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The World as a Point of Aggression
The starting point for my reflections is the insight that human beings are always already situated in a world, always already au monde, as the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts it. The first glimmer of awareness when we open our eyes in the morning or awake from anesthesia, and presumably even the first conscious impression of a newborn, is the perception that âthere is something,â that something is present.1 We can understand this presence as the ur-form of what we gradually come to experience, explore, and conceive of as world, although it essentially precedes the distinction between subject and world. From this original impression that âsomething is present,â I have sought to develop a sociology of our relationship to the world that assumes that subject and world are not the precondition, but the result of our relatedness to this presence. Little by little, in the course of our development, we learn from this âsomethingâ to distinguish between ourselves as experiencing subjects and the world as that which we encounter. The way in which the two are related is constitutive of both what we are as human beings and what we encounter as world. Hence, whenever I refer in what follows to (experiencing) subjects and (encountered) objects, these are to be understood as the two polesâthe âself poleâ and âworld pole,â so to speakâof the relationship that constitutes them.
The fundamental question of a sociology of our relationship to the world is, how is this something that is present constituted? Is it benevolent and redemptive, promising and seductive, cold and indifferent, or even threatening and dangerous? In contrast to philosophers, psychologists, and even theologians, who all grapple professionally with the question of the human beingâs place in the cosmos or our relationship to the universe, to nature, and so on,2 I start from the assumption that the way we are related to the world is not determined simply by the fact of our being human, but rather depends on the social and cultural conditions into which we have been socialized. We learn and become habituated to a certain practical attitude toward the world that goes far beyond our cognitive âworldview,â our conscious assumptions and convictions about what exists in the world and what the world is all about, what it all comes down to. The first guiding thesis that I would like to develop in this essay is that, for late modern human beings, the world has simply become a point of aggression.3 Everything that appears to us must be known, mastered, conquered, made useful. Expressed abstractly, this sounds banal at firstâbut it isnât. Lurking behind this idea is a creeping reorganization of our relationship to the world that stretches far back historically, culturally, economically, and institutionally but in the twenty-first century has become newly radicalized, not least as a result of the technological possibilities unleashed by digitalization and by the demands for optimization and growth produced by financial market capitalism and unbridled competition.
I will expand upon this phenomenon in greater detail in what follows. For now, I would simply like to illustrate it with a few brief examples. Let us consider our relationship to our own body. Everything that we perceive about it tends to be subject to the pressures of optimization. We climb onto the scale: we should lose weight. We look into the mirror: we have to get rid of that pimple, those wrinkles. We take our blood pressure: it should be lower. We track our steps: we should walk more. Our insulin level, our bustline: we invariably encounter such things as a challenge to do better, even if it is a challenge we can ignore or reject. Moreover, we ought to be calmer, more relaxed, more mindful, more environmentally conscious. Even those things we encounter outside ourselves take on the character of a challenge: Mountains have to be scaled, tests passed, career ladders climbed, lovers conquered, places visited and photographed (âYou have to see it!â), books read, films watched, and so on. This attitude can even be foundânot just latently, but manifestlyâin situations where we donât appear to be bent on âconquestâ at all. Patrons of the famous German tourist bar Ballermann 6 on Mallorca âdestroyâ buckets of beer and sangria, while members of church choirs have to flawlessly âmaster Mendelssohn.â More and more, for the average late modern subject in the âdevelopedâ western world, everyday life revolves around and amounts to nothing more than tackling an ever-growing to-do list. The entries on this list constitute the points of aggression that we encounter as the world: grocery shopping, checking in on a sickly relative, doctorsâ appointments, work, birthday parties, yoga classesâall matters to be settled, attended to, mastered, completed, resolved, gotten out of the way.
At this point we are surely inclined to wonder: Isnât this normal? Havenât things always been this way? Havenât human beings always encountered the world and reality as resistance?4 My theory is that the normalization and naturalization of our aggressive relationship to the world is the result of a social formation, three centuries in the making, that is based on the structural principle of dynamic stabilization and on the cultural principle of relentlessly expanding humanityâs reach. This may sound complicated, but the basic ideas are very simple. In my view, the character and dynamics of a social formation can only be understood in terms of the interplay between the structures and institutions that constitute it and the cultural forces that drive it: its fears, promises, and desires. The firstâthe structural dimensionâcan well be described using the means of empirical scientific observation, that is, from a third-person perspective, such as we use to observe and describe, say, the orbits of the planets. What this perspective is incapable of capturing, however, is the dynamic, energetic aspects of society. Social life plays out, and social change occurs, solely on the basis of the hopes and fears of the people who live in a certain formation; and these driving forces, these promises and apprehensions, can be reconstructed hermeneutically, in cultural terms, only from a firstperson perspective. I have elaborated both my structural and my cultural analysis of modernity at great length in a number of previous books.5 Here, then, I would like to offer only a brief summary.
