The Ethics of Aquinas

Stephen J. Pope

• Publisher: Georgetown University Press
• Year: 2002
• Print ISBN: 9780878408887
• eBook ISBN: 9781589019928
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Christian Theology

In this comprehensive anthology, twenty-seven outstanding scholars from North America and Europe address every major aspect of Thomas Aquinas's understanding of morality and comment on his remarkable legacy. While there has been a revival of interest in recent years in the ethics of St. Thomas, no single work has yet fully examined the basic moral arguments and content of Aquinas' major moral work, the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae. This work fills that lacuna.

The first chapters of The Ethics of Aquinas introduce readers to the sources, methods, and major themes of Aquinas's ethics. The second part of the book provides an extended discussion of ideas in the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae, in which contributors present cogent interpretations of the structure, major arguments, and themes of each of the treatises. The third and final part examines aspects of Thomistic ethics in the twentieth century and beyond.

These essays reflect a diverse group of scholars representing a variety of intellectual perspectives. Contributors span numerous fields of study, including intellectual history, medieval studies, moral philosophy, religious ethics, and moral theology. This remarkable variety underscores how interpretations of Thomas's ethics continue to develop and evolve—and stimulate fervent discussion within the academy and the church.

This volume is aimed at scholars, students, clergy, and all those who continue to find Aquinas a rich source of moral insight.

PART I

The First Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae

Happiness (Ia IIae, qq. 1–5)

Georg Wieland

Translated by Grant Kaplan

One can gather from the title that the Summa theologiae is a theological work. Such a statement seems trivial, yet it has significant repercussions. The structure and system of the Summa result from theological rather than philosophical presuppositions. The goal of theology is the knowledge of God: in the first place knowledge of God in Himself, that is, in the unity of the divine essence, in the Trinity of His persons, and in the departure of creation from Him; next knowledge of God as the end of creation; finally knowledge of God as Redeemer.

By understanding God as the end of creation, Thomas locates the human person at the center of his reflection from the start. As an image of God, “he is himself the principle of his actions, possessing, so to speak, a free will and control over his actions”(Ia IIae, Prol.).¹ Even when the “so to speak” (quasi) seems to hint at a limitation of human possibilities, in the Secunda pars of the Summa theologiae, Thomas understands the person as a fundamentally acting being (q. 6, Prol.). It is not so in the Summa contra gentiles, where, in Book III, Thomas treats the person and his deeds as simply a part of a complete process of the return of all creatures, even irrational creatures, to God. Thus it makes perfect sense in this context for Thomas to discuss questions of evil and divine Providence.² For how else but through the guidance and direction of God Himself can created beings reach their end? Book III treats “the complete authority or diginity of God, insofar as He is the end and ruler of all things.”³

By contrast, the Summa theologiae interprets the themes of divine Providence and evil in the context of the doctrine of creation. Therefore, the section concerning the return of creation to God takes the form of a practical treatise, a “consideration of morality” (moralis igitur consideratio; ibid.). This treatise considers how the person either reaches or falls short of the proper human end through his or her actions. Such a treatise must determine the end at the beginning, since human life and action only maintain order and structure on the basis of an end. “For the end is the rule of whatever is ordered to the end” (q. 1, Prol.).⁴

THE ULTIMATE END

Following his practical intention, Thomas places the determination of the end of human action in the center of his deliberation. There is again a definite difference from the Summa contra gentiles. The latter deals above all with the finality of every form of activity: “Every agent acts for the sake of an end.”⁵ Human action and the corresponding end only appear as a special case of cosmic movement (which is, however, especially important). In contrast, the Secunda pars of the Summa theologiae focuses on actions that proceed from reason and free will. They are called human actions (q. 1, a. 1).⁶ Thomas then answers the question: in what does the final end of human life and actions consist? The first five questions of the Prima secundae intend to answer this question.

