Possibilism

3 Key excerpts on "Possibilism"

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  eBook - ePub

  Exploring Social Geography (Routledge Revivals)

  • Peter A. Jackson, Susan J. Smith(Authors)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Taylor & Francis

    (Publisher)

  Harvey (in this essay, at least) and Ley identify firmly with the type of behavioural geography which is concerned with the philosophies of meaning, not those aspiring after ‘spatial science’. It is from this line of development (Marxian humanism in the case of Harvey, and the more liberal philosophies of phenomenology, existentialism, and pragmatism in the case of Ley), that contemporary humanism in social geography has emerged. In turning to consider this, it will be apparent that behavioural geography cannot be treated in isolation from other recent developments within social geography. The problems it has encountered in facing up to the criticism of its apparent neglect of structural constraints are part of a wider argument about the relationship between human agency and social structure (see Gregory 1981). This, in turn, goes back to such fundamental questions as the relationship between free will and determinism – a theme we now go on to consider.

  Human agency, free will and determinism

  One of the earliest philosophical debates within human geography concerned the controversy over environmental determinism. To what extent can human behaviour be ‘explained’ with reference to the physical environment and to what extent is man the agent of his own destiny, free from the controls of the inanimate world? The debate was provoked by those who, like Semple and Taylor, appeared to believe that the physical environment exercised an ineluctable influence on man: that human activity could be related back to causal explanations couched in terms of purely environmental influences. The crudest kind of environmentalism was climatic, and reached its apotheosis with Huntington (1907) who sought to relate human migration to climatic fluctuations according to a narrowly mechanistic, inexorable relationship. The roots of geographic determinism extend back at least to the 19th-century German geographer, Ratzel, who argued in a much quoted passage that ‘A people … should live on the land which fate has given them; they should die there, submitting to its laws …’ (Ratzel 1898–9, p. 12).

  These seemingly fatalistic attitudes towards an all-determining environment were countered, particularly in French geographic thought, by the rise of Possibilism, guided by the work of Lucien Feb vre (see Buttimer 1971). This movement was attractive in admitting the possibility of a variety of alternative human responses towards the same environment, but it never effectively countered the logical necessity for determinism in cause-and-effect explanations (Martin 1951). A series of papers attempting to do so (see Montefiore & Williams 1955, Jones 1956), which Harvey (1969) describes as ‘quite outstanding’, came to no real conclusions; for determinism was not the kind of hypothesis that could be accepted or rejected on the basis of simple empirical tests. Indeed, the demise of environmental determinism can truly be said to have come about finally not because its principles were disproved, but because its examples were disputed (Martin 1951). Thus, the earlier arguments over geographical determinism were never settled: indeed, it was scarcely conceivable that they should be, having in various guises continually stimuated the imagination of philosophers for generations.

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  Grand Theories and Ideologies in the Social Sciences

  • H. Wiarda(Author)
  • 2010(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  Lewthwaite argued that envi- ronmental determinism is “the view that the physical, natural or geographic environment rigidly controls human action.” He stated that “the definition of geography is the study of relationships between the environment and man.” Finally, “determinism, in geography,” is “frequently an abbreviation for the particular determinism which selects the geographic environment as the primary control of human life.” 6 E n v i r o n m e n ta l a n d G e o g r a p h i c D e t e r m i n i s m 143 Development of the Concept Geographical research after Darwin’s famous treatise was primarily concerned with recognizing the laws of nature. In human geography this approach led to a rather deterministic view of struggle and sur- vival. Nature was studied with open eyes, seeking as objectively as possible to identify the forces or processes that governed the forma- tion of valleys, uplands, and coastlines. Nineteenth century scholars held similar views with regard to human activity, as man’s achieve- ments were considered the consequences of natural conditions. 7 The biological roots of geography enabled it to serve as a significant component of legitimation theory in the post-Darwinian “natural- ism” period, when science, as distinct from religion, legitimated social actions. Geography became a modern, mass-produced science, as it fulfilled ideological functions as well as provided practical skills (like exploration, inventory, mapping, and boundary drawing). 8 One of the key environmental determinists during the Darwin/ Spencer era in the 1880s was Friedrich Ratzel. Trained in zoology, geology, and comparative anatomy, Ratzel was ideally positioned to establish geography as a modern science.

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  The Essential Hirschman

  • Albert O. Hirschman, Jeremy Adelman(Authors)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  This “naive” disregard of sociopolitical realities and of vested interests is precisely rooted in my Possibilism: I propose fundamental changes in institutions such as international aid and investment, but I am not willing to prejudge categorically the extent, much less the modality, of the wider social and political transformations that may or may not be a prerequisite for such proposals ever being adopted. The reason for this agnosticism is in this case the observation that the constraints on policy makers are far less binding in a number of conceivable historical constellations than at “normal” times. Moreover, one important condition for such constellations to yield real change is the prior availability and discussion (followed then, of course, by contemptuous dismissal) of “radical reform” ideas that can be readily picked up when times suddenly cease to be normal.

  The essays of part III deal in large measure with ideologies and concepts characteristic of the literature on economic and political development and of the intellectual climate in the developing countries. Here I have found an exceptionally good hunting ground for exaggerated notions of absolute obstacles, imaginary dilemmas, and one-way sequences. The essence of the possibilist approach consists in figuring out avenues of escape from such straitjacketing constructs in any individual case that comes up. But to go about this task efficiently it is helpful to be equipped with a few conceptual tools. In the following I shall therefore describe in general terms how I have come to practice “Possibilism,” how I have found it possible to increase the number of ways in which the occurrence of change can be visualized.

  One handy device is, once again, the notion of blessing (or curse) in disguise. By pointing to the ways in which many presumed “obstacles” to development have in some situations turned into an asset and a spur, one obviously casts doubt on any statements about this or that “obstacle” having to be eliminated if there is to be this or that desirable development.

  But the notion of “blessing in disguise” is like a label for a certain class of sense data; it has little explanatory value. An intellectually more satisfying, though more specialized, foundation for Possibilism was encountered in the theory of cognitive dissonance. A group of social psychologists has shown through this theory that changes in beliefs, attitudes, and eventually in personality can be entrained by certain actions instead of being a prerequisite to them. This idea is so congenial to my thinking that I pointed to one such “inverted” sequence even before I had become acquainted with Festinger et al.: in many situations, so I argued, the Protestant ethic is not the cause of entrepreneurial behavior, but rather arises as its consequence.29

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