Theories of Emotion

12 Key excerpts on "Theories of Emotion"

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  eBook - ePub

  The Emotional Self

  A Sociocultural Exploration

  • Deborah Lupton(Author)
  • 1998(Publication Date)
  • SAGE Publications Ltd

    (Publisher)

  From the cognitive approach it is argued that humans make judgements in relation to the physical sensations they feel when deciding what emotional state they are in. This approach builds on the writings of the early psychologist William James in his The Principles of Psychology, first published in 1890. James claimed that emotion begins with an initial bodily sensation (or set of sensations) in response to an event which is evaluated cognitively and labelled as a particular emotion: ‘we feel sorry because we cry, afraid because we tremble’ (James, quoted in Gergen, 1995: 8). From this perspective, therefore, the physical response is seen to precede the emotion and is interpreted in certain ways based on judgement of the situation. This is clearly a different approach from those perspectives I described above, which generally begin with the premise that emotion causes or is equivalent to physical sensation. Cognitive theorists are thus interested in the interrelationship between bodily response, context and the individual’s recognition of an emotion. They focus in particular on the ways in which environmental conditions are appraised, leading to an emotional reaction, but may also be regulated (controlled or voluntarily enhanced) in response to individual experience and the sociocultural system of norms about emotional expression in which an individual is located. This process of appraisal is represented as being related to the individual’s understandings of how events might affect her or his well-being. Appraisal, therefore, may be viewed as a product of socialization, for how a situation is appraised by an individual from one culture may differ from the appraisal given by another individual from a different culture

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  Understanding Trauma and Emotion

  Dealing with trauma using an emotion-focused approach

  • Colin Wastell(Author)
  • 2020(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  This chapter provides an introduction to the role of emotion in general human functioning, and especially in trauma. For our purposes here, the terms ‘emotion’, ‘affect’ and ‘feeling’ will be treated as equivalents. In many cultures, and especially in the West, displays of emotion are not encouraged as they are associated with weakness. A number of researchers have taken a different view, and regard emotion as both adaptive and central to normal human functioning. Its role in trauma is life-preserving, through the activation of responses such as flight and fight. If the physical and psychological mechanisms associated with emotion’s role in trauma remain activated, then problems will arise. The emphasis placed on the positive and constructive role of emotion in this book is the result of several influences. As with the previous chapter on trauma theories, the review of emotion theories which follows is selective and focuses on the proposed model of trauma.

  Modern cognitive Theories of Emotion

  The predominant Theories of Emotion have been ‘rationalist’ in approach—that is, they have emphasised the role of evaluative cognitive processes. The widely used approach of cognitive behavioural therapies to mood disorders illustrates the dominant position of reasoning over emotion. In essence, this approach asserts that if one’s cognitions are rational, the appropriate emotions will automatically follow. The work of a number of cognitivist theorists will now be discussed.

  Schachter and Mandler: Cognitive arousal

  The concept of bodily registration leading to feeling states was used by Schachter (1966, 1971; Schacter and Singer 1962), but from within a cognitive-contextual framework. In this theory, the physiological arousal that accompanies an emotion experience is recognised, but the label attached to the arousal is determined by the context. That is, the arousal states are not specific to the feelings but the feeling labels are the result of the environmental context in which the arousal occurs.

  Mandler (1980) took a similar approach to feeling states. He was interested in the cognitions that led to certain feeling states. Greenberg and Safran (1987) state, regarding this approach, that ‘there is no affect without evaluation’ (1987, p. 111). However, this theory cannot account for the impact of non-autonomic nervous system effects on emotion. The recently established finding that evaluation is not neutral, but a predetermined process that biases the selection of information, also limits the usefulness of this approach.

  Arnold and Lazarus: Cognitive appraisal

  Arnold (1960) proposed that there were essentially two orientations within the human species: attraction and aversion. The experience of these two orientations results in emotions. Over time, memories of attractive and aversive experiences—termed ‘affective memories’—are accumulated and retrieved in certain circumstances. Arnold asserts that the process of perception–appraisal–emotion is a rapid one, so knowledge of an experience is never simply objective, but always coloured by one’s intuitive appraisal. In her view, emotions are multiply determined by both the initial appraisal and later reappraisal cognitions. Behaviours that follow are a result of the cognitive processes triggered, rather than the emotions generated.

