House of Lords

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  Politics and Government of the United Kingdom

  • (Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Learning Press

    (Publisher)

  ________________________ WORLD TECHNOLOGIES ________________________ Chapter- 5 House of Lords The House of Lords (commonly referred to as the Lords and also known as House of Peers for ceremonial purposes) is the upper house of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom's national legislature. Parliament comprises the Sovereign, the House of Commons (which is the lower house of Parliament and referred to as the Commons), and the Lords. The House of Lords, like the House of Commons, assembles in the Palace of Westminster. Unlike the House of Commons, membership of the House of Lords is not attained by election from the population as a whole, but by inheritance or by appointment (Lords Temporal), or by virtue of their ecclesiastical role within the established church (Lords Spiritual). The Lords Spiritual are 26 senior bishops of the Church of England. The Lords Temporal make up the rest of the membership; of these, the majority are life peers who are appointed by the Monarch on the advice of the Prime Minister. Membership was once a right of birth to hereditary peers but, following a series of reforms, as of 2010 only 91, elected by the House from the hereditary peers, remain as members. The number of members is not fixed; as of October 2010 the House of Lords had 744 members, as against the fixed 650-seat membership of the House of Commons. The full, formal title of the House of Lords is The Right Honourable the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled . History Today's Parliament of the United Kingdom largely descends, in practice, from the Parliament of England, though the 1706 Treaty of Union and the Acts of Union that ratified the Treaty created a new Parliament of Great Britain to replace the Parliament of England and the Parliament of Scotland.

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  Unlocking Constitutional and Administrative Law

  • Mark Ryan, Steve Foster(Authors)
  • 2023(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  section 8.5 ). For example, in terms of self-regulation, in 2009 the House of Lords suspended two peers until the end of the parliamentary session.

  In addition, as indicated earlier at section 10.4 , historically until 2009 the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords was the highest domestic court. As a result, the law lords formed part of both the legislature and the judiciary and so violated a pure interpretation of the separation of powers (see sections 5.2.2 and 5.7.10 ). The Constitutional Reform Act 2005, however, created a new separate free-standing Supreme Court, which became operational in October 2009.

  10.9.2 A forum for debate

  The House of Lords is a debating chamber in which matters of public interest are examined and considered. As in the House of Commons, debates can take place either:

  • In the context of the passage of legislation by debating the principles and details of a Bill; or
  • As free-standing general debates.

  Although both parliamentary chambers hold debates, it is generally argued that debates in the House of Lords are qualitatively better than in the House of Commons for three reasons:

  • Firstly, there is a broader range of experience and expertise in the upper chamber, which arguably allows debates to be richer and more informed than in the Commons. Much of this experience and knowledge has been appointed under the Life Peerages Act 1958, but some of it is drawn from the ranks of the hereditaries. It must also be remembered that peers are unsalaried and (if working) can continue with their careers in parallel with their duties in the House. It has been observed that ‘It is, for the most part, a knowledgeable place in a way that distinguishes it from most other parliamentary assemblies in the world’ (R Rogers, R Walters, N Besly, and T Goldsmith, How Parliament Works (8th edn, Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2019) p 290).
  • Secondly, the atmosphere of the chamber is less partisan. The 2000 Royal Commission made particular reference to the non-polemic style of the House.

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  Reform of the House of Lords

  • Philip Norton(Author)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • Manchester University Press

    (Publisher)

  Enacting legislation is time consuming; a bill has to go through one House and then the other, with several stages in each, and time for considering bills within each parliamentary session (which usually lasts one year) is limited. With certain exceptions, bills that are not passed by the end of the session fail. Government has to be selective in determining which measures to bring forward and each will normally be subject to sustained scrutiny. From an institutional perspective, Parliament is thus a powerful body (Norton 2013 : 6–7). Often, the key consideration for government business managers is not whether they have the votes to pass a measure, but whether they have the time to get it through. The legislative process is based on the premise that government is entitled to get its business considered, but the Opposition has a right to be heard. Functions of the House of Lords Parliament as an institution, then, matters: it is core to the nation's political system. What, then, of the role of the House of Lords within Parliament? The functions ascribed principally to parliamentary second chambers are those of representation and reflection (Norton 2007a : 6–8). In federal nations, for example, second chambers are created to represent the component states or districts. The House of Lords is not a representative chamber in terms of being elected and speaking for a particular body of people, nor is it representative in terms of being socially typical (Pitkin 1967). Its contribution is in terms of reflection: that is, deliberating, particularly but not exclusively, on what the first chamber has done. As a reflective chamber, its contribution can be divided into several functions. We treat its functions as consequences for the political system, in other words, what it actually does, rather than tasks formally ascribed to it. The functions derive from the House's seeking to complement and not challenge the work of the elected chamber

