Referendum 1975

9 Key excerpts on "Referendum 1975"

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  Government by referendum

  • Matt Qvortrup(Author)
  • 2018(Publication Date)
  • Manchester University Press

    (Publisher)

  And, of course, Attlee’s refusal was not based on political philosophy, let alone on a careful study of continental constitutional practices at a time when referendums were used extensively by very credible democratic governments. But the argument worked. That is in the nature of political rhetoric: principles, arguments and seemingly erudite references to foreign constitutional practices are used to pursue political ends.

  All this was literally academic at the time. The referendum was not seriously debated until the end of the 1960s. The change in constitutional doctrine happened as a result of the schism over membership of the EEC.

  Referendums in the 1970s It was not until 1973 that the first major referendum was finally held in Britain, with previous attempts limited to local polls, such as that on temperance in Wales.

  After the outbreak of hostilities in Northern Ireland, the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath decided to submit the future of the province to a verdict by the people. Voters in the province were asked, ‘Do you want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom?’ The Catholic minority boycotted the referendum; thus the outcome was not reflective of the will of the people. On a 58 per cent turnout 98 per cent voted to remain part of the United Kingdom. The referendum merely cemented the demographic realities, and arguably prompted the more radical among the nationalist or Catholic minority to resort to violence and terror. Not for the first time blunt majoritarianism led to strife and exacerbated the conflict. But the Border Poll received little coverage, particularly compared to the following major referendum in 1975.

  In the light of more recent history, it is thus instructive to look at the referendum on EEC membership that took place in the mid-1970s. Not because history repeats itself, but rather to show that it does not, and – perhaps – to warn subsequent generations not to believe complacently that the past is a guide to the present.

  History lessons from the 1975 referendum?

  To understand why the referendum came to the fore in the early and mid-1970s requires us to look at the whole political ecology at the time. The referendum was not merely a result of one specific development. It was not caused by a single event, rather it emerged as a result of an interplay of different factors; ‘In sum’ … ‘history is not a chain of independent events’ (Steinmo 2008

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  Slipping Loose

  The UK's Long Drift Away From the European Union

  • Martin Westlake(Author)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • Agenda Publishing

    (Publisher)

  As a contemporary study reported, the result was “unequivocal, but it was also unenthusiastic. Support for membership was wide, but it did not run deep” (Butler & Kitzinger 1976 : 280). Space precludes a detailed analysis here (although see Chapter 7), but in the light of what has subsequently occurred the importance of the 1975 referendum cannot be overestimated. Five particular aspects should perhaps be underlined. To begin with, the referendum was the first-ever national plebiscite in British politics – ever. The longstanding eschewal of direct democracy was no more. The principle that a referendum might be held had been acknowledged by parliament, sovereign though it had always been and would always remain, through the Referendum Act 1975. The distance between opposition to, or acceptance of, that principle was clearly far greater than the distance between acknowledging that a referendum might be held and arguing that a referendum should be held. The 1975 referendum was undoubtedly the thin end of a wedge. Second, no matter what the language used about the consultative nature of any referendum result, the potential for discordance between what a majority of MPs, on the one hand, and a majority of the people, on the other, believed had been irrevocably created. In 1975, those two majorities happened to concur; in 2016, they did not. That one day they might not, whatever the question, was always a possibility from the moment the principle of the 1975 referendum was conceded by the British parliament. As of 1975, the dangerous potential for dissonance lurked. Logically, any parliament would have to bow to the majority view of the people it purported to represent

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  Beyond Brexit

  Towards a British Constitution

  • Vernon Bogdanor(Author)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • I.B. Tauris

    (Publisher)

  6 The 2016 referendum was also advisory, but, as in 1975, the government had agreed to be bound by the result.

  The 1975 referendum, Britain’s first national referendum, was held on 5 June. In it, voters were presented, first with a statement and then a question.

  The statement was: ‘The Government have announced the results of the renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s terms of membership of the European Communities.’ The question which followed was: ‘Do you think the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?’

