Russo-Japanese Relations, 1905-17

From enemies to allies

Peter Berton

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415725736
• eBook ISBN: 9781136585678
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

One surprising outcome of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was that, although Russia was humiliatingly defeated, by 1916 Russia and Japan had become allies. This book provides a detailed analysis of how this remarkable turnaround came about. It traces the evolution of relations between the two powers through the conclusion of three public and secret agreements in 1907, 1910, and 1912, and the controversial secret alliance of 1916. The book argues that careful examination of complete records of negotiations from both sides definitively proves the case for Germany, not the United States, as the target of the secret treaty. Based on meticulous examination of documents in both Russian and Japanese foreign policy archives, it charts diplomatic developments, explores how Japanese and Russian thinking evolved, and assesses the wider international impact of the new alliance.

1 Russo-Japanese relations,
1905–1914

The aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war

In 1905, Japan and Russia ended their war and signed a peace treaty, and in 1916 the Japanese Government proposed to Russia a draft of an alliance that was essentially an unlimited offensive–defensive pact. How did this happen? How did the Japanese and the Russians transform their relationship from enemies to allies in a decade? This study explores this transformation from the standpoint of Japanese and Russian domestic politics as well as the evolving international environment in the world, and in East Asia in particular. It touches upon Japan and Russia's evolving relationship with their respective allies, Great Britain and France, and the significance of the role of China and Germany. The study discusses the three agreements (public and secret) negotiated by Japan and Russia in 1907, 1910, and 1912 that effectively demarcated their respective spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia; the attempts of France and Russia to join the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the beginning of World War I; and the successful negotiations in Tokyo and Petrograd that led to the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese Treaty of alliance in 1916. This was the path from enmity to alliance taken by the protagonists of the war of 1904–1905.

Normally wars produce a desire for revenge on the part of the losing side, which eventually becomes a prelude to the next war. One such example is the relationship between Germany and France after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, which led to World Wars I and II. And who does not remember the picture of Hitler dictating the terms of surrender in the same railway car that the French dictated their terms of surrender to the German delegation in 1918?

Some wars, however, do not end as preludes to further wars of revenge, but result in a modus vivendi between the former adversaries. Still other wars transform the protagonists into allies who face a new common enemy. Such was the historical scenario of the relationship between the United States, Britain, and France on the one hand, and their former World War II enemies Japan and Germany on the other. A long and bloody war did not necessarily lead to feelings of revenge on the part of the losers—the Germans and the Japanese—but brought them into a close alliance with the victorious powers. The author will argue in this study that this is what happened to the relationship between Russia and Japan after the bloody war of 1904–1905. But it takes two to tango, and the author intends to look into the motives of both the Japanese and Russian military and their civilian leadership. A powerful motive was their desire to demarcate and consolidate their respective spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia. Additionally, the Japanese military wanted to avoid a Russian war of revenge.

The Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 brought the Russo-Japanese War to a conclusion. By the terms of this Treaty, Russia:

(1) recognized Japan's paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea;

(2) transferred to Japan its lease and rights in the Liaotung Peninsula, which included the port of Dairen and the naval base of Port Arthur;

(3) ceded to Japan the southern section of the Russian-built Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, between Changchun and Port Arthur;

(4) ceded in perpetuity full sovereignty in the half of the Island of Sakhalin (Saghalien) south of the fiftieth degree of north latitude, and all adjacent islands.¹

This Treaty was the first step towards working out a new balance of power in East Asia.² After its unsuccessful war, Russia's concern was to minimize the danger of internal revolution. As its foreign policy turned westward to Europe, some guarantee of the stability of its Far Eastern possessions was desirable. An internal Foreign Ministry document gives the following two reasons for the need to come to an agreement with Japan:

(1) pressure of the Japanese on North Manchuria and Mongolia;

(2) pressure of the Chinese and other foreigners on Russian and Japanese interests in Manchuria.³

In Japan, on the other hand, the military leaders, fearing a war of revenge, felt the need to come to an understanding with Russia. The following resolutions were adopted at a top-level secret conference held at the Japanese Prime Minister's residence on May 22, 1906:

(1) measures should be taken immediately in Manchuria to prepare against Russian revenge;

(2) measures should also be taken to win over Russia and make the former enemy forget the past.⁴

The rapprochement between Russia and Japan was further promoted by their respective allies, France and Great Britain, which were anxious to align the two countries against Germany and to make it possible for Russia to concentrate its forces in Europe.⁵

Russo-Japanese agreements of 1907

In July 1907, Russia and Japan signed a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation,⁶ and a fisheries convention,⁷ followed by two political agreements, only one of which was to be made public.⁸ In the public agreements each of the two countries “engaged to respect the actual territorial integrity of the other” and all rights accruing from treaties. They recognized the independence and territorial integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity, and undertook to support and defend the maintenance of the status quo by all pacific means at their disposal.⁹

The secret convention signed on the same day divided Manchuria into two spheres of influence, leaving the larger, northern part to Russia, and the southern part to Japan. In view of the “natural gravitation of interests and of political and economic activity in Manchuria,” both governments agreed not to obstruct the initiative of the other in their respective spheres. The line of demarcation agreed upon ran roughly from the northwestern point of the Russo-Korean frontier, along the Sungari, Nonni and Tola Rivers, to the 122° meridian.¹⁰ Furthermore, Russia, recognizing “the relations of political solidarity between Japan and Korea,” undertook not to interfere with further development of those relations, while Japan, recognizing “the special interests of Russia in Outer Mongolia,” undertook “to refrain from any interference which might prejudice those interests.”¹¹ The text of the secret agreement was communicated by Russia to France and by Japan to Britain.¹²