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  Text, Cases and Materials on Public Law and Human Rights

  • Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson, Alexander Williams(Authors)
  • 2020(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  This chapter will consider the constitutional role of the House of Lords. It will examine its membership, the pattern and extent of party control over it, its effectiveness in scrutinising legislation and policy, and the constraints, both legal and conventional, which restrict its powers. In the context of that inquiry it will then consider the various proposals for reform discussed above and lessons from overseas that may help resolve the debate as to the best way forward for this still unfinished part of Labour’s constitutional reform programme.

  Composition of the House of Lords and Party Balance

  The Composition of the House before 1999

  It is important to understand the significance of the last major reform of the House—the removal of nearly all of the 750 hereditary peers in 1999. As Shell remarked in 1994, ‘That most of those entitled to sit, to speak, and to vote in the second chamber do so simply because they inherited this right seems extraordinary.’8 As to the remainder:

  every single one of them has become a member of the second chamber because the Prime Minister of the day had decided to recommend them for a peerage … [while] whatever the complexion of the government of the day, the Conservative Party always enjoys control in the House of Lords … To say that such a House is deeply offensive to democratic values is.… truism.9

  The membership of the House of Lords was thus drawn from a number of sources: the hereditary peers, 26 Bishops of the Church of England (other Christian denominations and non-Christian faiths are not represented); the Law Lords, and the life peers. On the creation of life peerages in 1958, Griffith and Ryle comment:

  Life peers have transformed the House. Instead of a House consisting predominantly of landowners and retired politicians (with a sprinkling of lawyers and bishops) the range of occupations and interests has been vastly increased.10

  The following description was given by a Peer during a House of Lords debate:

  You form a unique pool of expertise and experience. Casual research reveals that 20 per cent of you came from the [Commons], including two former Prime Ministers, five former Chancellors of the Exchequer and more than 60 other former Ministers; another 20 per cent come from business, international commerce and financial services; and some 14 per cent are lawyers and judges. Other well represented sectors are local government, the Civil and Foreign Services, trades unions, teachers, professors, doctors, nurses, the voluntary services, the armed forces and police, agriculture, the religious faiths and the media.11

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  The Labour Party and Constitutional Reform

  A History of Constitutional Conservatism

  • P. Dorey(Author)
  • 2008(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  3 The House of Lords On summer evenings and winter afternoons, when they have nothing else to do, people discuss how to reform the House of Lords. Schemes are taken out of cupboards and drawers and dusted off, speeches are composed, pamphlets written, letters sent to newspapers . . . . Occasionally legislation is introduced; it generally fails. The frenzy dies away until next time. (Morgan, 1982: 294) Introduction The Labour Party has been more critical of the House of Lords than of any other political institution or constitutional feature of British politics, yet has never been able to agree on precisely what to do about the Second Chamber. This is because the Party has advanced a variety of criticisms of the House of Lords, and whilst these have not been mutually exclusive, they have implied different ‘solutions’. For example, some Labour MPs have focused on the socio-political composition of the House of Lords, particularly the extent to which it comprised (until the very end of the twentieth century) hereditary peers, most of whom tended to be Con- servatives. This, in turn, yielded much Labour criticism concerning the power (to delay legislation) of these unelected and thus unaccountable peers, even though this power was usually invoked only sporadically and sparingly, at least until the mid-1970s. Yet these two key objections raised a number of issues which the Labour Party has struggled satisfactorily to resolve. For example, if the primary objection to the House of Lords concerned its composition, then the question arose as to how precisely its membership should be reformed. Two particular options have variously been mooted in 100 The House of Lords 101 an attempt to address this question, namely the appointment of more Labour peers, in order to negate the inherent Conservative preponder- ance in the Upper Chamber, or the democratization of the Lords through some form of election.