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  Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath

  The Value of Others

  • Jim Baxter(Author)
  • 2021(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  Modern feeling theorists, including Jesse Prinz 3 and Jenefer Robinson 4 are indebted to James to varying extents. Cognitive theories, by contrast, hold that thoughts are in some way essential to emotions. Cognitive theories are to be found in the work of Martha Nussbaum 5 and Robert Solomon, 6 both of whom hold that emotions are essentially a species of evaluative judgement. According to perceptual theories, emo- tions either are, or are closely analogous to (can be modelled on) percep- tions, usually of value. Ronald De Sousa 7 is a prominent defender of a perceptual theory of the emotions. As noted by Goldie, there is a high degree of variability, in respect of a number of qualities, between the phenomena that are usually called, as a matter of ordinary language, emotions. This variability has led some, including Paul E Griffiths 8 and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 9 to call for the 2 James (1884). 3 Prinz (2004a). Prinz’s theory is a sophisticated one which contains elements of perceptualism, but it is a feeling theory in the sense that it identifies emotions with internal perceptions of physiological states and changes. 4 Robinson (2004). 5 Nussbaum (2004). 6 Solomon (2004). 7 De Sousa (1987), De Sousa (2002). 8 Griffiths (2004). 9 Oksenberg Rorty (2004). 100 Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath abandonment of the idea that there can be a single unifying ‘theory of the emotions’. Griffiths argues that emotions are not a natural kind – that ‘the psychological, neuroscientific, and biological theories that best explain any particular subset of human emotions will not adequately explain all human emotions’. 10 The alleged distinction between mood and emotion discussed earlier is one example where the limits of the vernacular category of the emotions may not coincide with boundaries that can be drawn at a theoretical level.

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  Cognitive Science

  • Benjamin Martin Bly, David E. Rumelhart(Authors)
  • 1999(Publication Date)
  • Academic Press

    (Publisher)

  The field of emotion has not achieved a consensus of basic knowledge and core paradigms across the various cognitive sciences. In its place, I shall try to give the reader a general overview of a much divided field. Since the 1960s the field of emo-tion, in its various guises, has attracted increasing numbers of investigators, and sooner or later some kind of paradigm is likely to be agreed upon and further devel-oped. In the meantime, here is a vade mecum into a large and often disorganized ter-ritory.There is much still to be done, and the enterprising reader should be encour-aged to follow some of the often tantalizing leads that the field presents. I. INTRODUCTION The cognitive sciences have inherited a number of natural language categories that are believed to denote more or less unitary collections of phenomena. These cate-gories include intelligence, information, development, and, of course, emotion. Similarly, at least until sometime in the 20th century, the traditional view has been that emotion is a unitary phenomenon, and that the only question to be resolved was which theoretical account best explains that unitary phenomenon. 1 Until the 19th century the dominant belief was based on the notion that most C H A P T E R 8 Emotion George Mandler 367 Cognitive Science Copyright © 1999 by George Mandler. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 1 For a contemporary introduction to problems of emotion see Strongman (1987), and for more extended discussion of some of the historical themes see Mandler (1979). emotions represent some concatenation of bodily or visceral arousal and cognitive or belief states—a position that goes back to Aristotle and was repeatedly revived over the centuries, most notably by Descartes. Aristotle saw the emotions as a com-bination of cognitive and sensual functions and, very much in the modern mold, defined emotions in terms of the beliefs (cognitions) that engendered them.

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  Psychology

  • Ronald Comer, Elizabeth Gould, Adrian Furnham(Authors)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Wiley

    (Publisher)