  The outcome of the referendum was a 2 to 1 victory for staying in the Community. On a turnout of 64.5 per cent, 17,378,581 (67.2%) voted ‘Yes’ and 8,470,073 (32.8%) voted ‘No’, The ‘Yes’ majority was nearly 9 million – 8,908,508. The result was announced on 6 June 1975, the thirtieth anniversary of D-day. From that referendum, two conclusions might have been drawn.

  The first was that it had been held because Britain’s political leaders had a sincere wish to discover the views of the British people on continued membership of the European Communities; for that reason, they introduced the novel device of the referendum.

  The second was that the outcome of the referendum showed that the British people had become enthusiastic Europeans. Both these conclusions would, however, be entirely mistaken.

  The referendum was held primarily for tactical reasons, to prevent a split in the Labour Party – just as the 2016 referendum was to be held primarily for tactical reasons, to prevent a split in the Conservative Party.

  Entry to the European Communities had been negotiated by the Conservative government of Edward Heath in 1972. The preceding Labour government of 1964–1970, led by Harold Wilson, had also sought to negotiate entry and many assumed that Labour would, in consequence, support British accession. But in opposition after 1970, Labour’s Left wing, which was opposed to entry, became more powerful and it appeared that many MPs and a large majority of party members were against entry and wanted to commit the party to leaving the European Community when it was next returned to power. This was something that Wilson and the pro-Europeans in the Labour Party could not accept. There was some danger of a party split and the issue came to be entangled with that of the leadership of the Labour Party. Wilson’s opponents on the left and various competing leadership aspirants were, so Wilson believed, seeking to supplant him and to use the European issue for that purpose. The referendum offered him a way both of drawing the teeth of his opponents in the party and of avoiding a Labour commitment to withdrawing from the Community.

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  Themes and Flux in British Politics

  Evolution, Change and Turbulence

  • Duncan McTavish(Author)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  The referendum resulted in leave winning over remain by a margin of 52–48 per cent on a turnout higher (72 per cent) than the preced- ing general election of 2015 (66 per cent), but much lower than the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 (85 per cent). However there were considerable variations across the UK. England voted leave, Scotland remain, Northern Ireland remain, Wales leave. There were also other substantial geographic and demographic differences in voting. Context of referendums about the UK’s relationship with Europe Given the referendums we have seen in the UK since the late 1970s (Scotland twice for devolution once for independence, Wales once for devolution, Northern Ireland for the ‘peace process’ settlement, Europe twice, once for considering – rather half heartedly – a move to a mild form of proportional representation), it is worth remembering that the referendum as an instrument of popular representation has not been commonly favoured in UK constitutional practice, unlike some other European democratic jurisdictions. The concept of parliamentary rep- resentation sees Parliament in Britain with its elected MPs as the forum for representing the public. This has been well documented historically from Edmund Burke writing as an MP in the 18th century and A.V. Dicey in 1915 to constitutional academic Vernon Bogdanor in the 21st century (Bogdanor 2009). Britain’s engagement with membership of the European Community after initial entry in 1973 (at the third time 88 Brexit referendum of asking) saw a politically opportunist use of the referendum by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1975. Somewhat ironically, Wilson and the other main party leaders had only recently spoken against the use of the referendum in principle at the 1970 UK election – and in Wilson’s case much later than this (see Qvortrup 2016). The circumstances of the deployment of a referendum in 1975 are worth recalling given the circumstances of the 2016 leave/remain refer- endum.

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  The British political elite and Europe, 1959-1984

  A higher loyalty

  • Bob Nicholls(Author)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • Manchester University Press

    (Publisher)

