Occupation of the Ruhr

8 Key excerpts on "Occupation of the Ruhr"

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  Does Conquest Pay?

  The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies

  • Peter Liberman(Author)
  • 1998(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  C H A P T E R 5 The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923–1924 R EPARATION , like imperial tribute, consists of economic resources ex-torted from vanquished nations. The main difference is that reparations are justified by victors, fairly or unfairly, as legitimate and finite compen-sation for war damages and costs caused by criminal aggression. But few defeated nations are so burdened by war guilt that they happily surrender the demanded sums. Most must be militarily occupied or threatened for reparations to be extracted. Since cases of forced reparations extraction are analogous to other cases of conquest and economic mobilization, they add to our knowledge about the profitability of conquest. Over the course of 1923 and 1924, France and Belgium occupied Ger-many’s industrial Ruhr Valley to collect reparations for the damage in-flicted on them in World War I. The first phase of the occupation, from January through September 1923, resembled the German occupation of Belgium during World War I. The occupied population took no violent steps to expel the intruders but used passive resistance to frustrate re-source extraction. This passive resistance campaign, known as the Ruhrkampf (“Ruhr struggle”), worked while it lasted, but it depended on support from the rest of Germany. When this support dried up, resistance collapsed, allowing the occupiers to extract massive reparations during the second phase of the occupation. Comparing the two phases of the Ruhr occupation, like comparing World War I Belgium and Luxem-bourg, provides further evidence of the importance of coercion to the profitability of conquest. FRANCO-BELGIAN AIMS At the end of World War I, France sought lasting guarantees of security against Germany. Though defeated and territorially pruned, Germany remained the most industrially dynamic and populous country in West-ern Europe. France, while triumphant, had lost a generation of men, mortgaged its financial future, and seen its industrial northern region dev-astated.

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  Experience and Memory

  The Second World War in Europe

  • Jörg Echternkamp, Stefan Martens, Jörg Echternkamp, Stefan Martens(Authors)
  • 2010(Publication Date)
  • Berghahn Books

    (Publisher)

  Many a young Belgian had experienced the occupation of his region by German soldiers between 1914 and 1918 and then, after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, had himself taken part in the Occupation of the Ruhr Area and the Rhineland. Twenty years later, he again found himself under the domination of a German administration. On the German side, many generations had been shaped by similar experiences, which significantly contributed to the evolution of a national identity in this border region between France and Germany. This chapter traces the conception of the occupation of the Benelux countries the Germans developed at the time. It is not primarily interested in the views of the National Socialist functional elite, but rather in the networks between administrators, historians, and other intellectuals who had an interest in these regions. Wittingly or unwittingly, these individuals took part in a thought process that facilitated German plans for the reannexation of these territories between 1940 and 1944. In this context it is important to distinguish between two levels of historical time: space of experience (Erfahrungsraum) and horizon of expectation (Erwartungshorizont) (Reinhart Koselleck). 2 The concept space of experience is particularly suitable for this analysis in that it combines two significant terms: space in its geographical and experience in its temporal connotation. Combining these two elements for the region in question, which encompasses Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, we can discern three important aspects: the First World War, the occupation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr Area, and Westforschung. 3 Space and time are intimately interwoven here. Moreover, these aspects had multifaceted impacts on the planning and implementation of Germany'.s occupation policies in Western Europe from 1940 onwards. Three possible spaces of experience The first space of experience is the First World War

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  The British in Interwar Germany

  The Reluctant Occupiers, 1918-30

  • David G. Williamson(Author)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • Bloomsbury Academic

    (Publisher)

  1 In fact in the early hours of 11 January the Ruhr was invaded in a three-pronged operation by French and Belgian troops. By the evening 6,000 French troops equipped with tanks and artillery had occupied Essen, and over the next three days the rest of the Ruhr district was firmly under Franco-Belgian control. On 11 January General Degoutte set up the Inter-Allied Mission for the Control of Factories and Mines (MICUM) under Emile Coste, which was to supervise the delivery of coal and other raw materials to France and Belgium. Its task was to be greatly complicated by the rapid evacuation on 8 January of the offi ces of the Rhine-Westphalian Coal syndicate, which controlled the whole coal output of the Ruhr, to Hamburg. This led to MICUM offi cials engaging ‘in a long weary war of attrition with individual firms and even pit managers’ in an effort to acquire accurate production statistics. 2 Poincaré’s assessment that the German government had no plans to counter a French occupation was initially proved correct. Opposition to the occupation began with a locally inspired general strike, which was supported by the works’ councils, and was primarily sustained by the Ruhr workers and local government offi cials. Once it became clear that this had popular backing, only then did the Berlin government offi cially support it. By the Düren agreement of 10 February signed by the Reich and Prussian governments and representatives of the unions and employers it was agreed that employees were to be paid and kept at work regardless of production levels. 3 Passive resistance in the longer term significantly increased the cost of the Ruhr occupation for the French and weakened the franc, but at the same time, as it was financed through the printing of money, it also destroyed the mark through hyperinflation and gave Poincaré the opportunity to take coercive measures, which went far beyond seizing control of productive pledges.