  What was the key idea in the James–Lange theory of emotion, and what were Cannon’s argu- ments disputing this idea? 7. What element did Schachter and Singer’s two-factor theory add to explanations of what deter- mines emotional experience? 8. In what major way do Lewis and Izard disagree about the developmental relationship between cognition and emotion? 9. According to current research, what region of the brain is especially important in the experience of fear? What Do You Think? Recall a powerful emotional experience you have had. Which of the Theories of Emotion detailed in this chapter seems to best explain your experience? Is one theory sufficient? THE RANGE OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES 423 HOW WE D I F F E R The Range of Emotional Experiences LEARNING OBJECTIVE 3 Discuss the emotional dimensions on which people may dif- fer, and describe how malfunctions in emotional processes are related to psychological disorders. Actually, there are as many emotional experiences as there are people. Do you know anyone who experiences emo- tions in exactly the same way you do? Probably not. People experience their emotions in a variety of ways. In extreme cases, these differences may even amount to psychological disturbances. Let’s examine both differences in how people experience emotion and psychological disturbances of emo- tion and conclude with a discussion of current research in the field of positive emotions. Experiencing Emotion In this section, we will look at some common patterns in how different people experience emotions. Indeed, some researchers suggest that such patterns affect how well indi- viduals adapt to their environments We will also discuss how people differ in their ability to regulate emotions. And finally, we will ask how much gender and culture affect the experi- ence of emotions.

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  Theories of Emotion

  • Robert Plutchik, Henry Kellerman, Robert Plutchik, Henry Kellerman(Authors)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Academic Press

    (Publisher)

  Part I THE EVOLUTIONARY CONTEXT This page intentionally left blank Chapter 1 A GENERAL PSYCHOEVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF EMOTION ROBERT PLUTCHIK ABSTRACT The general psychoevolutionary theory of emotion that is presented here has a number of important characteristics. First, it provides a broad evolutionary foundation for conceptualizing the domain of emotion as seen in animals and humans. Second, it provides a structural model which describes the interrelations among emotions. Third, it has demonstrated both theoretical and empirical relations among a number of derivative domains including personality traits, diagnoses, and ego defenses. Fourth, it has provided a theoretical rationale for the construction of tests and scales for the measurement of key dimensions within these various domains. Fifth, it has stimulated a good deal of empirical research using these tools and concepts. Finally, the theory pro-vides useful insights into the relationships among emotions, adaptations, and evo-lution. Both an explicit and an implicit body of knowledge about emotions exist. The explicit knowledge concerns such things as how well we judge emotions from facial expressions, whether our emotions are revealed by physiological changes, what emotions infants express, and whether aggressive behavior can be produced by brain stimulation. This knowledge, based on formal studies, is often inconsistent and relatively narrow in the sense that only a few key issues have been examined in the laboratory. 3 Emotion: Theory, Research, and Experience Volume 1: Theories of Emotion Copyright © 1980 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISBN 0-12-558701-5 4 ROBERT PLUTCHIK The implicit knowledge of emotion is probably universal, and most people believe that they already know a great deal about emotions. For example, we believe that emotions are powerful inner forces that affect our behavior and thoughts, even when we would prefer that they did not.

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  Available until 11 Feb |Learn more

  Psychology of Emotion

  • Paula M. Niedenthal, François Ric(Authors)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • Psychology Press

    (Publisher)

  Variability in how emotion components fit together may be caused by stable individual differences. Some people may react to all emotional events primarily with facial expressions, whereas others may mostly show strong autonomic responses (Marwitz & Stemmler, 1998). There are individual differences in the complexity of cardiac responses across different experiences of stress that are provoked in the laboratory (Friedman, 2003). Psychological constructionists also suggest that the components of emotion are controlled by distinct neural and bodily systems that respond to particular features of the event in which an emotion was experienced (Russell, 2003; Stemmler, 2003). In their view, then, an emotion emerges from conceptualizations that trigger multiple response systems rather than one affect program.

  Figure 1.8 A schematic diagram of psychological constructionism.

  An emotion from the perspective of psychological constructionist theories is illustrated in Figure 1.8 . When events are encountered that have acquired emotional significance through learning, they cause a change in core affect. The changes are conceptualized in terms of emotion categories that are relevant to the current circumstances. The categorization may trigger some of the components of emotion, although they do not have to occur in one package. Components of emotion can be augmented or prevented due to social or cultural rules. The resulting responses constitute the total emotion.

  Summary

  • Theories of Emotion are testable statements about 1) the causes of an emotion, 2) what people are born with (biological givens), and 3) how different components of emotion come together in the emotional expressions.
  • Evolutionary Theories of Emotion hold that emotions are biologically evolved, functional responses to certain opportunities and challenges posed by the environment. One of the key predictions of the evolutionary theory of emotion, which we will revisit several times in this book, is that a set of universally recognized facial expressions of emotion exists.