  The referendum to determine whether Britain stayed in or came out of the Common Market was crucial in more ways than one. The outcome of the vote committed Britain to European integration: the British public had now given its consent and therefore the referendum legitimised Heath's decision to take Britain into Europe. Labour's Ted Short justified holding a referendum when he stated in the House of Commons in March 1975, ‘the issue continues to divide the country. The decision to go in has not been accepted. That is the essence of the case for having a referendum’ (Hansard, 11 March 1975, Vol. 888, c. 292). As a result of the referendum, the issue of Europe ceased to divide the nation. ‘The decision to stay in the EEC was accepted; and to that extent, the device fulfilled precisely the purpose it had been assigned’ (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976 : 279). This is in sharp contrast to the situation in 2017, when the close result of the 2016 referendum on EU membership brutally exposed existing divisions within British society. Perhaps even more important was that the result not only defeated the left on the issue of Europe, but also dealt a devastating blow to the left on other issues such as nationalisation and the economy. Wilson's victory in the referendum provided him with the opportunity to remove Tony Benn from his position as Secretary of State for Industry (Cronin, 2004). The nature of Benn's dismissal was symbolic as it removed the central advocate of the left-wing strategies. As Eric Varley, Benn's replacement, lacked the ideological zeal of his predecessor, it was unsurprising therefore that ‘little more was heard of the planning agreements, the nationalisation of docks and shipbuilding, and the industrial democracy envisaged in the 1974 manifesto’ (Broad, 2001 : 122). In offering the British public a referendum on Europe, Wilson took what appeared to be a calculated risk, but in reality the odds of victory were stacked heavily in his favour

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  Scotland Decides

  The Devolution Issue and the 1997 Referendum

  • Hugh Bochel, David Denver, James Mitchell, Charles Pattie(Authors)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  8The Referendum in Context

     

  REFERENDUMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

  By late 1998 seven significant referendums had been held in the United Kingdom.1 The first-ever (and so far only) United Kingdom-wide referendum took place in June 1975 on the question of the country's membership of the European Community. It was followed in 1979 by votes on devolution in Scotland and Wales but thereafter, with the Conservatives in power, there was no recourse to a referendum for 18 years. The new Labour government elected in May 1997 was much more interested in constitutional reform than the Conservatives had been, however, and more willing to hold referendums. The 1997 Scottish referendum was the first in a series initiated by the government. In little more than 12 months, in addition to the Scottish case, referendums were held on the creation of an Assembly for Wales (18 September 1997), reforming the government of London to allow for an elected mayor and a Greater London Authority (7 May 1998) and on the proposals for Northern Ireland contained in the ‘Good Friday Agreement’, which related to the system of government as well as to other matters (22 May 1998). Further referendums are promised on other issues including reform of the electoral system, United Kingdom entry into European economic and monetary union and, possibly, the setting up of regional assemblies within England.

  As the constitutional commentator Geoffrey Marshall has remarked, this new-found enthusiasm for referendums is ‘a curious turn of events’ (Marshall, 1997). It is curious because most British politicians and most constitutional experts have, in the past, been hostile to the use of the referendum, seeing it as inconsistent with parliamentary democracy and an abdication of responsibility by elected representatives. It might also be argued that referendums undermine a fundamental element in the British constitution—the sovereignty of Parliament. To circumvent this suggestion, all referendums held in the United Kingdom have been, in theory, advisory only, leaving the final decision on the matter concerned to Parliament. In practice, however, Parliament has never legislated in defiance of a referendum result conforming to agreed rules, and the chances of its ever doing so must be very slim indeed.

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  Political Communications Transformed

  From Morrison to Mandelson

  • John Bartle, Dylan Griffiths(Authors)
  • 2001(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  It is time J. Bartle et al. (eds.), Political Communications Transformed © John Bartle and Dylan Griffiths 2001 132 Dylan Griffiths therefore to study campaigning in referendums more carefully. In this chapter I will draw particularly from the lessons of the 1975 referendum, the only UK-wide referendum held so far and ably chronicled and inter- preted by Butler and Kitzinger, and the Welsh Devolution referendum of 1997, the most narrowly won, though not closely fought, referendum campaign held in the UK so far. Academic studies have suggested that the campaign in Wales in 1997 might have had a decisive influence on the result 3 and the Welsh referendum influenced the Neill Committee’s inquiry into party funding and the conduct of referendum campaigns. 4 In this chapter I will show that referendum campaigns differ from general (and other election) campaigns in fundamental ways and pose particular challenges for voters, parties, politicians and, not least, electoral law. Distinguishing characteristics of referendums Referendums are not legally required Regular parliamentary elections are a legal requirement in the United Kingdom. The same is true for elections to the European Parliament, Table 8.1 Referendums held in the United Kingdom Source: David Butler and Iain McLean, ‘Referendums’, in Bridget Taylor and Katarina Thomson, Scotland and Wales: Nations Again? (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999). Date Location Subject % ‘Yes’ vote % turnout 8 March 1973 N. Ireland Stay in UK 98.9 58.7 5 June 1975 UK Stay in EEC 67.2 64.5 1 March 1979 Scotland Approve devolution 51.6 63.6 1 March 1979 Wales Approve devolution 20.9 58.8 11 September 1997 Scotland Establish Parliament 74.3 60.1 11 September 1997 Scotland Tax varying power 63.5 60.1 18 September 1997 Wales Establish Assembly 50.3 51.3 7 May 1998 London Approve mayoral government 72.0 34.0 22 May 1998 N. Ireland Approve Good Friday Agreement 71.1 81.0

