US Nuclear Deterrence

11 Key excerpts on "US Nuclear Deterrence"

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  The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

  Legal Challenges for Military Doctrines and Deterrence Policies

  • Jonathan L. Black-Branch(Author)
  • 2021(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  See also Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 25. 9 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, para. 67 10 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., sub verbo “deterrence.” 11 R. v. Melnyk [1997] 8 WWR 589, [1997] SJ No. 392 at 40. Nuclear Weapons and the Theory of Deterrence 169 ment – the death penalty – as a deterrent to more serious crimes such as murder. 12 From a state’s military defense standpoint, deterrence is “the threat of force intended to convince a potential aggressor not to undertake a particular action because the costs will be unacceptable or the probability of success extremely low.” 13 After states began obtaining nuclear weapons in the mid-to-late 1940s, nuclear weapons were inducted in their defense strategies. With the goal of preventing nuclear conflict, states undertook “the development and rigorous analysis of deterrence as a discrete strategic concept” for nuclear weapons. 14 Thus, nuclear “[d]eterrence theory was developed against the backdrop of the Cold War nuclear arms race and focused on the prevention of nuclear conflict.” 15 During this period, “deterrence became synonymous with nuclear weapons [and] assumed an increasingly important role in the development of military strategy.” 16 Nuclear deterrence is a defense strategy to warn states that nuclear weapons may be used against them, where the nuclear-armed states conditionally promise to deploy them in the event of an act of aggression or threat to, or breach of peace. 17 This is done with the intention of achieving a desired outcome: preventing military conflict or aggression; threatening nuclear aggression to prevent aggression.

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  Beyond Nuclear Deterrence

  Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation

  • Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin(Authors)
  • 2011(Publication Date)
  • Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace

    (Publisher)

  They are disassembling the entire complex of accords on central nuclear disarmament in order to ensure maximum freedom of action for themselves in the technical development and planning of real combat ap-plication of nuclear weapons, as reflected in their official mili-tary doctrines, armament programs, and budgets. As never before, nuclear deterrence now appears to be a permanent factor in international politics—at least until even more destructive weapons are invented. This is due not only to the difficulty of achieving complete nuclear disarmament but to the significant advantages that are supposedly inherent to nuclear weapons in providing security and “civilizing” inter-national relations by encouraging restraint in the use of force. A historical analysis of the evolution, present state, and future prospects of nuclear deterrence—along with its various modes and practical implementation in weapon systems and opera-tion plans—raises serious doubts about such a benign evalua-tion of the doctrine. The Problems Inherent to Nuclear Deterrence As long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear deterrence will re-main the most important means for the indirect use of this type of weapon and the basic element of strategic relations with the nations that possess this kind of weapon. In an ideal world, nuclear deterrence would mean that nuclear weapons were not a means for waging war. Rather, they would be political instru-ments that guaranteed that nuclear weapons would not actu-ally be used in practice—neither in the context of a premedi-tated attack, nor as a result of the escalation of a non-nuclear conflict between nuclear powers. In the sixth decade of the nuclear era, this view is commonly taken for granted. However, contradictions of nuclear deterrence 17 historically, this has not always been so, and the validity of this theory of strategic behavior has always been, and continues to be, subject to question.

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  Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century

  • Stephen J. Cimbala(Author)
  • 2000(Publication Date)
  • Praeger

    (Publisher)

  2 Rethinking Deterrence: A New Logic to Meet Twenty-First Century Challenges Lewis A. Dunn For nearly five decades deterrence was at the center of U.S. national security policy. Initially, deterrence via the threat of nuclear punish- ment was seen as the most critical means to implement the Cold War policy of containment of Soviet aggression in Europe. Over time, mu- tual nuclear deterrence between the United States and the former So- viet Union came to be viewed as the key to containing the threat of mutual nuclear devastation. Over those decades U.S. officials periodi- cally debated and redefined the requirements of stable nuclear deter- rence, while putting in place a robust set of theater and strategic nuclear and nonnuclear military capabilities designed to convince their So- viet counterparts of the fearful damage that would result from ag- gression. With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and the emergence of hostile proliferators armed with chemi- cal or biological weapons (CBW), or possibly even nuclear weaponry, it is timely—and necessary—to begin to rethink in three important respects the role and requirements of deterrence in American security policy. First, while nuclear weapons continue to provide a hedge against a breakdown of the slow process of political reform in Russia, the logic of nuclear deterrence could well impede rather than support the emer- gence and regularization of a more cooperative U.S.-Russian political- military relationship. Instead, the logic of mutual nuclear deterrence needs to be first complemented, then gradually subordinated to, and 24 DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION possibly even eventually replaced by a new logic of U.S.-Russian mutual strategic reassurance. Second, deterrence is and will remain an important element of the overall U.S.

