Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces

The making of a distinctive power

Sven Biscop, Jo Coelmont

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415716901
• eBook ISBN: 9781136639197
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

This book examines how the European Union can pursue a grand strategy and become a distinct global actor in a world of emerging great powers.

At the grand strategic level, its sheer economic size makes the EU a global power. However, the EU needs to take into account that many international actors continue to measure power mostly by assessing military capability. To preserve its status as an economic power, therefore, the EU has to become a power across the board, which requires a grand strategy, and the means and the will to proactively pursue one. The authors of this book aim to demonstrate that the EU can develop a purposive yet distinctive grand strategy that preserves the value-based nature of EU external action while also safeguarding its vital economic interests.

The book analyses the existing military capability of the European Union and its bottom-up nature, which results in a national-based focus in the member-states, impeding deployment capability. A systematic realignment of national defence planning at the strategic level will enable each member-states to focus its defence effort on the right capabilities, make maximal use of pooling and specialization, and contribute to multinational projects in order to address Europe's strategic capability shortfalls. A stronger Europe will therefore result, it is argued, a real global actor, which can then become an equal strategic partner to the United States, leading to a revitalized Transatlantic partnership in turn.

This book will be of interest to students of military studies, European Union policy, strategic studies and International Relations generally.

1 EU grand strategy and foreign
policy strategy

For a long time, strategic studies and European studies appeared to mutually ignore, if not disdain, each other. In the context of the Cold War, strategic studies concentrated on the exercise of hard power as an instrument of foreign policy. Their natural focus was the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers. It came equally naturally to ignore the European Economic Community (EEC), which except for the informal consultation mechanism of European Political Cooperation (EPC) did not venture into the realm of foreign policy, let alone security and defence policy. European studies themselves for the most part did not look at the EEC as an actor in the field of security and defence policy, turning instead to conceptualizations of the Community as a “civilian power” or, more recently, a “normative” or “transformative power”, i.e. an actor that consciously refutes the use of power to achieve its objectives in favour of the power of attraction and other indirect methods.

Even when the European Union came into existence and with it the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to be followed by the European, now Common Security and Defence Policy (ESDP and CSDP), many European scholars focused their efforts on trying to explain how these developments did not detract from Europe's status as a civilian or normative power. Others, who thought these developments did just that, offered recommendations to put things right, as if somehow it would be wrong for the EU to venture onto another path and become a fully fledged actor in the field of security and defence (see e.g. Manners 2009; Smith 2006). Many strategic studies scholars meanwhile, if they could be convinced at all to allow themselves to be distracted for a moment and take a look at the EU, did not take the tentative steps of the CFSP and CSDP very seriously (see e.g. Heisbourg 2004; Toje 2005; Wyllie 2006).

Strategy applied to the EU

The cause of this divide is that since the end of the Cold War both strategic studies and European studies scholars for the most part have interpreted the notion of strategy very narrowly. Too often, strategy is understood as pertaining only to “the application of military power to achieve political objectives” (Baylis et al.2002: 3). If analysed through this lens, the EU obviously is less well developed than other unitary actors. Many EU studies scholars rightfully reject such an exclusively military–oriented approach for ideological reasons or because, less obviously, strategic studies are associated with an exclusively realist approach to foreign policy. Many strategic studies scholars on the other hand feel that the EU is too insignificant an actor in the field of security and defence to merit their attention – although every classic author about strategy actually warns against underestimating the enemy. However, military force, even coercive instruments in the broader sense, are but one of a much broader range of instruments at the disposal of a foreign policy actor. Admittedly the most dramatic tool, force is also the instrument of last resort – an actor that had no other available instruments would not last very long. On the international scene, the EU, which is a state–like actor, is much more than a military actor – like any other actor for that matter. No useful analysis of the EU can therefore be limited to military strategy.