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  Yes to Europe!

  The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain

  • Robert Saunders(Author)
  • 2018(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  Responding to Douglas Jay in 1970, The Times challenged the argu- ment for a referendum point by point. First, on the peculiar importance of the European question, it noted that many decisions of comparable scale could never be subjected to such a vote. Jay himself had served in government when India was granted independence, a decision that transformed British policy and set off the long process of post- war decolonisation; yet it would plainly have been absurd to hold a 73 / ‘A Device of Dictators and Demagogues’ referendum in the UK. Nor would it normally be possible to hold a referendum before a declaration of war. The paper denied, in any case, that the European question involved a unique transfer of sovereignty. Over the post-war era, a weakened British economy had come more and more under the control of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Britain’s creditors overseas. ‘We may have been sovereign, but we were not our own masters. Entering the EEC is likely to increase rather than reduce the ability of British government to protect the interests of Britain.’ Second, the paper stressed the constitutional dangers. The referendum, it warned, was ‘open to manipulation’, ‘favourable to autocracy’ and ‘conservative in its effect’. In the absence of a writ- ten constitution, there could be no clear rules on when a referendum should be deployed. Britain had no special category of ‘constitutional legislation’ and no constitutional court to arbitrate on disputes. On a common-sense view, Heath’s reorganisation of local government might count as ‘constitutional’ legislation, while the decision to allow US mil- itary bases on British soil might not. Yet the latter transgressed what Max Weber had given as the essential definition of a state: ‘the monop- oly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’.

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  The Worm in the Apple

  A History of the Conservative Party and Europe from Churchill to Cameron

  • Christopher Tugendhat(Author)
  • 2022(Publication Date)
  • Haus Publishing

    (Publisher)

  He was successful on both counts. The two groups repaid his efforts in May, the month before the referendum, at a Commonwealth summit at which thirty-two heads of government signed a note supporting British membership of the EEC. In so doing, they provided reassurance to significant bodies of opinion on both the right and the left of the political spectrum, while robbing the No campaigners of an important card. The British budget contribution was left to be dealt with at some future date, by which time, as it turned out, Thatcher would be in charge.

  The political class followed the re-negotiation with close interest, the general public much less so. Domestic issues were by far uppermost in the minds of most people. In October 1974 MORI found that only 10 per cent of the electorate regarded Europe as an important issue. Wilson’s judgement about how they would react to his terms was, however, correct. When the re-negotiation began, Gallup had recorded a majority of about 5 per cent for pulling out of the EEC. A week after the new terms were announced, it gave those who wanted to stay in a twenty-nine-point lead. From then on, the result of the referendum was never really in doubt.

  Wilson’s colleagues proved harder to convince. Of the twenty-three members of the Cabinet, seven opposed making a positive recommendation to the electorate. When this question was put in the House of Commons, 145 Labour MPs voted against the motion and 137 in favour with 33 abstentions. More than half of all ministers, counting junior as well as senior, voted against the government. Without the backing of Conservative MPs, Wilson’s proposition would not have got through and the referendum could not have been held. Only eight Conservatives opposed it. In normal circumstances, no government could have survived such a result. But, aware of the divisions within his own government and party, Wilson had some time earlier suspended the principle of collective responsibility, so that ministers as well as Labour MPs could vote and campaign on whichever side they wished, both in Parliament and in the country at the forthcoming referendum.

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