Introduction to Political Theory

Paul Graham, John Hoffman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN: 9781138389205
• eBook ISBN: 9780429753992
• Edition: 4
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This vibrant and significantly revised new edition is a comprehensive and accessible text for studying political theory in a changing world.

Bringing together classic and contemporary political concepts and ideologies into one book, it introduces the major approaches to political issues that have shaped our world, and the ideas that form the currency of political debate. Consistently, it relates political ideas to political realities through effective use of examples and case studies making theory lively, contentious, and relevant.

With significant revisions which reflect the latest questions facing political theory in an increasingly international context, key features and updates include:

• Two brand new chapters on Migration and Freedom of Speech and a significant new section on the radical right;
• Thought-provoking case studies to bring the theory to life including social media and internet regulation, Brexit and the EU, anti-vaxxer campaigns, surrogacy tourism, and autonomous anarchist zones;
• A revamped website, including podcasts, to aid study of, and reading around, the subject.

Introduction to Political Theory, Fourth Edition is the perfect accompaniment to undergraduate study in political theory, political philosophy, concepts and ideologies, and more broadly to the social sciences and philosophy.

Part 1 Coercion, legitimacy, and collective choice

Chapter 1 The State

DOI: 10.4324/9780429424106-3

Introduction

The state is a central concept in politics. Sociologist Max Weber defined it as an entity that commands a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a particular territory. Much modern (post sixteenth century) political theory is concerned with the meaning of ‘legitimacy’ and in this chapter we set out a number of arguments for the legitimacy of the state, as articulated by major political thinkers: (1) Its legitimacy derives from self-interest (Hobbes). (2) It reconciles morality and self-interest (Rousseau, Kant, Hegel). (3) It is an expression of sovereignty and it cannot be reduced to morality, self-interest, or even law (Schmitt). While the primary focus is on the individual’s relationship to a state, the chapter is rounded off with a discussion of the state in international relations – that is, the relationship between states.

Key questions

• What is the state?
• What is the rationale for the state?
• Could the state be reduced in size? Does it (for example) need to provide policing?

What is the state?

One of the most influential and useful definitions of the state was articulated by Max Weber (1864–1920): ‘The state is the only human community, which within a determinate area successfully claims a monopoly on legitimate physical violence’ (Weber, 1994: 311).¹ The italicisation is Weber’s and is the key part of the definition: what is a monopoly? What does it mean for this thing we call the state to be legitimate? And what is physical violence (physische Gewaltsamkeit)? Is there a difference between the state and a criminal gang? We start with the last of those questions.

A criminal gang can effectively impose its will within a particular locality. And it can extract payment, in the form of protection money. So how does it differ from the state?

1. State violence is based on laws, meaning that those who are subject to violence can predict how the state will behave. Of course, the success of organised criminal gangs also requires that their victims can plan: a business must know when and how much protection money it must pay, so this is not an entirely convincing distinction.
   Case study 1.1
   Do we need the police?

   

   PHOTO 1.1 © Marcin Rogozinski/Alamy Stock Photo.

   In economically developed societies, the state provides many services including health, education, and roadbuilding. These are funded from taxation, which is a compulsory charge imposed on citizens. There are vigorous debates about the degree to which these services should be state-funded, as we can see in the controversy over the Affordable Care Act (‘Obamacare’) in the United States. Rare however is it advocated that policing should be privately provided and funded. Security – internal (policing) and external (the armed forces) – is taken to be the core function of the state. But why not privatise the police?
   Before reading this chapter try to imagine a society without state-funded police. Note that security could be provided by non-state actors, so you are not being asked to imagine a society without security. The question is whether as a matter of fact in the absence of the state, such security would be produced.
2. The state uses violence, but it is constrained by a higher law, which may be positive (posited, created) or natural (not created). God’s commands would be an example of the former, while natural rights (human rights) illustrate the latter. However, the idea of being constrained conflicts with the idea of a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
3. States emerge from criminal gangs but over time acquire legitimacy in the eyes of those subject to violence. Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen argue that the Vikings, who raided England over several centuries, changed in the period 850–925 from roving to stationary bandits as they realised more was gained by monopolising violence – ‘taxing’ people in return for protecting them against other bandits (Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen, 2003: 256–7).
4. Perhaps we need to distinguish legitimate violence, exercised by the state, from illegitimate violence, practised by criminals. But then, Weber could have used a different phrase, such as a ‘monopoly on authority’. Furthermore, the term ‘authority’ is ambiguous. We accept to a large degree the authority of experts – for example, deferring to medical practitioners. Yet, authority can also be coercive. There is a continuum from the relatively freely accepted authority of experts to the coercive authority of bodies that threaten violence.
5. We could distinguish between de jure and de facto states. The former is legally recognised but does not effectively practise coercion, while the latter lacks legitimacy but is effective in getting people to do what they want them to do. But Weber argues that the state must be both legitimate and effective. An ineffective state is a failed state.

It is difficult to get away from the idea of violence and the tension between legitimacy and violence. There are various strategies for addressing this. The first is to reject legitimacy: the state is no different to a criminal gang and can never be legitimate, even if psychologically ‘citizens’ have internalised their acceptance of the state and perceive it as legitimate. This is the anarchist position (see pp. 207–8) The second approach is to reconcile violence and legitimacy through appeal to self-interest: we are all better off if we submit to the state. Its most famous advocate is Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and this position is discussed in the next section. The third is to identify the state with a community that is more than the sum of its members and so while violence – or the threat of violence – may be used against individuals, it is never ultimately used against the community. In different ways, we see this argument in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), Immanuel Kant (1720–1804), and G W F Hegel (1770–1831). The fourth can be found in the work of Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) and combines Hobbes, and his emphasis on power as a fact, with the German tradition of the community as above the individual.