The first question proposes the fundamental axiom that all human beings strive toward a single end (q. 1, a. 7). Thomas must answer certain questions in order to establish this central axiom. The first question asks: do human beings act for the sake of an end (q. 1, a. 1)? Thomas approaches this question by examining the finality intrinsic to the intentional structure of human action. Human action is a “movement” that proceeds from a potency—in this case from the will—and is directed to an act. This act receives its “nature” (ratio) from the corresponding object (Ia, q. 77, a. 3), that is, the “end” (finis) of the will (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 1).⁷ Human action thus entails a disposition toward an end.

The analytical connection between action and end leads to the next question: could it be that only certain beings which possess reason and free will act for the sake of an end because only they are able to know an end, and have their actions directed toward that end? Thomas naturally rejects this suggestion because every action presumes an end and the end allows the process of acting to take its course (q. 1, a. 2). The difference between irrational and rational creatures, according to Thomas, is that the former strive for an end because they are led by something outside themselves, whereas the latter move toward the end conceived and desired by themselves (ibid.). Thomas goes one step further in his theory of action by arguing that human (or moral) actions as such can be identified through the intentionality of the agent (q. 1, a. 3). He gives the example of killing a person either for the sake of justice or to appease one’s anger (q. 1, a. 3, ad 3). In the first case, the killing is an act of virtue (at least according to the conventional logic of the thirteenth century), while in the second case, it is a reprehensible act.

This answer still falls short of a complete description of human or moral actions; intention is necessary, but does not suffice as a provision for action. If intention alone were enough, then the floodgates would be open for randomness and complete relativity. One must therefore locate individual intention within a more comprehensive moral context. Thomas thus continues by establishing the necessity of a final end. Such a foundation is essential; without it, the movement of action could not be reached. This is because the final end does not merely consist in the end of one’s action and the cessation of one’s striving, but also in their respective origins. Striving and action would not be initiated, and would not be able to move from potentiality to actuality, if they were not already in possession of an end, mediated through the intention. This end puts the process of action in motion (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4). And in the sequence toward the end there must be a conclusion.

To prove this claim, Thomas invokes the impossibility of the “infinite regression” (regressus in infinitum; Ia, q. 2, a. 3; q. 46, a. 2, ad 7).⁸ Without a first, which is the origin of a movement, there could not be a second, third, and so on; therefore, no movement at all. This impossibility pertains to the order of intention: there must be a final end that sets the striving and action in motion, and it is effective in the order of execution. There must be a “point” from which an action derives, because the action could not otherwise begin (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4). Thomas is primarily concerned with the order of intention, and for this intention, he proposes a final end. This end exists for the particular goals of a person and means an inner, lasting foundation, not simply an external, contingent impulse.

In article six of the first Question, Thomas examines the final end in the particularity of striving and action. He formulates his thesis in the following manner: “The strength of the first intention, which results with regard to the final end, remains preserved in every striving for every possible object even when one does not expressly think about the final end” (q. 1, a. 6, ad 3).⁹ This axiom applies as well for the actions lacking extrinsic purpose and end. Certain actions, such as games or quiet, self-contained reflections, have their purpose in themselves. Delight and rest are brought to the performer of such activities, and they contribute to his or her well-being. The anthropological and ethical significance of this line of thinking is obvious: despite the plurality and particularity of one’s striving and action, the person develops not only a natural, but also an intentional and practical unity, and due to such a unity, each person is able at all times to answer for his or her entire life.

Thomas does not hold that the presence of the final end in every particular act of striving means that each person is continually aware of this presence. Experience teaches us that such an awareness is not possible. Yet the final end still has consequences for all our actions. In the final analysis, it actually orders each human life. Hence, an individual cannot simultaneously have more than one final end (q. 1, a. 5).

The connection between human striving and fulfillment provides the decisive argument for this thesis. That which completely fulfills human striving is called the “final end” (ultimus finis) (ibid.). This is a purely formal determination, not entailing any specification concerning substantive qualities. Yet simply in light of this idea, it is contradictory to accept several final ends. For if the striving of the person were completely fulfilled, and the person still desired something else, such striving would necessarily not have been completely fulfilled.