Thus, in the secret agreement, Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia, were definitely set aside for Russian or Japanese activity, while the public convention spoke of such respectable ideas as the principle of equal opportunity and the territorial integrity of China. The conclusion of the first agreements proved that cooperation was feasible between the recent enemies, while developments in the Far East, as events proved, were to facilitate this rapprochement. A month before the conclusion of the First Russo-Japanese Agreement, Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky wrote that whereas only half a year before, the Russian military authorities in the Far East had been afraid of a Japanese attack, the new Russo-Japanese Agreement, together with the Franco-Japanese Agreement, would serve to restrain the possible expansionist policy of Japan.¹³ Speaking in the State Duma, Russia's parliament, he stated that the Russo-Japanese Agreement was in harmony with the entire Russian system of treaties.¹⁴ The 1907 Agreement settled a number of disputed problems, but at the same time gave rise to new disagreements, which were caused by the fishery convention and the Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, which opened the way for Japanese commercial activity in the Russian Far East.¹⁵

In the fall of 1909, Russian perceptions of their relationship with Japan became complex. Russian consuls in North Korea and Manchuria began to report concentration of Japanese troops on the Russo-Korean border.¹⁶ The Russian military attaché in Tokyo reported in October 1909 that although there was no preparation on the part of the Japanese army to attack Russia, military preparedness in terms of its scale indicated that of all its potential adversaries, it had in mind the Russian army.¹⁷ According to one Russian scholar, the relationship between Japan and Russia worsened and there were even rumors of a new Russo-Japanese war.¹⁸ Pro-German circles and their press were responsible for these rumors. This perceived deterioration in the situation in the Far East led Russian officials to send their families from the Far East to the Urals.¹⁹

Russia and Japan however, continued on their path to a closer relationship. When the Japanese authorities found out about the trip of Finance Minister V.N. Kokovtsev to the Russian Far East, they invited him to visit Japan. The Russians did not respond positively to the idea. The Japanese Government, nonetheless, decided to arrange a meeting with Kokovtsev in Harbin, the administrative center of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The emissary was Prince Ito Hirobumi, former Resident General of Korea and an ardent advocate of closer relations with Russia. Unfortunately, negotiations did not take place because Ito was assassinated at the Harbin Railway station on October 26 by a Korean nationalist.²⁰

On November 6, 1909 in a communication to the British Government, the American Secretary of State Philander Knox advanced the plan for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways. He proposed that an international syndicate be formed to make a loan to China so that it might buy out Russian and Japanese interests in the Manchurian railroads. They would then be internationally administered during the period of the loan.²¹ At a special government conference devoted to a possible Russian reaction to the Knox proposal, Foreign Minister Izvolsky candidly argued that “if we reject the American proposal, there may be a temporary cooling of relations with the U.S.A., but America will not declare war, nor will it send its navy to Harbin, whereas Japan in this regard is much more dangerous.”²² At the same time, the Japanese Ambassador in St Petersburg, Baron Motono, told Izvolsky that he not only favored developing the First Russo-Japanese Agreement further, but also transforming it into a formal alliance.²³ The latter declined the idea of an alliance, arguing that this could bring about a negative reaction in China.

On December 1, 1909, Foreign Minister Izvolsky submitted to the Tsar a written report on Russian policy in the Far East, arguing for a pro-Japanese position. The Tsar agreed with his Foreign Minister's arguments, adding in the margins of the report: “For me it was clear that Russia should enter into the closest relationship with Japan.”²⁴ The following day, the Russian Government published a statement on Russo-Japanese relations, in which it stated that rumors in the press regarding the alleged clash between Russia and Japan were without foundation. There is complete and mutual preparedness and readiness in our relations with Japan to solve all emerging problems by peaceful and friendly agreements.²⁵ On December 11, 1909, the Russian Government, at a special meeting chaired by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Stolypin, adopted a principled decision to conclude an agreement with Japan. Izvolsky was supported by the army and navy ministers.²⁶

The Russian and Japanese reaction to the American interference was to work more closely together. Both countries rejected the American plan in notes, similarly worded, written on the same day, January 21, 1910.²⁷ On January 27, the Japanese Foreign Minister Komura, in a speech in parliament, declared that relations between Japan and Russia were becoming more friendly and heart-warming.²⁸

Russo-Japanese agreements of 1910

The American intervention provided an impetus for new Russo-Japanese negotiations, first in Tokyo between Komura and the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo Malevskii-Malevich, and later in St Petersburg between Foreign Minster Izvolsky and Ambassador Motono. Russia tried unsuccessfully to include a paragraph regarding the status quo in Korea, but otherwise the negotiations proceeded smoothly. These negotiations led, once again, in July 1910, to the conclusion of two conventions;²⁹ one was made public, the other was to remain secret except for informing the British and French Governments.³⁰

In the public convention³¹ the two powers pledged friendly cooperation to improve their respective railway lines in Manchuria and to refrain from competition. This in effect transferred to the public treaty, for the purpose of giving public notice to the other powers, an obligation already assumed in the secret Agreement of 1907. Mention of the recognition of “the independence and territorial integrity of China” and o...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Explanatory notes
• List of abbreviations
• List of appendices
• 1 Russo-Japanese relations, 1905–1914
• 2 Efforts to conclude alliances at the outbreak of World War I
• 3 Russo-Japanese relations during the early part of World War I
• 4 The torturous road to Japan’s decision on an alliance with Russia
• 5 Conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Alliance of 1916
• 6 The 1916 treaties, China, and the powers
• 7 From enemies to allies: summary and conclusions
• Notes
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index