Since the eighteenth century, life in the modern, âwesternâ world has undergone a structural change at every level, as a result of which the basic institutional structure of modern society can be maintained only through constant escalation. A modern society, as I define it, is one that can stabilize itself only dynamically, in other words one that requires constant economic growth, technological acceleration, and cultural innovation in order to maintain its institutional status quo. In terms of cultural perception, this escalatory perspective has gradually turned from a promise into a threat. Growth, acceleration, and innovation no longer seem to assure us that life will always get better; they have come instead to be seen as an apocalyptic, claustrophobic menace. If we fail to be better, faster, more creative, more efficient, and so on, we will lose our jobs, businesses will close, tax revenues will decline while expenditures increase, there will be budget crises, we wonât be able to maintain our healthcare system, our pension levels, and our cultural institutions, the scope of potential political action will grow ever narrower, and in the end the entire political system will appear to have lost its legitimacy. All this can be observed in the early twenty-first century, for example in Greece, which has been plagued by a prolonged recession. At both the individual and the collective level, what generates this will to escalation is not the promise of improvement in our quality of life, but the unbridled threat that we will lose what we have already attained. To argue that modernity is driven by an increasing demandâhigher, faster, fartherâis to misunderstand its structural reality. This game of escalation is perpetuated not by a lust for more, but by the fear of having less and less. It is never enough not because we are insatiable, but because we are, always and everywhere, moving down the escalator. Whenever and wherever we stop to take a break, we lose ground against a highly dynamic environment, with which we are always in competition. There are no longer any niches or plateaus that allow us even to pause, let alone say âthatâs enough.â This can be seen empirically in the fact that a majority of parents in the âdevelopedâ world report that they are no longer motivated by the hope that their children will have it better than they do, but by the desire to do everything they possibly can so that they donât have it worse.
Because modern societies can stabilize themselves only dynamically, that is, through escalation, they are structurally and institutionally compelled to bring more and more of the world under control and within reach, technologically, economically, and politically: to develop resources, open markets, activate social and psychological potentials, enhance technological capabilities, deepen knowledge bases, improve possibilities of control, and so on.
Meanwhile, it would be a grave misunderstanding to see the fear of falling behind as the sole motivational resource behind modernityâs compulsion toward expansion. No social formation can persist for very long (particularly not as robustly and resiliently as capitalist modernity has) if it is based only on fear. Hence there must be a secondâpositive, attractiveâforce in play, one that we can identify as the promise of expanding our share of the world.6 The tremendously powerful idea that the key to a good life, a better life, lies in expanding our share of the world has arisen as a cultural correlate to the structural logic of dynamic stabilization in modernityâs understanding of itself, working its way deep into the tiniest pores of our psychological and emotional life. Our life will be better if we manage to bring more world within our reach: this is the mantra of modern life, unspoken but relentlessly reiterated and reified in our actions and behavior. As I would like to demonstrate in this essay, the categorical imperative of late modernityâAlways act in such a way that your share of the world is increasedâhas become the dominant principle behind our decision-making in all areas of life and across all ages, from toddlers to the elderly. This explains what makes money so attractive. How much world lies within our reach can be determined directly from our bank account. If our balance is high, then that South Seas cruise, the weekend cabin in the Alps, the luxury apartment in Winterhude outside Hamburg, the Ferrari, the diamond necklace, the Steinway piano, even an Ayurveda retreat in southern India or a secure guided tour of Mount Everest all lie within our reach. If we are billionaires, even a flight to the moon or to Mars is not out of the question. On the other hand, if we are deep in debt, we may not even be able to afford the bus ride home, a sandwich for lunch, or our basement apartment anymore. They are out of our financial reach.
Amazingly enough, the promise of increasing the radius of what is visible, accessible, and attainable to us may explain even the motivation that drives the entire history of technology. This becomes immediately comprehensible if we think about how we expand our individual radius over time via our mode of transportation. Learning to ride a bike is often a defining moment in the evolution of most childrenâs relationship to the world. Why? Because our first bike drastically expands the horizon of what we can reach on our own, of our own volition. Now I can ride to the lake, to the woods at the edge of townââmyâ world is now noticeably bigger. At least for children living in the countryside, this experience is t...