It is important to note that Thomas here argues in a formal manner. By contrast, in the Summa contra gentiles, he draws the conclusion of unity of the highest good—of God—directly from the teleology of all things: “Since everything strives toward its end insofar as that end is good, then the good must be the end insofar as it is good. The highest good is, accordingly, in the greatest measure the end of all things. But the highest good can only be one thing, and that is God.”¹⁰ This logic shows that the formal argumentation in the Summa theologiae takes this presupposition into account, namely that the person is a dispositional essence. From this presupposition, Thomas cannot immediately reach a conclusion concerning the unity of the final end. He must find instead the nature of the person and of human striving in order to unpack the essential unity of the person and the nature of the final end.

Thomas holds that there can only be one final end, not only for one person, but for all human beings (q. 1, a. 7). The teleology of movement in general and of human action in particular explains the dynamic of striving. This striving aims at and comes to rest in its fulfillment. The assertion of the “unity” of the final end does not only apply in this form to rational creatures, but in fact to all creatures. Moreover, Thomas believes it obvious that all things strive for their fulfillment.

However, the determination of the final end is the point where opinion divides. Different conclusions are derived from different lifestyles (q. 1, a. 7, ad 2). The politician considers power the final end, and the hedonist pleasure. The question concerning the true final end can best be answered by the one who lives the most moral life (q. 1, a. 7). This axiom can only apply if all agree on what constitutes the most moral life.

Even if one accepts that the thirteenth century had a universal consensus, Thomas does not argue on this basis; rather, he draws on his insight into the essence of human striving and action. This becomes evident when he pursues the question of whether the final end of human beings differs from that of the rest of creation (q. 1, a. 8). In his doctrine of creation, Thomas holds that “the divine goodness is the end of all things” (Ia, q. 44, a. 4).¹¹ He speaks of God as “the final end of humanity and all other realities” (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 8).¹² Thomas does not introduce this proposition in an argumentative manner, but simply uses it to emphasize the special manner in which humans (and other rational creatures like angels) achieve this end. They do so through knowledge and love, which separates them from all other creatures that do not possess reason and free will.

THE CONTENT OF HAPPINESS

The purpose of the first Question is fulfilled: all people have a single end—their completion. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that with the beginning of the second Question, Thomas first officially introduces the concept of happiness (beatitudo). Yet even if one accepts the results of the first Question, there remain a number of problems, two of which need to be raised here. If all people have only one final end, why do they pursue completely different ends? Furthermore, what exactly is it that wholly fulfills the person? The formal line of argument in the first Question led to a formal conclusion. This formal conclusion must now be complemented with a substantive, material explanation.

The second Question does not openly examine the basis for the difference of ends. Instead this difference is assumed. This means that Thomas proceeds with the presupposition of different lifestyles. One finds this in the formulation of the Question itself. Thomas’s question—“in which forms (concepts) does happiness consist?”—assumes more than one understanding of an “end” (q. 2, Prol.).¹³ He does not address this plurality by referring to the unity of the end. In fact, he cannot do this, because he recognizes in principle the different ways in which this one end can be reached. Instead, he analyses the different ends under a formal perspective, that is, whether these ends can guarantee human completion. Thomas is concerned here with understanding the essence of humanity. He does not ask what the person should do, but what different ends can or cannot be achieved.¹⁴ One can see as a result of this discussion that the one good that corresponds to the universality of human striving is capable of achieving the completion of the person (q. 2, a. 8). At this point, Thomas concludes that only God can be the end of all humanity.

The analysis of different accounts of the content of the end connects Aristotelian and Stoic ethics with their Christian reception in Thomas’s theological context. In the course of the question, Thomas develops a variety of important ideas meriting examination. The idea that the happiness of a person could consist in wealth was always rejected by classical and medieval ethics. This possibility obviously applies to Thomas’s position as well (q. 2, a. 1). He takes up two Aristotelian ideas: the instrumental character of wealth and the potential infinity of human acquisitiveness.

One can describe wealth as the possession of natural goods that direc...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas—Revisited
• The Sources of the Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas
• Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas
• Part I: The First Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae
• Part II: The Second Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae
• Part III: The Twentieth-Century Legacy
• Contributors
• Index