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  Possibility of a Nuclear War in Asia

  An Indian Perspective

  • G G Pamidi(Author)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd

    (Publisher)

  The proponents of nuclear deterrence cite the relative peace during the Cold War period as a reason for its success. However, it has been pointed by various other analysts that this is not entirely true. They cite the numerous armed conflicts in different parts of the world, while conceding that there were no wars in Europe or a war between the two super powers. However, what many are unwilling to accept as true is that this is due to the existence of nuclear weapons and the deterrent effect of a doctrine that threatened that they would be used. The most that many are willing to accept as true is that nuclear deterrence is a policy whose accuracy cannot be proved. There are many political and strategic causes which may have had an effect - and a decisive one on the maintenance of the relative peace during the Cold War. What is a historical fact and that which is indisputable is that today, both the US as well as Russia have realized that deterrence does not need thousands of warheads and delivery platforms. While both appear to be sincere in their disarmament efforts, they continue to rely on nuclear deterrence as a mainstay for ensuring their security.

   

  1      Steven.E.Miller, ed, “Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence”, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984.

  2      Ram Briksha Kumar, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Emerging World Order”, Doctoral Thesis, JNU, 1995.

  3      Steven.E.Miller, ed, “Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence”, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984.

  4      Ram Briksha Kumar, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Emerging World Order”, Doctoral Thesis, JNU, 1995.

  5      Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited”, World Politics, Vol 31, No 2, January 1979.

  6      See “Bulletin of Atomic Scientist”, August, 1995.

  7      Strobe Talbott, “The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace”, New York, 1988.

  8      Roger B. Myerson (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press.

  9      Frank C Zagare and D Marc Kilgour, “Perfect Deterrence”, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 2000.

  10    Thérès e Delpech, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st century :Lessons from the Cold Warfor a New Era of Strategic Piracy,” Rand Corporation, 2012. Accessed at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1103.pdf

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  Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan

  • Zia Ul Haque Shamsi(Author)
  • 2021(Publication Date)
  • Peter Lang Group

    (Publisher)

  Nuclear Deterrence: Guarantor of Peace in South Asia? According to Ward Wilson, “deterrence is persuading an adversary (usually by threat) not to take action.” 5 Deterrence is an attempt to force the adversary into inaction. Prerequisites of an effective deterrent posture are the clear and careful communication to the adversary of what is prohibited and the kind of price he might have to pay for disregarding the prohibitions. The object of deterrence is to prevent an opponent from taking the decision to use military instrument; putting it in more general terms, this means persuading him when faced with a given situ- ation, to act or react in the light of the existing set of dispositions which constitute an effective threat. The result it desires to achieve is, therefore, a psychological one, and it is sought by means of threat. In the earlier days of nuclear era, the deterrence was understood to be “dissuading someone from an action by frightening that person with consequences of the action…. Deterrence depends what one can do, not or what one will do.” 6 According to Saira Khan, “studies revealed that the motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons derive from systemic, domestic, and individual factors … that security was the primary driving force for most states’ tendency to proliferate.” 7 India, an aspiring regional leader, claims to have acquired the nuclear weapons to counter China’s rise as a global leader whereas empirical evidence suggests that offensive realists’ characteristics in India’s state structure had motivated it to acquire the nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Pakistan which had been broken from the status of the largest Muslim state into two separate countries as Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971, had to acquire the same capability to ensure its survival as a political entity.

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  Deterrence

  Its Past and Future—Papers Presented at Hoover Institution, November 2010

  • George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, James E. Goodby(Authors)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Hoover Institution Press