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  Demystifying Emotions

  A Typology of Theories in Psychology and Philosophy

  • Agnes Moors(Author)
  • 2022(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  PART II Emotion Theories One by One In Chapter 2, I listed a number of axes on which emotion theories can differ. These differences could arise across the four stages of the demarcation-explanation cycle: working definitions in Stage 1, explan- ations in Stage 2, validation in Stage 3, and scientific definitions in Stage 4. Chapter 2 already worked out the details for the working definitions in Stage 1. I listed the desiderata, that is, the typical and apparent properties for which there is fair consensus that emotion theories need to account for them. In the coming chapters, I discuss the next three stages for a range of emotion theories. To structure the discussion, I will group emotion theor- ies into families based on the causal-mechanistic stories that they peddle (with a clear emphasis on mental rather than neural mechanisms; i.e., Axis 6). My choice for this axis is prompted by a radically mechanistic approach. I apply this approach not only to psychological emotion theor- ies, which are already mechanistically oriented at heart, but I will also try to “squeeze” philosophical emotion theories into the mechanistic mold. This will inevitably come at the cost of not doing full justice to all the questions that are traditionally posed within the philosophy of emotion (e.g., epistemology, phenomenology, rationality, ethics). Yet it may also bring a hitherto underexplored benefit, namely that answers to mechan- istic questions could eventually also throw some light on these non- mechanistic questions. The analysis presented here is first and foremost an exercise. It is an honest attempt to make – sometimes hidden – assumptions about mechanisms more explicit. As such, it is an invitation for the reader to participate in what will hopefully become a fruitful discussion in years to come. The order of appearance of emotion theories is as follows.

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  The Emotions

  A Philosophical Introduction

  • Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni(Authors)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  6    Perceptual theories of the emotions

  While accounting for some important aspects of the emotions, the various theories we have considered up to now face serious difficulties, which essentially have to do with the fact that they remain almost completely silent on the nature of the felt aspect of emotions. After all, one of the most surprising aspects of the evaluative judgment theory discussed in the last chapter consists in its failure to come to grips with the fact that emotions are experiences, and as such cannot be assimilated to judgments. We have thus repeatedly underlined the importance of the felt aspect of emotions and have spoken of phenomenology, qualitative experience, hedonic quality, and feeling, while leaving open the question of the relation between emotion and feeling.

  The purpose of this chapter is then to gain a better grasp of the role feelings play in an analysis of emotions and to specify their nature. The starting point for our discussion will be the theory put forward by William James, a theory that identifies emotions with distinctive kinds of feelings. We shall see that this theory proves unsatisfactory, precisely because it fails to account for the intimate links between emotions and evaluative properties. This will then lead us to consider and criticize two contemporary approaches to the emotions – conceptions according to which emotions are direct or indirect perceptions of evaluative properties – that emphasize both their phenomenological aspects and their intentional relations to evaluative properties.

  James's theory

  As we pointed out at the very beginning of this book, it is striking how ordinary language constantly brings to the foreground the bodily dimension of emotions. When Jonas is afraid, he feels his heart racing, his breathing quicken, his throat constrict, and so on. When Mary is ashamed, she feels the blood go to her head, her knees go weak, her shoulders fall, and so on. So why not appeal directly to these features in analyzing emotions? Descartes, for one, held that a passion is the consciousness of the activity of animal spirits in the body. This kind of view is today more commonly associated with the names of William James (1884, 1890/1950: Chapter 25) and Carl Lange (1922).

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  The Role of Emotions in Criminal Law Defences