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  The Palgrave Review of British Politics 2006

  • M. Rush, P. Giddings, M. Rush, P. Giddings(Authors)
  • 2007(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  Based on the characteristics of second chambers generally considered by scholars, little has changed about the House of Lords since 1999 – it remains unelected and has the same powers as before. 39 Indeed, some even argued that the reform would make the chamber weaker. 40 Instead, what we see is that the departure of the hereditaries and, crucially, the new party balance, have boosted the Lords’ sense of legitimacy and given it more confidence to challenge the government. This remains even despite allegations of cronyism in Lords appointments. Second, a stronger upper house does not necessarily mean a weaker lower house – indeed, possibly quite the reverse. Although ministers try to present arguments as Lords versus Commons, the far more interesting dynamic is that of Parliament versus executive. The existence of the Lords as a serious longstop has given a greater confidence to MPs to extract concessions from ministers, and the greater rebelliousness of the Commons also acts to boost the power of peers. This intercameral partnership, if it continues and grows, could represent a real shift of power within the British Westminster system. Notes 1. This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council, grant no. RES-000–23–0597. 2. See M. Russell and M. Sciara, ‘The House of Lords in 2005: A More Representative and Assertive Chamber?’, in M. Rush and P. Giddings (eds), The Palgrave Review of British Politics 2005 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 122–36; P. Cowley, ‘Making Parliament Matter?’, in P. Dunleavy, R. Heffernan, P. Cowley and C. Hay (eds), Developments in British Politics 8 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 3. For a discussion see M. Russell and M. Sciara, ‘Legitimacy and Bicameral Strength: A Case Study of the House of Lords’, paper to 2006 Conference of the Political Studies Association specialist group on Parliaments and Legislatures, University of Sheffield.

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  The Palgrave Review of British Politics 2005

  • M. Rush, P. Giddings, M. Rush, P. Giddings(Authors)
  • 2006(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  This led to increasing questioning of the convention that governments should get their way – particularly from the Liberal Democrats, whose votes are pivotal in the chamber. By the end of the year it seemed that on the surface everything remained the same in the House of Lords, but at a deeper level everything might have changed. This had implications for 122 Parliament: The House of Lords 123 government and the House of Commons, and even for the party system, as well as for the Lords itself. Lords reform doesn’t happen (again) Early in the year, the impending general election provided a new focus for debates about Lords reform. Eight years in, there had already been three government white papers, a royal commission report, and another from a joint committee of MPs and peers, whose proposals were subject to ‘free’ votes in both Houses of Parliament. 2 The Labour manifestos of 1997 and 2001 had promised further reform following the removal of most hereditary peers. Yet no firm conclusions had been reached and no further action had been taken. In February 2005, a cross-party group of senior parliamentarians sought to ‘break the deadlock’ by publishing a detailed report and draft bill. 3 They attempted to build on the points of agreement in earlier reports, and the perceived ‘centre of gravity’ around a largely elected House amongst both MPs and the public. The group was co-ordinated by Liberal Democrat Shadow Leader of the Commons, Paul Tyler, along with his former opposite numbers Robin Cook (Labour) and George Young (Conservative), plus Labour’s Tony Wright and Conservative Kenneth Clarke. 4 Their central recommendation was for a 70 per cent elected chamber, using proportional representation, with members serving the equivalent of three House of Commons’ terms. The rest would be appointed, mostly chosen by a statutory appointments commission and taking no party whip, but with a maximum of four per Parliament selected by the Prime Minister to serve as ministers.

