Paternalism

5 Key excerpts on "Paternalism"

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  The International Humanitarian Order

  • Michael Barnett(Author)
  • 2009(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  The concept of Paternalism provides one way of reuniting ethics and power. Paternalism can be generically understood as the belief that we can and should act in someone else’s best interests and even without their consent; the combination of care and control means that Paternalism offers a combustible mix of ethics and power. If the possibility of Paternalism is present in nearly all acts of compassion, which I believe it is, then it is most certainly a clear and present danger once compassion becomes institutionalized and globalized. In short, Paternalism is not an unfortunate legacy of nineteenth-century humanitarianism but rather is an enduring feature of the international humanitarian order. Not only is it impossible to remove the possibility and the presence of Paternalism, it is also not necessarily desirable—there are moments when Paternalism is highly defensible. Accordingly, the challenge is to consider whether and when forms of Paternalism are warranted and how to safeguard against the ever-present possibility that those who are in positions to care for others do not unjustifiably violate the autonomy, dignity, and liberty of the vulnerable. The concept of Paternalism challenges practitioners, forcing them into a world of greater uncertainty regarding whether they are truly doing the right thing. Anxiety need not be a prelude to ethical resignation; it also can generate an opening for a different kind of engagement with those in need.

  The international humanitarian order challenges not only the world of practice but also the world of scholarship. The discipline of international relations, much like the social sciences, has a history of considering the study of ethics and practical engagement as compromising the quest for objective, value-neutral, knowledge. The explicit incorporation of the language of ethics often unnerves the professional and modern social scientist, trained to consider ethical theory as either irrelevant or worthy of a few sentences at the end of the research. Yet my experience, which tracks with many of my colleagues whose scholarship focuses on genocide, humanitarianism, human rights, and public health, is that our choice of research subjects owes not to abstract curiosity or the discovery of an untapped data set but rather because we feel passionately about the importance of the subject, and retain hope that our research might advance our understanding of important developments in global affairs and make a difference to those outside our professional sanctums. It is nearly impossible to study the circumstances of the radical poor and the victims of structural and lethal violence without also considering what kinds of practical interventions might improve their circumstances, interventions that invariably include the language of causation and ethics. A healthy, vibrant, and relevant social sciences can only exist with practical ethics and engagement.

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  Escaping Paternalism

  Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and Public Policy

  • Mario J. Rizzo, Glen Whitman(Authors)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  8 The Political Economy of Paternalist Policymaking* Politics. n. A strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles. The conduct of public affairs for private advantage. —Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary [T]he typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again. —Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy In Chapters 6 and 7, we argued that policymakers do not and most likely cannot possess the knowledge needed to craft paternalistic policies that reliably improve human welfare. Nevertheless, real-world policy- makers face tremendous pressure to take action, to legislate, to attempt to solve problems even in imperfect ways. The question, then, is what kind of paternalistic policies we can reasonably expect policymakers to create. Camerer and his coauthors say that their strategy of “asymmetric pater- nalism” offers “a careful, cautious, and disciplined approach” (2003, 1212) to crafting paternalistic policies. Zamir (2014) exemplifies the behavioral paternalists’ optimism about the political process: Policymakers weigh the options in a more detached and calm manner, based on objective, general statistics. The various inputs to the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes, coupled with the decision-makers’ cumulative experience, are likely to result in a sensible assessment of the relevant factors. (Zamir 2014, 222–223) * Portions of this chapter, particularly in the section “Public-Choice Paternalism in Prac- tice,” were adapted from Rizzo and Whitman (2009b). 309 Yet policymakers’ lack of truly relevant knowledge guarantees that the paternalists’ vision of well-informed and cautious policymaking is literally impossible.

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  Evaluating parental power

  An exercise in pluralist political theory

  • Allyn Fives(Author)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • Manchester University Press

    (Publisher)

  Part I

  Paternalism and its limits

  When parents exercise power over their children, are they acting paternalistically? Indeed, must parents behave towards their children in a paternalistic fashion for their power to have legitimacy? These are the questions addressed in the next two chapters. I first ask, what is Paternalism (Chapter 1 )? We shall see that there are two very different definitions of Paternalism that political philosophers employ. My argument is that the most widely used of these definitions, the one most closely associated with Mill’s liberalism, is the least satisfactory. I will make the case for an alternative, pluralist, definition of Paternalism, according to which Paternalism does involve moral conflicts, it does not always involve interference with another’s liberty, and it is only exercised over those possessing the qualities of an agent.