Even during the Cold War, strategic studies did not apply such a reductionist perspective. A broader understanding of strategy certainly is in order therefore if the strategic lens is to be valuable in analysing and interpreting today's world. If the notion of strategy has its origin in the study of the use of force as a tool of policy, its application is much broader, as Gaddis (2009: 7) explains:

Our knowledge of it derives chiefly from the realm of war and statecraft, because the fighting of wars and the management of states have demanded the calculation of relationships between means and ends for a longer stretch of time than any other documented area of collective human activity. But grand strategy need not apply only to war and statecraft: it's potentially applicable to any endeavour in which means must be deployed in pursuit of important ends.

Even without including the private sector, a logical application of strategy is found throughout all policy areas addressed by public authorities. Inspired by the tradition of public management or policy science, strategy can therefore be defined as a policy–making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of the actor in question, outlines the long–term policy objectives to be achieved and the instruments to be applied to that end, which serves as a reference framework for day–to–day policy–making in a rapidly evolving and complex environment, and which guides the definition of the means that need to be developed.

Various levels of strategy can be distinguished, all of them applicable to the EU as an international actor:

• A grand strategy, defined by Gaddis (2009) as “the calculated relationship between means and large ends”, defines an actor's fundamental objective and the basic categories of instruments it chooses to apply to achieve that. Grand strategy thus equals the choice to be a certain type of actor or power. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) operates at this level. Grand strategy, moreover, has implications for internal policies as well.

• A foreign policy strategy translates the implications of the grand strategy into objectives, instruments and means covering all dimensions of foreign policy (Biscop 2009a). It includes diplomacy and the military, but it goes beyond CFSP, covering the entire remit of the High Representative and the External Action Service. Such a comprehensive foreign policy strategy is of course not an operational document, but has to be further translated into sub–strategies, policies and actions. It has what Bailes (2005: 14) has called an inspiring function vis–à–vis policy– making. Next to a foreign policy strategy, the EU will, for example, also define a trade strategy.

• A security and defence strategy is one of the sub–strategies to the overall foreign policy strategy, defining priorities, instruments and means for the deployable civil–military arm of the EU: CSDP. Other strategies at this level cover, for example, the Neighbourhood, Africa, development, terrorism and WMD.

Clearly, this updated definition of strategy can no longer be exclusively tied to the realist school. Not that that ever made sense: a strategy inspired by a realist world view is just one option out of many that any international actor can follow. The ESS, with its focus on a preventive, holistic and multilateral approach, testifies to this. As strategy concerns foreign policy in its entirety, civilian or normative power should not be seen as being in contradiction with the development of military power by the EU, but as complementary dimensions of a single foreign policy strategy. As Howorth (2010a: 465) forcefully puts it:

The debate over “normative power Europe” is largely an irrelevance. Of course the EU will continue to pursue norms– based effective multilateralism; of course it will continue to promote a world in which human rights, human security, international institutions and international law will replace the jungle. But if those objectives are actually to be achieved, the EU must have the entire range of policy instruments, including a significant measure of hard power. ESDP exists. It exists for very powerful historical reasons. It functions as a vital underpinning of the EU's normative ambitions around the world. The EU is, and will remain, a military actor – albeit a military actor of a new and very different type.

Furthermore, every theoretical school captures only part of the EU. The strategic perspective by contrast offers a methodology rather than a theory, which can be applied regardless of the different IR schools and their proselytes. However, this modernized, broader definition of strategy is not so broad as to validate Strachan's (2005: 34) view that “the word ‘strategy’ has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with banalities”. Rather, it allows for the useful application of the strategic perspective to the EU, which as it has become an actor in its own right in all fields of foreign and security policy, can no longer be ignored by strategists. In recent years, several authors have looked at the EU through the strategic lens, particularly since the adoption of the ESS in 2003 (see e.g. Biscop 2005; Biscop and Andersson 2008; Engelbrekt and Hallenberg 2008).

The first question to be addressed when applying the strategic perspective is of course: does the EU have a strategy? It is not sufficient to have a strategy, however – one must also apply it. The next question, therefore, is whether the EU can be considered a strategic actor, i.e. an actor that not only consciously sets long–term strategic objectives, but that actively pursues those and acquires the necessary means to that end. If a strategic actor is effective, i.e. if it is successful in achieving its strategic objectives, it can be considered a power.