    (Publisher)

  nuclear posture that has only partly made its way into official thinking—or U.S. nuclear policy. From an official standpoint, the United States remains unwilling to abandon that last shred of deterrent power offered by nuclear threats. While President Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report stated that the “fundamental” purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal “is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners,” it went on to offer the qualification that, for states out of compliance with the NPT, “there remains a narrow range of contingencies [emphasis added] in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW [chemical and biological weapons] attack against the United States or its allies and partners,” contingencies presumably aimed at countries like Iran and North Korea. 82 A very limited number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, and a modified nuclear doctrine of limited force, should suffice for deterrence in such cases. 83 Yet apart from numbers and doctrine, if nuclear deterrence aimed at such complex contingencies is to become a serious option, many factors require careful analysis—factors which have not been examined in any depth. • What specific red lines would justify nuclear use? Most likely, not threats that states have developed without the United States using nuclear weapons—a criterion which rules out proliferation, conventional attack, and terrorism. • What specific goal or objective would nuclear use attempt to achieve? In some cases it might be clear—elimination of an about-to-be-employed nuclear capability, for example. But such cases may be rare. Much more often, the United States might be implying nuclear use without a clear objective

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  Deterrence

  Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century

  • A. Lowther(Author)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  In contrast, a long-term strategy might be to lessen the value attributed to nuclear weapons as a means of guaranteeing security by reducing fears of external attack. Considering both long- and near- term aspects of the proliferation problem can help us understand how to sculpt a more consistent long-term US national deterrence strategy. This is accomplished by understanding the actor and how our deterrent actions might need to transition should long-term efforts fail. On Power The United States possesses significant national power. This power must be measured, timely, and decisive when applied, even in pursuit of deterrence strategies aimed at nuclear proliferation challenges. The con- sequences of inappropriate application of US power can include a lasting, tarnished US image in the international community, irrevocable loss of precious resources, strains of over-extension, as well as deterrence failure. Further, failing to plan and organize to marshal and to use US power can frustrate other national security strategies and compound adverse consequences upon us, regardless of the problem at hand. When we think of power, we often think of an acronym such as DIMEFIL (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement). In doing so, however, we typically do not associate applying these elements of power in a coordinated or synchronized way toward an end such as deterrence. Economic power, for example, has many aspects and serves many purposes: it undergirds social well-being and trade, taxes and government programs, and so forth, but it can also be used to influence others through, for example, T A I L O R E D D E T E R R E N C E A N D S M A R T P O W E R 79 the withholding of economic benefits. Unfortunately, when we think of our nation’s “deterrent,” or “strategic deterrence” loosely stated, we usually associate such power with long-range nuclear forces.

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  Survival February - March 2022

  The Reckoning: Russia, Ukraine and NATO

  • The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)(Author)
  • 2023(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  The United States and its European and Indo-Pacific allies therefore need to work much harder at making deterrence in the nuclear domain more relevant and credible in the face of the threats they now confront. This requires looking beyond the next round of arms-control talks and potential confidence-building measures to the nuts and bolts of nuclear strategy in a regional context, as great-power competition between the US and its rivals continues to intensify. Devising a more systematic and integrated approach to nuclear strategy and determining how this strategy interacts with crisis and escalation management are crucial. As a follow-on action from the next NPR, the Biden administration, together with US allies, should examine three key questions about the role of nuclear weapons in US extended deterrence: how does the balance in strategic nuclear forces relate to the security of US allies? How can US extended deterrence control risks of inadvertent escalation while also imposing them on adversaries? And should extended deterrence include the threat of limited nuclear use?

  Allied security and the nuclear balance

  During the 1950s, clear US nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union allowed the United States to threaten ‘massive retaliation’ against the Warsaw Pact for any major attack on US allies. As the US homeland became vulnerable to Soviet retaliation, however, that strategy lost credibility.

  The emergence of parity, or strategic equivalence, between the superpowers led to arguments that questions of superiority and inferiority in the nuclear age were essentially redundant.20 According to this perspective, mutual assured destruction was a reality in the sense that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons was deterring war between the major powers. Moreover, if the United States strove for superiority, this would have the effect of triggering strategic instability because Moscow would come to perceive that the US was preparing to strike first.21 This worry did not stop US administrations from Richard Nixon’s through to Ronald Reagan’s from seeking operationally credible nuclear options in targeting and force planning.22

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  Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons

  How do countries think about the bomb?

  • Norman Cigar(Author)
  • 2016(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  Saudi Arabia, although a propagator of its version of Islamic practice and a supporter of proxies in other countries as it seeks to enhance its influence and security in the region, is basically a status-quo state (although, arguably, its efforts to restore earlier statuses quo have at times been destabilizing) and would almost assuredly intend to use any nuclear arsenal in a deterrence capacity to enhance what it viewed as regional stability. Saudi commentators have stressed repeatedly this defensive aspect of nuclear doctrine as a form of reassurance for foreign and domestic publics.

