1
A MOVIE PROBLEM
As soon as the Jews gained control of the âmovies,â we had a movie problem.
âHenry Fordâs Dearborn Independent, 1921
The idea that Hollywood could be subversive is as old as the industry itself. The culture wars at the turn of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of mass amusements as a challenge to a Victorian America grounded in distinct class and gender divisions, especially in the realm of entertainment. This Protestant culture faced the challenge of new immigrants, many of them Catholics and Jews from southern and eastern Europe. As the forces of urbanization and industrialization transformed the nation, a mass society emerged and, along with it, a mass culture. Starting with nickelodeons in ethnic communities and spreading to movie houses across the nation, cinema quickly became the leading form of mass culture.1
As middle-class defenders of the Victorian way struggled to maintain social control, they turned their attention to the screen. To their dismay, they found that control of the film industry rested in the hands of the very groups they sought to maintain in a position of subordination. As one historian notes, the movie mogulsâpredominantly eastern European Jewsâwere seen by the public as âpart splendid emperors, part barbarian invaders.â2 The Hollywood Jews soon became the target of vicious anti-Semitic diatribes. For instance, in 1921 Henry Fordâs Dearborn Independent branded Hollywood as
Jew-controlled, not in spots only, not 50 per cent merely, but entirely; with the natural consequence that now the world is in arms against the trivializing and demoralizing influences of that form of entertainment as presently managedâŠ. As soon as the Jews gained control of the âmovies,â we had a movie problem, the consequences of which are not yet visible. It is the genius of that race to create problems of a moral character in whatever business they achieve a majority.3
The image of a Jewish-controlled medium, therefore, was deeply intertwined with the image of a morally subversive Hollywood.4
For some, film became synonymous with licentiousness. The theaters themselves were seen as dens of iniquity, where illicit activities could take place beneath the cover of darkness. In an era marked by steep concern over urban vice and âwhite slavery,â moral guardians believed that the exhibition of movies threatened a sexual revolution. What appeared on the screen did little to set their minds at ease. Genteel-minded critics fretted over the vulgar antics of Charlie Chaplin, whose penchant for bawdy humor enthralled many. Film critic James Agee recalled his motherâs objections to the comedian: âThat horrid little man!âŠHeâs so nasty!âŠSo vulgar! With his nasty little cane; hooking up skirts and things, and that nasty little walk!â Others were outraged by Cecil B. DeMilleâs Male and Female (1919), which tantalized audiences with a brief glimpse of Gloria Swansonâs bare breasts. Fearing the effect on society and especially on children, middle-class reformers, Catholic leaders, and activists in the Womenâs Christian Temperance Union pushed for control of the screen. Censorship boards sprang up at local and state levels, leading finally to the industryâs adoption of a code for self-regulation in the early 1930s. The motion picture industry, as historian Francis Couvares notes, took shape not only as a result of economic imperatives, but cultural ones as well.5
Hollywood, therefore, served as a leading locale for early twentieth-century culture wars, a moral and ethnic challenge to the established order. Often seen as subversive in this broader sense, the motion picture also acquired a reputation for political subversion as well. Political struggles over film content focused largely on class issues until the late 1930s, when fighting fascism consumed much of Hollywoodâs political focus. During this earlier period, filmmakers on the left sought to use film to promote the betterment of the working classes, their messages ranging from calls for sympathy to demands for revolution. Their enemies on the right detected a grave danger in all of this, fearing a Communist propaganda conspiracy that could induce the masses to overturn the social order in the name of Bolshevism. In this cultural struggle lay the roots, though not yet the beginning, of Hollywoodâs cold war.
This chapter traces the âmovie problemâ during the 1920s and 1930s, when political battles for control of the screen focused first on issues of labor and class, and then, as fascism threatened Europe beginning with the Spanish Civil War, on issues of foreign policy. In the early 1920s, government officials, led by J. Edgar Hoover and his Bureau of Investigation began monitoring filmmakers, fearing the production of films they considered Communist propaganda. In the wake of the first red scare, however, the bureauâs powers were stripped, and federal surveillance of filmmaking all but ceased. Concerns over Communist propaganda remained, however. During the 1930s, Hollywoodâs internal censors in the Production Code Administration sought to prohibit the production of radical films. By many standard accounts they succeeded in this endeavor, but film can be a tricky medium. In the past decade historians have chronicled the ways in which some 1930s Hollywood films managed to convey left-of-center ideas despite this censorship.6 Indeed, as I argue in this chapter, even in some cases where the censors believed they had scored a victory, alternative (even radical) readings of the film in question remained possible. Despite the efforts of these officials, 1930s culture remained open to cinematic critiques from the left. Americaâs âmovie problemâ had only just begun.