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  Britain and the Weimar Republic

  The History of a Cultural Relationship

  • Colin Storer(Author)
  • 2010(Publication Date)
  • I.B. Tauris

    (Publisher)

  The c ontinuing economic crisis in Germany and the German insistence that reparations payments would not be forthcoming left the British with no choice but to acquiesce to the occupation of Düsseldorf, Duisbu rg and Ruhort by French troops in March 1921. This ac tion was a prelude to a more serious crisis which erupted when, against the wishes of the British, France and Belgium sent troops to invade and occupy the Ruhr in January 1923. The Ruhr Crisis , and the policy of passive resistance by which the German gover nment sought to deal with it , se nt the German economy into free fall and threatened to break the fragile Anglo -French entente once and for all. Furthermore , it resulted in increased hardship for an already weakened and demoralised population and, as one his torian has suggested, left the Weimar Republic ‘fatally wounded, a weakened body that soon enough would be overwhelmed by the Nazi virus’ . 6 Yet it also led to the formation of the Dawes plan and brought an end to French ambitions on the Rhine. The Ruhr adv enture had been a gamble on the part of the French and for a moment it had looked as though it might pay off. But the venture left France exhausted, and without British financial backing she had no choice but to seek a negotiated settlement and accede to t he Anglo -American suggestion of the establishment of a financial commission chaired by American financier Charles Dawes. The resultant plan brought some much -needed stability to the relationship between Britain, France and Germany and paved the way for the Locarno Agreements of October 1925, which did much to rehabilitate Germany as a great p ower. In the wake of Locarno the occupation was increasingly seen as unnecessary and out -of -date and was correspondingly unpopular with the British public.

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  Foreign Pol France 1914-45 V7

  • Nere(Author)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Taylor & Francis

    (Publisher)

  When the Reparations Commission had duly ascertained the German omissions in the deliveries of wood and coal on 11 January 1923, the French and Belgian governments sent an ‘Interallied Mission of Control of Factories and Mines' (MICUM) into the Ruhr. This mission consisted of a group of engineers, protected by troops, designed to guarantee the fulfilment of the pledges of production. In fact, the operation very quickly resulted in an extension of the military occupation of this region of the right bank of the Rhine.

  The legality of this occupation has been hotly debated. The text of the Treaty of Versailles on which it is based is as follows:

  The measures which the allied and associated Powers will have the right to take, in the case of voluntary omission by Germany, and which the German government undertakes not to regard as acts of hostility, can include acts of economic and financial prohibition and reprisals, and in general, other such methods as the respective governments may consider necessary in the circumstances.

  The occupation of territories beyond the Rhine did not then appear among the sanctions explicitly provided for. Was it, however, excluded? Legally, it seems that the Allied governments were left with very great latitude. In fact Britain had taken part in the occupation of DÜsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort; on several occasions she had accepted the idea of Occupation of the Ruhr, at the same time seeking ways of delaying putting it into practice. In January 1923 Britain broke away from the operation, but she lacked a juridical basis for opposing it. Her objections developed basically on political and economic levels.

  c The ‘passive resistance'

  Germany's reaction was clearly much more drastic. On 13 January the German government suspended all payments in kind to France and Belgium. It forbade railway officials and employees47 to obey the orders of the occupying authorities. The strike spread quickly to the private sector.

  47 The German railways had already been state-owned for a long time .

  Such was the ‘passive resistance’. The idea – like that of the Occupation of the Ruhr – had been discussed for a long time. The German nationalists saw it as a means of questioning the Treaty of Versailles as a whole. It is, however, difficult to imagine how they visualized making this weapon effective.

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  The Berlin Embassy of Lord D'Abernon, 1920-1926