  A Saudi analyst encapsulated eloquently the prevailing Saudi view of the utility of nuclear weapons. As he saw it:

  the simplest option if you wish to protect yourself and fortify your nation and your people in case you are menaced by a neighbor who covets your country’s riches and who has hostile intentions is for you to be able to ward him off by having defensive means at least equal to, if not better than, his, with capabilities that will deter him and make him think a thousand times before he attacks you.1

  Another Saudi commentator stressed the unique utility of nuclear weapons within the context of deterrence, and noted that “possessing force is the most unambiguous means of preventing the use of the opponent’s force; only iron counters iron.”2 Conceptually, it would seem that the military—insofar as one of the country’s most prominent military thinkers is representative of such thought—accepts very much as a given a “realist” analytical framework, seeing the international system as anarchic and the use of power in order to achieve national interests rather than morality and justice as the acknowledged approach among states.

  In the division between “pessimists” who, conceptually, see nuclear weapons as destabilizing, and “optimists,” who see nuclear weapons as stabilizing through mutual deterrence, the Saudis tend to fall squarely in the latter camp, although, as noted already, the Saudis also have doubts about whether Iran is a rational actor relying on a calculus of balance of power, or whether that approach could be overridden by what they interpret as Iran’s messianic religious tendencies. In this vein, a Saudi journalist, Hasan Ahmad Hasan Fitayhi, for example, challenged an essay by an American academic, Andrea Varisco, in which the latter had argued that the spread of nuclear weapons to small and medium powers would undermine stability in today’s multipolar system. Fitayhi disagreed vehemently and held that, on the contrary, nuclear weapons would continue to serve as a stabilizing deterrent to prevent wars.3

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  Complex Deterrence

  Strategy in the Global Age

  • T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, James J. Wirtz, T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, James J. Wirtz(Authors)
  • 2009(Publication Date)
  • University of Chicago Press

    (Publisher)

  First, both sides took steps to defuse further military crises and undertook a dialogue seeking to resolve the Kashmir issue. Second, the two sides adopted stronger command-and-control mechanisms and developed new nuclear doctrines that mitigated but did not completely eliminate the potential for nuclear use during war. Third, India sought new technologies to overcome some of the limitations of deterrence—technologies that are not purely defensive but that could facilitate offensive operations. These new military technologies and doctrines add to the complexity of deterrence in South Asia. There is both change and continuity in the practice of deterrence among old actors (the superpowers) and new actors (Pakistan and India). Like the old actors, the new actors have undertaken and developed military forces and doctrines for a variety of military operations under their respective nu-clear umbrellas. Deterrence relationships between new nuclear powers and their rivals also contain novel elements, especially when these new powers are deterring challenges from nonstate actors who act as proxies for their rivals. Deterrence of such proxy wars can be extremely difficult, leading states to seek deterrence, compellence, and defensive and offensive military options versus their revisionist rivals. This chapter elaborates upon these observations about nuclear develop-ments in South Asia over the last decade. It begins by reviewing the military c o m p l e x i t y o f d e t e r r e n c e 1 8 5 crises that occurred in South Asia in 1 999 and 200 1 –2. It discusses how fac-tors such as a stability-instability paradox and asymmetric military capabili-ties, combined with nuclear deterrence, contributed to crises in South Asia. It next reviews nuclear learning in South Asia. It also describes how new doctrines and new technologies add to the complexity of deterrence in the region.

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  Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy

  • Charles L. Glaser(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  Examining disar- mament reminds us that ignoring the importance of superpower politics leads to poor analysis of military policy. We can usefully apply this lesson to living in MAD. While we do not know how to transform international relations, we have a better idea of how to reduce the tensions generated by superpower military policies. The United States should maintain its deterrent capability while posing as little threat as possible to necessary Soviet capabilities. In other words, the United States should try to minimize the possible "spiral effects" of its military policy by buying retaliatory capabilities (defense) and forgoing forces designed for damage-limitation (offense). This military policy will not eliminate superpower tensions. Among possible nuclear policies, however, this policy offers the greatest prospects for improving superpower relations while insuring that the United States has adequate capabilities for Disarmament vs. MAD · 203 deterring the Soviet Union. At a minimum, superpower relations will not be unnecessarily damaged by military competition and the superpowers will be able to devote more energy to constructive diplomacy. The remainder of the book considers in detail the strategic nuclear policies the United States should adopt to maximize its security in MAD. P A R T I I I Decisions in MAD

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