The state as the product of individual self-interest

One of the most important arguments for the state was advanced by Hobbes in Leviathan (published 1651), which is arguably the first significant work of modern political thought. The method he uses to justify the state is contractarian (see pp. 165–6): we imagine a situation in which there is no state – the state of nature – and ask ourselves whether it is better to remain in the state of nature or agree to submit to a sovereign (or state). In the twentieth century, Hobbes has been reinterpreted as a rational-choice theorist (McLean, 1981). People are maximisers: they have preferences, and they seek to satisfy as many as possible. Other humans can frustrate them, but life is not pure conflict: through cooperation competitors can all gain. This competitive relationship can be thought of as a game – hence ‘game theory’; the most famous game is the prisoner’s dilemma.

Leviathan can be interpreted as an attempt to solve the prisoner’s dilemma. We imagine two people arrested for a crime. If they remain silent, each will be convicted of a relatively minor offence and spend a year in prison. If both confess, each receives five years for a more serious offence. If one confesses but the other remains silent, the confessor goes free, while the other receives a ten-year sentence. Clearly, the actions of one affect the outcome for the other, as can be seen from the pay-off table:

	Second prisoner Remains silent	Confesses
First prisoner Remains silent	1, 1	10, 0
Confesses	0, 10	5, 5

If we assume that the prisoners are self-interested, each will attempt to achieve his first preference. The preference-ordering of each can be tabulated:

	1st preference	2nd preference	3rd preference	4th preference
First prisoner	0, 10	1, 1	5, 5	10, 0
Second prisoner	10, 0	1, 1	5, 5	0, 10

It is not rational to remain silent while the other prisoner confesses and so the likely outcome is that each confesses, with the consequence that each satisfies only his third preference. This is termed the Nash equilibrium (or the unbeatable strategy): if you are the first prisoner, then no matter what the second prisoner does, you cannot do better than confess. If the second prisoner confesses you get five years. If he does not confess you go free.

What, however, makes the game interesting is that while from an individual perspective you cannot do better than confess, if you both cooperate and agree to remain silent, you could do better than five years in prison. The prisoner’s dilemma is a non-zero sum game: a gain for one prisoner does not result in an equivalent loss for the other. The explanation of how, through cooperation, each prisoner might move from his third to his second preference is a contemporary rendition of the reasoning behind Hobbes’s contract theory. The third preference represents the non-cooperation characteristic of the state of nature, the agreement to remain silent is equivalent to the contract itself, and the satisfaction of the second preference equates to life under a state. There are costs as well as benefits resulting from submission to a state – we are required to conform to laws which restrict our freedom. But we also gain the benefits of security, and with security comes increased prosperity, and a guarantee that we will enjoy a significant amount of (protected) personal freedom.

It might appear that the rational strategy is for each prisoner to give up his first preference to achieve his second preference. This is incorrect: for each prisoner, achieving his first preference should remain his goal. What he wants is an agreement with the other prisoner that each will remain silent, but then break the agreement in the hope the other prisoner will honour it. He wants to free-ride on the other’s compliance, gaining the benefit of cooperation, which is the avoidance of four years (five less one) in prison, without paying the cost of cooperation, one year in prison. Of course, each prisoner understands the motivations of the other, so a voluntary agreement is ineffective. What they need is a third-party enforcer of the agreement. The enforcer imposes sanctions on free-riders, so there is an incentive to comply. If each can be assured of the enforcer’s effectiveness a move from each prisoner’s third preference to his second preference can be achieved. In political terms, the enforcer is the state.

Hobbes reduces the legitimacy of the state to self-interest. His starting point is a materialist conception of human nature: human beings are ‘bodies in motion’, continually desiring things, and never fully satisfied (Hobbes, 1991: 118–20). Because there is scarcity of desired objects, humans are brought into conflict with one another. Their greatest fear is death, and that fear is the key to understanding why the state of nature is a ‘war of all against all’ (1991: 185–6). Because even the weakest can kill the strongest, there is an equality of vulnerability that makes pre-emptive action rational: kill or be killed.

While there are ‘laws of nature’ in the state of nature, these are best interpreted as rational guidance rather than moral obligations. For example, we are required to seek peace, unless war is necessary for self-defence (1991: 190).

A twentieth century theorist, John Plamenatz, criticised Hobbes on grounds that if his description of the state of nature were accurate, people would be too nasty to stick to any agreement, and if they stick to the agreement the state of nature cannot be as Hobbes describes it (Plamenatz, 1992: 193–7). One of the several insights of game theory is to provide a solution to this apparent paradox: what we seek is an agreement, equivalent to the prisoners’ agreement to remain silent, but what we fear is that other people will defect from the agreement. It follows that prisoner’s dilemma-type situations are assurance games. In short, people are not nasty, but fearful. You do not pre-emptively kill another out of enjoyment but because you cannot be certain she will not kill you. The key point is that you know other people face the same dilemma – kill or be killed – and so you have no option but to kill. What is required is somethin...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Brief Contents
• Table of Contents
• Preface to the Fourth Edition
• Introduction
• Part 1 Coercion, legitimacy, and collective choice
• Part 2 Freedom, equality, and justice
• Part 3 Classical ideologies
• Part 4 Contemporary Ideologies
• Part 5 Global political theory
• Index