  • G. Johnson(Author)
  • 2015(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  8 Germany was now suffering the consequences. 9 His Presidential Address to the Royal Statistical Society in 1927 about the operation of the German economy during his embassy provides further testimony to his bitterness. 10 During the autumn of 1922, the German government pressed the Allies for a moratorium on reparations payments. In November a note was sent to London and Paris stating that the mark could only be sta- bilised if all payments were suspended for the next three or four years. 11 The request was declined and in December the Reparation Commission declared that Germany was in arrears in payments in kind, particularly in timber. A similar statement was issued on 9 January 1923 declaring that Germany had failed to make sufficient coal deliveries. Two days later, French and Belgian troops entered the Ruhr, thus prompting the most serious crisis in Europe since the Great War. D’Abernon interpreted the invasion as conclusive evidence that the French were so hostile to From Rapallo to the Ruhr Crisis, 1922–24 53 the Germans that they were willing to threaten European peace to extract what they wanted from them. The Germans were to be beaten into submission because it was becoming clear that the implementa- tion of the Treaty of Versailles had become a byzantine operation. 12 Poincaré, D’Abernon argued, should be condemned as a warmonger while the British government should do all in its power to distance itself from his policies. He also accused the French of pursuing a policy of economic imperialism, arguing that the Ruhr occupation marked the beginning of a more general policy to secure commercial hegemony in Europe. British responses to the Ruhr crisis During the crisis, D’Abernon’s position in Berlin was made increasingly difficult by the lack of clarity in British policy towards French policy in the Ruhr.

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  A Political Biography of Arkadij Maslow, 1891-1941

  Dissident Against His Will

  • Mario Kessler(Author)
  • 2020(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  At first, the inflationary thrust had a positive economic effect: While the victorious allied countries suffered from a decline in production and employment, Germany achieved almost full employment and growing production volumes. A solution to the monetary problems was not in sight, however. Inflation rose immeasurably: In January 1921, the US Dollar exchange was 15.5 Reichsmarks, a year later 45.5 Reichsmarks, in July 1922 118 Marks, and by December 1922 had reached 1810 Marks. By the autumn of 1923 the US Dollar was worth 4,210,500,000,000 Reichsmarks.

  In November 1922 new government was appointed under Wilhelm Cuno , chairman of the Hamburg-America Steamship Line, which was mainly composed of businessmen and experts. This new government was unable to solve the problem.1

  In January 1923 the Cuno government claimed that it could no longer afford the reparation payments required by the Versailles Treaty. When it defaulted on some payments, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr region, Germany’s industrial heartland, taking control of most mining and manufacturing companies. French so-called punitive expeditions not only robbed banks but cordoned off main streets and robbed passers-by as well. March 1923 saw an especially long record of French brutality: shootings, thrashings, and terrorization. But the occupiers were quite unable to operate anything: By the end of March “they were getting only 1 percent of the coal that they had previously enjoyed from the Ruhr.”2

  The German government called for passive resistance to occupation and found support among the entire population, including KPD followers.3 Strikes were called and resistance encouraged. These strikes lasted eight months, further damaging the economy and increasing the cost of imports. The strikes meant that no goods were being produced. This infuriated the French occupation forces who began to kill and exile protestors in the region. Around 180,000 people fled their homes or were forced to flee.4

  The ECCI closely monitored events in Germany. It set up a special committee to coordinate illegal activities, convinced that “the party was likely to have to live clandestinely for a while.”5 According to a resolution of the ECCI Presidium, the German party had to adopt a system of communication and illegal printing in order to provide members with false papers in an attempt to occupy positions in the army and the security forces. The resolution stated: “Party members, like the rest of the working class, must realize that, in one way or another, in the short or long term, they will be forced to confront their enemies in a violent fight; it is therefore necessary to prepare them ideologically.”6

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  France's Rhineland Policy, 1914-1924

  The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe

  • Walter A. McDougall(Author)
  • 2015(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  But behind the government's rigid stance there were as many dif- fering interpretations of the Ruhr policy as there were interest groups in France. The Chamber, the newspapers, the military and the Rhenish bloc, the steel and coal interests held various priorities. Those differences would clash seriously and challenge Poincare's control over policy after the present need for unity disappeared. The passive resistance had not succeeded in intimidating the French government or parliament, but the 50 million francs per month added to the budget were only the visible cost of the Ruhr. Indirect costs in- cluded the loss of the modest, but tangible reparations-in-kind from Germany, the forced importation of English coal and other goods at inflated prices made even worse by the franc's decline in purchasing power, and the vast loss of production in French industry. The occupa- tion of the Ruhr had not been a project of the Comite des Forges. The steel interests were no more pleased with the early results of the oper- ation than were those responsible for the government budget. Instead of ensuring the flow of reparations coal from Germany, the Ruhr action stopped it almost completely. By March over half of all French fur- naces were blown out. Occupation of the Ruhr did raise hopes that the German indus- 57 P.-V., Commission des Affaires Etrangeres, 17 May 1923: Archives de 1'Assemblee Nationale, Auditions, 1923. ECONOMIC WAR ON THE RHINE AND RUHR 279 trialists might prove amenable to an industrial accord favorable to France, but the hopes were in vain. Stinnes and his cohorts had just elected to follow their workers into passive resistance when French steel demarches were made in January 1923, and they were in no mood to bargain. While French industrialists enjoyed a bit of Schadenfreude from knowing the Germans were as badly off as themselves, they de- rived no benefit from the Ruhr occupation.

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