The First Red Scare and the Movies
It seems fitting that the Bureau of Investigation was founded by a Bonaparte. In 1908 Theodore Rooseveltâs attorney general, Charles J. Bonaparte, grandnephew of Napoleon I, created the agency as the investigative arm of the Justice Department, which had previously relied on Pinkertons or the Secret Service Division of the Treasury Department. The act went against Congressional desires to preclude âa Federal secret police,â but it was nonetheless part of Teddy Rooseveltâs ânew federalism,â which initiated one of the greatest political trends in twentieth-century America, the increasing centralization of power under the executive branch. Indeed, this trend was evident within the Bureau of Investigation itself (which would be renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1935), for its power and jurisdiction would eventually grow well beyond the role initially defined by Bonaparte.7
However, the man who would preside over most of the bureauâs growth and wield much of its power did not descend from European rulers but from American bureaucrats. John Edgar Hoover joined the bureau as a clerk in 1917. The job paid poorly, but it did provide an indefinite deferment from military service. Having mastered the filing system at the Library of Congress before joining the bureau, Hoover used his bureaucratic skills to assist his meteoric rise in the agency. His xenophobia and antiradicalism also suited him well, for his rise within the bureau mirrored that agencyâs expansion, largely a result of wartime legislation (the Immigration Act, the Espionage Act, the Sedition Act). The postwar biennio rosso, or âred years,â witnessed further repression from the newly formed Radical Division,8 headed by Hoover under Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. Palmer and Hoover soon started a deportation drive that, according to Richard Gid Powers, had as its real aim âa permanent alteration in American political culture by the setting of strict legal limits to allowable political dissent.â Known perhaps misleadingly as the âPalmer raids,â the Justice Departmentâs roundup of thousands in 1919 and 1920 was secretly orchestrated by Hoover. Palmer sought political capital for his planned presidential campaign, but his predictions of radical violence on May Day came to naught, and Senate hearings soon exposed the Palmer raids for what they were. Palmer was out as soon as the Harding administration was in. Hoover managed to survive.9
Warren Gamaliel Harding won election to the presidency on a âreturn to normalcyâ campaign engineered by Will H. Hays. Hardingâs attorney general, Harry Daugherty, named William J. Burns as the new director of the bureau in 1921. There was a new assistant director tooâJ. Edgar Hoover. Burns and Hoover continued the antiradicalism of the Palmer days, but with much less publicity. Bureau surveillance extended beyond radicals to such groups as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Communists, leftist college students and faculty members, even members of Congress who had been critical of the Palmer raids or who advocated recognition of the Soviet Union were monitored by bureau agents.10 Hoover managed to strongly influence the bureau, even in this early period, and he would shape the agencyâs ideological mold over the course of his half-century tenure as âthe boss.â
In many ways, Hooverâs fears were Americaâs fears. As historian Anders Stephanson argues, Americaâs cold war ideology evolved from a deeply rooted tradition in which the polar extremes of âfreedomâ and its opposite (tyranny, slavery, totalitarianism) are in constant tension. Indeed, the âfirst principleâ of this peculiarly American mindset âis the dynamic notion that freedom is always already under threat, internally as well as externally, and that it must be defended by those so called upon.â11 Thus, the American worldview proclaims a messianic national mission (city on a hill, white manâs burden, containment) while revealing a fundamental insecurity.