  I will then ask, is parental power always paternalistic (Chapter 2 )? Based on an extended analysis of the caretaker thesis and the liberation thesis, I argue that parental power often is not paternalistic, as understood by my preferred definition. Therefore, the concept of Paternalism is not sufficient for our normative evaluation of parental power. Parents exercise their power in ways that are not paternalistic but may, nonetheless, be justified. However, the concept of Paternalism, correctly defined, does shed light on both the nature of power and also the role of the philosopher in considering its legitimacy. Namely, it puts to the forefront the fact that power takes many forms and that in the evaluation of power we can be faced with moral dilemmas. In subsequent chapters, in Part II of this book, I explore the various ways in which power is exercised and also the various considerations appropriate to its justification.

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  Paternalism

  In this chapter, I introduce the central themes of the book. These themes can best be presented as questions, as follows: When parents exercise power over their children, what are the various forms power takes and what forms of power can be morally justified? When we evaluate the legitimacy of parental power, can we be faced with moral dilemmas, and if so how can we resolve such conflicts? Finally, in what ways may parents exercise power over children who lack the qualities of an agent, those who are capable of agency but are incompetent, and those who are fully competent? I do not claim to answer all of these questions in full in this chapter. However, by examining two competing definitions of Paternalism I think we can highlight what are the pertinent issues that we must explore further, while I will also endeavour to make clear the arguments to be made in the coming chapters.

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  The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon

  • Jon Mandle, David A. Reidy(Authors)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  P  153. Paternalism T hough it is said that Paternalism is inconsistent with liberalism, Rawls is one liberal who holds that some paternalistic actions are permissible. Although he does not define this term, he uses it in discussing coercive actions that are justified as benefitting those who are coerced against their present wishes (TJ 249). According to Rawls, parties in the original position will agree to permit some actions of this kind because they are motivated to choose principles that guarantee each person the primary social goods necessary to develop and exercise their moral powers fully, and because, due to immaturity, mental dis- ability, or “irrational inclinations” (TJ 249), a person might act so as to lose these goods or to undermine in some other way the conditions necessary for the full development and exercise of their moral powers. Parties in the original position will therefore agree to principles that authorize others in some cases “to act in their behalf and to override their present wishes if necessary” (TJ 249). Paternal- istic decisions, however, must be guided by a person’s own settled preferences or, when this is unknown, by the theory of primary goods. Furthermore, “we must be able to argue that with the development or recovery of his rational powers the individual in question will accept our decision on his behalf and agree with us that we did the best thing for him” (TJ 249). So although some paternalistic actions are permissible – those that prevent a person from acting on a temporary lapse in judgment in a way that will result in the permanent loss of some important good – paternalistic actions are not permissible that prevent a mature, mentally sound person from acting on his settled convictions.

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  Paternalism in Early Victorian England

  • David Roberts(Author)
  • 2016(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  In Gladstone’s political priorities, as in those of most others, paternalist sentiments rated only second, third, or lower. This fact explains the paradox that Paternalism could be at once so popular and yet be so weak as a constructive political force. It was a pervasive but shallow sentiment because it was only part, and that a lesser part, of men’s outlooks. It formed but one strand of Gladstone’s complex views, just as it was only a part of the outlook of the Whig Lord Morpeth, the churchman John Colquhoun, and the squire Joseph Henley. It even proved to be but one strand, and that exaggerated, for those stalwart Young Englanders, George Smythe and Baillie Cochrane. And for Disraeli was it much more than another of his colorful garbs to be worn on apt occasions? To ask such is not so much to doubt Disraeli’s sincerity as to point out that paternalist sentiments were within individuals, as within groups, only a part of an intricate and complicated combination of ideas, prejudices, and interests, a combination in which Paternalism had to compete with some powerful forces. Above all it had to face the pressures of the M.P.s’ constituencies, their own economic interests, and their religious passions. It also had to vie with party loyalties and personal political ambitions. It is not, then, surprising that in such a competition the advocacy of paternalist ideas rated only a second, third, or lower priority.

  Social ideals, of whatever kind, seldom form the main passions behind politics—except perhaps negatively. Paternalism in particular did not because as a social philosophy it was itself too mixed and varied. Some viewed it as property performing its duties, some as the church carrying out its mission, and others as the firm rule of local government or the exalted role of monarchy. Within these aspects there were more nuances: for some landed property was superior to manufacturing property, and for others the clergyman was quite superior to the layman as a visitor to the poor. Since Paternalism meant different things to different men, it became popular in many different circles. But its diversity and amorphousness also made it even more likely that, in competition with other more explicit interests and opinions, it would not be a first priority. Such a social philosophy is not likely to inspire positive and constructive legislation.

  It certainly did not do so in the politics of the 1830s and 1840s. Those two decades saw the origins of a state that took a greater interest in the welfare of its citizens than ever before, but in that evolution Paternalism played a minor role.

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