are both genuinely hierarchical and autocratic in that the truth (knowledge) can only be discerned by those trained to do so: the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Holy See, and pontifical authority, on the one hand, and the Ulema and Ayatollahs (jurists) on the other. This is reflected in the fact that their theologies are the basis of legal systems. As a result, both are also genuinely anti-democratic. Such systems, by virtue of their truth being universally valid, are also, necessarily, imperialist. There was disappointment in Iran that the Shia revolution failed to export (it was, of course, opposed by the Saudis who feared a loss of their power). The Vatican still sees the enemy to its power and influence as secularism. In Russia the Orthodox Church is a national church; in particular it flourished under Tsar Peter the Great in the eighteenth century when it, in effect, became a state department dealing with education and social welfare. Under the Soviet system it was repressed in its influence but was still used as a state representative with a national and international agenda at international peace conferences. In the post-soviet world it is resurgent. As Irena Mayniak observes, ‘The Russian Church falls more naturally into an autocratic order than a democratic one. Pluralism, tolerance, diversity and a global perspective do not form part of its frame of reference.’⁴

Whilst in Europe the model of state–church partnership was the established historical example, in the United States distance was created between state and church; numerous protestant movements flourished, but these were often of a literalist and fundamentalist kind. You could say that this has been an interesting effect of deregulation within a democracy and that it provides a certain parallel with the deregulation afforded to business and finance in the United States. One result of this, however, has been the reactionary views expressed by many of these groups over numerous human rights issues. Two of the most prominent of these have concerned homosexuality and the role and rights of women. These have even affected the Episcopalian Church, with the appointment of a homosexual bishop in liberal New Hampshire and a woman as Presiding Bishop-elect of the Episcopal Church in 2006. These incidents have even provoked congregations to seek new leadership from bishops in Africa who are better disposed to their non-liberal views. The dilemma of democratic rights and religious freedom is a vexed one for liberals, with increasing examples either putting the law to the test or resulting in a determination by secular states to change the law.⁵

Perhaps the most severe test to date of liberal democracy was Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie. This set a precedent. It was the first to be delivered whose jurisdiction extended beyond Muslim countries.⁶ In effect it was a reverse strategy in the offshore game: extend your jurisdiction into foreign territory. Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979 also introduced a new and contested interpretation of the concept of velayat-e faqih whereby Khomeini himself became the supreme jurist and obedience to his rulings was tantamount to obedience to government, a religious obligation on the population.⁷ This is, of course, incompatible with democracy. It also provides something of a parallel to the Vatican claiming its suspected paedophile priests should not be subjected to the laws of nation states. These events are not just about refusing to acknowledge a need to collaborate with democratic nation states and their legislation, but about being opposed to the imposition of law devised by democratic nation states or the international community.

Sarah Maitland provides an interesting commentary on the contradictions inherent within the European enlightenment and democracy that is pertinent to our discussion. ‘What I see ... is a faltering, a loss of faith, in the whole Enlightenment project.’⁸ Due to the Enlightenment, ‘At the political level, [religious sentiment] was replaced by nationalism.’⁹ ‘Part of the underlying importance of The Satanic Verses episode was the way it exposed the fact that Articles 18 and 19 in the UN Charter of Human Rights were incompatible: it proved impossible to defend both freedom of speech and the right to have one’s religious belief and practice respected.’¹⁰ The same is also true of Article 26, which states both that ‘Education shall be directed ... to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms ... shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial and religious groups’ and ‘the maintenance of peace.’ But ‘Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.’¹¹

What this also teaches us is that the international context is paramount. What happens in any specific national environment is necessarily influenced by the global one and vice versa. While specific nations clamp down on movement into their borders, they are not in control of the influence of religion globally and the type of religion entailed. It is very complex. This is why suicide bombers can be recruited from European countries and why such events as 9/11 can occur in New York and the July 2005 bombings can occur in London. National and religious allegiances do not conform to the same pattern and types. Religious allegiances vary according to international influences and these influences involve different juridical policies and practices.