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  Parliamentary reform at Westminster

  • Alexandra Kelso(Author)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Manchester University Press

    (Publisher)

  Consequently, despite the promises of the 1911 Parliament Act, there had been no attempt to tackle together the issues of the powers and composition of the House of Lords. The hereditary peers remained, and the 1958 Life Peerages Act simply supplemented their number, and did not intimate a wholesale reassessment of the basis on which the second chamber was constituted. For academic observers, the problem with reforming the House of Lords was quite clear:

  No lasting solution to the resulting set of anomalies, contradictions, privileges and inefficiencies will be achieved until both political parties are willing to look, not just at the question of powers and composition of the Chamber, either separately – which has been foolish enough – or even together, which has been deliberately avoided, but at the basic questions of the function and utility of the Second Chamber in the context of the work of Parliament as a whole, indeed of the whole framework of British government and administration. (Crick 1963: 174)

  Yet, the 1960s became the decade in which British institutions were examined and found wanting. As Chapter 5 explained, Richard Crossman, as Leader of the House of Commons, had already embraced the demand for reform in the lower chamber. As a contemporary observer noted, ‘[a]lthough the [Labour] government would doubtless prefer not to be involved in radical reconstruction of the Second Chamber, there is a mounting demand for modernisation of all Parliamentary institutions’ (Weare 1965: 432). The constitutional situation of the House of Lords left it almost ripe for reform:

  On one side, it can be said that the continued possession of even these powers by a House so constituted is inherently objectionable; on the other hand that, because the powers are unsatisfactory and unlikely to be used, there is no really worthwhile role for the House to perform in modern government (Bromhead and Shell 1967: 337).

  The Labour government and the Parliament (No. 2) Bill

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  The Governments of Europe

  • Frederic Austin Ogg(Author)
  • 2007(Publication Date)
  • Perlego

    (Publisher)

  117. Effects of the Act.—By the provisions which have been enumerated the co-ordinate and independent position which, in law if not in fact, the British upper chamber, as a legislative body, has occupied through the centuries has been effectually subverted. Within the domain of legislation, it is true, the Lords may yet exercise influence of no inconsiderable moment. To the chamber must be submitted every project of finance and of legislation which it is proposed to enact into law, and there is still nothing save a certain measure of custom to prevent the introduction of even the most important of non-financial measures first of all in that house. But a single presentation of any money bill fulfills the legal requirement and ensures that the measure will become law. For such a bill will not be presented until it has been passed by the Commons, and, emanating from the cabinet, it will not be introduced in that chamber until the assent of the executive is assured. The upper house is allowed one month in which to approve or to reject, but, so far as the enactment of the bill is concerned, the result is the same in any case. Upon ordinary legislation the House of Lords possesses still a veto—a veto, however, which is no longer absolute but only suspensive. The conditions which are required for the enactment of non-fiscal legislation without the concurrence of the Lords are not easy to bring about, but their realization is not at all an impossibility. By the repeated rejection of proposed measures the Lords may influence public sentiment or bring about otherwise a change of circumstances and thus compass the defeat of the original intent of the Commons, and this is the more possible since a minimum period of two years is required to elapse before a non-fiscal measure can be carried over the Lords' veto. But the continuity of political alignments and of legislative policy is normally such in Great Britain that the remarkable legislative precedence which has been accorded the Commons must mean in effect little less than absolute law-making authority.

  118. Possible Further Changes and the Difficulties Involved.—What the future holds in store for the House of Lords cannot be discerned. The Parliament Act, as has been pointed out, promises further legislation which will define both the composition and the powers of a second chamber constituted on a popular instead of an hereditary basis; but no steps have as yet (1912) been taken publicly in this direction, nor has any authoritative announcement of purpose been made.[162] Many Englishmen to-day are of the opinion that, as John Bright declared, "a hereditary House of Lords is not and cannot be perpetual in a free country." None the less, it is recognized that the chamber as it is at present constituted contains a large number of conscientious, eminent, and able men, that upon numerous occasions the body has imposed a wholesome check upon the popular branch, and that sometimes it has interpreted the will of the nation more correctly than has the popular branch itself. The most reasonable programme of reform would seem to be, not a total reconstitution of the chamber upon a non-hereditary basis, but (1) the adoption of the Rosebery principle that the possession of a peerage shall not of itself entitle the possessor to sit, (2) the admission to membership of a considerable number of persons representative of the whole body of peers, and (3) the introduction of a goodly quota of life peers, appointed by reason of legal attainments, governmental experience, and other qualities of fitness and eminence.[163]

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