And yet Hooverism greatly intensified this traditional American insecurity.12 Hoover, after all, subscribed to what some historians term a âcountersubversiveâ tradition, an ideology marked by intense anxieties regarding the danger of foreign and radical subversion. Countersubversives were those patriotic zealots who despised the radical Left with a fury. Their anti-Communism was irresponsible, their devotion to the cause often fanatic and at times irrational. They were spurred on by nightmares of conspiracy, by their endless lists of spies and subversives (some real, some imagined), and by the intense feeling that radicalism was akin to a contagious germ that would spread unless quarantined. Over the years Hoover would often compare Communism to a disease, insisting that âthe Communist hopes to implant his Red virus and to secure a deadly culture which will spread to others.â13 Whether this disease discourse truly represented Hooverâs fears, or whether he employed this language merely for public consumption, Hoover was quite effective in mobilizing a countersubversive network consisting of government, civic, business, labor, and religious institutions. His bureau was soon at the center of this network.14
Hoover was by no means all powerful or unique, but his position of powerâhe was named director of the bureau in 1924, a position he held until his death nearly half a century laterâmeant that his ideology and his idiosyncrasies could be transmitted into policy, sometimes with disastrous effects. Hooverâs personality loomed large over his subordinates. To a great degree he was able to institutionalize his own worldview within the bureau. His biographers describe the FBI as a âtightly centralized bureaucracyâ in which âa virtual cult of personalityâ reigned. Perhaps unable to control each of his agents as strictly as he wished, âthe bossâ nevertheless ran a tight ship. He formulated stringent guidelines for his men, moral as well as professional. He insisted that agents undergo extensive legal training, and also that their personal lives comport with his conservative values. Bureau agents were expected to abide by a dress code and remain faithful to their wives, and they were subject to a rigorous merit-based system for employee evaluations. Furthermore, recruits consisted mainly of young men from the South and West, whom Hoover believed were more easily molded to his conservative worldview. Hooverâs agents were a tightly disciplined bunch, monitored for their performance, professionalism, sobriety, and even marital status.15
Despite his traditionalism, and even despite his quirks, Hoover was no simpleton. He quickly gained a reputation as an excellent administrator, an expert at scientific management. At the time he took the top spot in the bureau, Hoover was described as a youthful, no-nonsense leader dedicated to professionalizing the agency by discharging the âgumshoe sleuthsâ and putting a high premium on agentsâ legal training. His administrative reforms successfully centralized the bureauâs files and operations. Under Hoover, the bureau pioneered advanced techniques in criminal identification. One arm of the FBI, the Crime Records Division, operated simultaneously as a tool for public information and bureau publicity. The director transformed the bureau into an efficient, yet authoritarian, outfit molded closely to his own ideological predispositions and personal idiosyncrasies.16
A supremely talented bureaucrat and manager, Hoover was also an odd man. His biographers describe him as âprobably totally repressed.â He was a moralist who lived with his domineering Calvinist mother. He was a loner whose few companions were always men. He was parochial, xenophobic, and power hungry. A sickly youngster, he maintained a phobia of germs. He even âhad his toilet in northwest Washington built on a platform to protect him from the menace of micro-organic invasion.â And Communists, to Hoover, were much like germs, for âhe identified political radicalism with filth and licentiousness, neither of which ever failed to arouse in him almost hysterical loathing.â17 Hooverâs bureau evinced this hysteria in its acute fears of Communist propaganda in the motion pictures.
Independent left-wing filmmakers, not Hollywood artists, were the first to raise the bureauâs fears concerning film propaganda. In November 1920, the director of Connecticutâs Department of Americanization, Robert Deming, alarmed the Justice Department to the threat mounted by the Labor Film Service (LFS), a New Yorkâbased company that has been described by one historian as the most ambitious of the left independents in the 1920s. Deming received his information from Guy Hedlund, a protĂ©gĂ© of D. W. Griffith and director of The Contrast (1921) for LFS. Deming forwarded the Labor Film Serviceâs literature, noting âa peculiar flavor about it that is not pleasant.â To this Connecticut official, the existence of the Labor Film Service âindicate[d] that Lenine [sic] and Trotsky are not short of agents in this country.â This information quickly made its way to Hoover, who soon had his own agents monitoring LFS. Hoover promptly shared bureau reports with the director of Military Intelligence. In short time, the Labor Film Service aroused deep concern on the part of many government officials.18 Given their politics, the countersubversives were right to fear the Labor Film Service. Headed by Joseph D. Cannon, a fiery union radical who was New Yorkâs Socialist candidate for governor in 1920, LFS had very lofty goals.19 The company recognized its task as propagandistic, yet asserted that its films would be made âalways on the basis of truth and fact.â Cannon proclaimed that the masses would flock to LFSâs quality-made motion pictures; not only would these films be popular, they would âserve as the most potent force for good in the country.â Such may have been the typical hyperbole of a fund-raiser, but, nonetheless, Cannon and his colleagues in LFS were idealistic, even romantic radica...