  Duress, Necessity and Lesser Evils

  • Eimear Spain(Author)
  • 2011(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  Psychologist 352. 74 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, The Intelligence of Emotions, above note 65, at p. 34. 75 Ibid., at p. 44. 76 Ibid., at p. 64. 77 R. De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), at p. 6. 78 Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave, Emotions & Choice, above note 29, at p. 86. psychological literature 79 The preceding discussion should not be taken to suggest that all cognitive theorists are in agreement on the exact relationship between cognition and emotion. Pillsbury acknowledges that ‘[t]he exact nature of cognition in emotion is a matter of some controversy among cognitive theorists’. 79 Some see cognition as constituting emotion, others view it as merely playing a part, though an important part, in emotion generation. Clore takes the view that as mental states, emotions involve substantial cognitive involvement. 80 However, he stresses that ‘[a]sserting that emo- tions are mental states in no way implies that emotions are not also bodily states and legacies of our evolutionary past . . . It requires only that emotion be seen as part of a larger information processing system’. 81 Solomon suggests that ‘[t]he cognitive theory of emotions takes emotions to be composed (at least in their essential structure) of cognitions – concepts, perceptions, judgments, beliefs’. 82 However, he acknowledges that: [t]here is by no means agreement about the precise nature of these cognitions, whether they are peculiar to emotions or no different as such from other cognitions, whether they consist of beliefs, or thoughts, or judgments, whether they alone constitute emotion or whether other factors, in particular ‘feelings’ are also required. 83 This passage highlights another dilemma for adherents to the cognitive appraisal theory, that is, the definition of cognition. Whether one is willing to accept that emotions are cognitive in nature depends very much on how one defines cognition.

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  The Aesthetics of Emotion

  Up the Down Staircase of the Mind-Body

  • Gerald C. Cupchik(Author)
  • 2016(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  Appraisal theories also hold that features of the external world can be analyzed and quantified so as to guide motivated actions and thereby fulfil needs, desires, and goals. The reaction model: interpreted situations and emotional experiences The roots of the reaction model lie in functional responses to environ- mental events. Three situational themes – attachment–loss (Bowlby, 1969), fight–flight (Cannon, 1915), and attraction–repulsion (Berlyne, 1960, 1971) – can be related to three complementary pairs of primary emotions: happy–sad, anger–fear, and interest–disgust, respectively. These “themes” are instances of “social kinds” because of their ubiquity in the mammalian world. The evocative sources become more abstract Emotional Phase Theory 109 and complex as we move up the hierarchy of species toward Homo sapiens. At lower levels of the mammalian hierarchy, bonding and survival are of primary importance and instinctual processes determine an animal’s response to specific stimulus cues in the environment. As we move up the hierarchy to humans, personal and social meanings shape interpretations of critical situations through the mediation of language and emotionally loaded episodic memories. In this context, emotional experiences can be referred to, metaphorically speaking, as liberated instincts because the evocative stimulus is not fixed for humans whereas it may be for animals. Interpretive efforts at understanding events are governed by a principle of closure whereby suggestions in complex situations rapidly evoke connec- tions in the mind which are tied to episodic emotional memories. When critical events recur, a personal schema or prototype is built up that shapes subsequent efforts after meaning. Emotional experiences are conse- quent to the deeper interpretation of situational meanings, not merely their appraisal in terms of positive or negative implications, and this process is influenced by both individual and social dynamics.

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  Handbook of Psychology, History of Psychology

  • (Author)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • Wiley

    (Publisher)

  Frijda (1986) may be the most wide-ranging contemporary theorist. He starts off with a working definition that defines emotion as the occurrence of noninstrumental behavior, physiological changes, and evaluative experiences. In the process of trying a number of different proposals and investigating action, physiology, evaluation, and experience, Frijda arrives at a definition that's broad indeed. Central to his position are action tendencies and the individual's awareness of them. The tendencies are usually set in motion by a variety of mechanisms. Thus, Frijda (1986) describes emotion as a set of mechanisms that ensure the satisfaction of concerns, compare stimuli to preference states, and by turning them into rewards and punishments, generate pain and pleasure, dictate appropriate action, assume control for these actions and thereby interrupt ongoing activity, and provide resources for these actions (p. 473). The question is whether such mechanisms do not do too much and leave nothing in meaningful action that is not emotional. At least one would need to specify which of the behaviors and experiences that fall under such an umbrella are to be considered emotional and which not. But that would again raise the elusive problem as to what qualifies as an emotion.

  Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) define emotions as “valenced reactions to events, agents, or objects, with their particular nature being determined by the way in which the eliciting situation is construed” (p. 13). Such a definition is, of course subject to James's critique; it is abstracted from the “bodily felt” emotions. Richard Lazarus and his coworkers define emotion as organized reactions that consist of cognitive appraisals, action impulses, and patterned somatic reactions (Folkman & Lazarus, 1990; Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman, 1980). Emotions are seen as the result of continuous appraisals and monitoring of the person's well-being. The result is a fluid change of emotional states indexed by cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms. Central is the notion of cognitive appraisal, which leads to actions that cope with the situation.

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