For example, the Vatican, by virtue of its ‘offshore’ religious and legal status, rivals the City of London in its ‘offshore’ financial status as the most deregulated ‘state’ in the world. Geoffrey Robertson’s book The Case of the Pope: Vatican accountability for human rights abuse documents the basis on which the Vatican can ignore statutory legal demands by virtue of its unique status as a state and the juridical rights that entails. There are two means by which the Vatican ensures its privileged authority: canon law and its statehood. With regard to canon law it sought to oppose the jurisdiction of the laws of nation states in relation to suspected paedophile priests. Robertson records:

In 2001, the Vatican actually congratulated Bishop Pierre Pican of Bayeux for refusing to inform police about a paedophile priest and for giving him parish work despite his confession of guilt. ... This came to light after the priest had been sentenced to 18 years for repeated rapes ... and the bishop received a three month suspended sentence for not reporting the abuse, contrary to French law.¹²

Canon Law operates differently from normal law enforcement. It is, in Robertson’s words, ‘not “law” in any real sense ... but rather a process relating to sins for which the only punishment is spiritual’.¹³ This provided the justification behind the scandal within which paedophile priests were protected from legal action as long as the Vatican refused to identify them and submit them to secular legal procedures within the countries in which they committed their offences. This enraged populations of Western nation states because the Church was so reluctant to allow the imposition of secular law in relation to its priests and so reluctant to apologize. The refusal to apologize or take responsibility is a characteristic trait of ‘offshore’ organizations. A similar tactic has been used by banks following the 2008 financial collapse. They always claim they are a special case and that the normal rules and moral codes do not apply.

The Vatican was granted statehood through the Lateran Treaty in 1929 by Mussolini. The qualifications for statehood of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States in 1933 effectively ruled out the statehood of the Vatican¹⁴ but it is still recognized as a state by the United Nations in so far as it retains privileges that other religious bodies and NGOs do not have, specifically in relation to lobbying UN members, and especially through consular relations. These privileges ensure that it is the only ‘non-member state’ at the UN ‘with every entitlement of a member except the right to vote at the General Assembly and to be elected to the Security Council’.¹⁵ Such is its comparative influence and its protection.

There are significant controversies over a number of other issues concerning how religions often act as reactionary forces in the modern world. Those concerning women priests, homosexuality, human and women’s rights and contraception in relation to Aids in Africa are pertinent examples. These are not just about the influence of Roman Catholicism but also the influence of specific other Christian churches and forms of Islam, in particular. In some cases, such as female circumcision, we are faced with the conundrum of religion versus ‘tribal culture’. It is not just a matter of condemning religious views when they are opposed to progressive liberal opinion but of weighing the doctrines, justifications, causes and consequences of difference and the moral implications involved, and recognizing the socio-political contexts within which these issues exist.

To claim religion is a reactionary force is not to suggest that all forms of religious expression are so, or that all are the same in this respect. For example the Society of Friends (Quakers) and Unitarians could be presented as obvious exceptions. Also, Bahias operate as an inclusive organization, though they certainly have a mission for conversion. Guru Nanak is an earlier example of someone who started a movement that opposed the doctrinalization of religion. All of these movements have suffered persecution at the hands of other religious ideologies but all three have institutionalized into movements with exclusive identities. It is also the case that religions have charitable arms that operate to alleviate suffering and poverty. Nevertheless, these are often subsidiary organizations in tension with the doctrinal and ideological purposes of those branches of religion of which they are a part. CAFOD and Christian Aid serve as particular examples. What is clear is that religion has both ideological and reactionary forms of expression and can sometimes have more liberal ones. We are dealing with a spectrum of characteristics. When these characteristics collide in one religion it is salutary to see what happens, as the liberation theologian Leonardo Boff reports:

Twenty years ago, on 7 September 1984, I sat on the very same seat as Galileo Galilei [condemned to imprisonment for heresy in 1633] and Giordano Bruno [burned at the stake for heresy in 1600] in the Palace of the Holy Office in Rome – formerly the Inquisition – to defend the opinions expressed in my book Church, Charism and Power. ... Twenty years on, I see that there was something providential in what happened to me. ... People discovered ano...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Introduction The politics and discourse of RE
• Part 1 Representations of religion and education: critical enquiries
• Part 2 Diagnosing RE’s pedagogy, provenance and politics
• Part 3 The case for a radical transformation of RE
• Notes
• Index