The ESS: an incomplete grand strategy

In the ESS, the EU has a document that operates at the grand strategic level. The core of the ESS can be summarized in three principles, which together constitute an approach, a method, to deal with the international environment.

The core of the ESS

The first core principle of the ESS is prevention: “. . . we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early”, as the ESS states. A permanent strategy of prevention and stabilization, addressing the root causes of threats and challenges, aims to prevent conflict so that, ideally, coercion and the use of force will not be necessary. Addressing the root causes means to close the gap, both within and between countries, between the haves and the have–nots in terms of access to the core public goods to which all individuals aspire, and to which all are indeed entitled: security, prosperity, freedom and social well–being. “Under conditions of endemic in equality, all other desirable goals become hard to achieve” (Judt 2010: 184). For this gap between haves and have–nots generates feelings of frustration and marginalization on the part of those that are excluded economically or politically, as well as radicalization and extremism of various kinds, social and economic instability, massive migration flows, and tension and conflicts within and between states. The gap in access to the core public goods thus constitutes the fundamental root cause of instability. Effective prevention is an enormous challenge, for it means addressing a much wider range of issues, at a much earlier stage, across the globe, because as the ESS says “the first line of defence will often be abroad”.

Closing the gap between the haves and the have–nots of necessity demands a holistic approach, the second principle, for the security, economic, political and social dimensions are inextricably related – an individual cannot enjoy any one core public good unless he has access to them all – and all are present, in differing degrees, in all threats and challenges. In the ESS: “none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.” Therefore, every foreign policy must simultaneously address all dimensions, making use in an integrated way of all available instruments: “Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda.” The core phrase in the ESS is perhaps the following:

The best protection for our security is a world of well–governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Such a holistic approach is best implemented via multilateralism, the third principle. “We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors”, according to the ESS. Only in cooperation with others can our objectives be achieved peacefully, only in cooperation with all global actors can global challenges be successfully addressed, and only in cooperation with a wide range of actors can complex issues be comprehensively tackled. “The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule–based international order is our objective”, declares the ESS under the heading of “effective multilateralism”. Multilateralism can be considered “effective” to the extent that the ensemble of regimes, mechanisms and institutions manages to provide access to the core public goods to citizens worldwide.

From these three principles it follows that the EU must be a global actor. As the ESS states:

As a Union of 25 [now 27] states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player.

In a globalized world, interdependence is such that none of these principles can be successfully applied at the regional level only, for the most pressing challenges are global challenges. The EU cannot insulate itself or its neighbourhood from the world.

These are indeed principles of foreign policy, i.e. the EU pursues them as a matter of principle, even when in specific circumstances doing so may render a task more difficult. The reason why it is not a matter of choice is that these principles reflect the values on which the EU itself is based; therefore, they determine the EU's soft power, i.e. the credibility and legitimacy of its foreign policy.

For the European Union the internal is the external, that is to say the way it preserves the values if affirms to stand for, its founding values in the internal order, will shape the perceptions of the other international players – as well as its own self–perception.

(de Vasconcelos 2010: 17)

From these principles, the ESS also draws some implications for the means, notably the need to be more active, more capable and more coherent, and to work with partners.

These three principles only constitute a partial grand strategy, however. They represent an important strategic choice, but they mostly tell us how to do things – the ESS is much vaguer on what to do. The issue is not that the ESS is not valid or has become outdated – in fact, it already mentions all of the so–called new threats and challenges, e.g. climate change, energy shortages and large–scale migration, proof of the authors’ foresight. The issue is that the ESS is incomplete in terms of the fundamental objectives which the EU aims to achieve. It is so because to start with it is not clear about the values and interests to be defended. Even with an incomplete grand strategy, the EU could have been more of a global power though, beyond the area of trade, if it had not been for the half–hearted implementation of the ESS and Member States’ reluctance to act proactively and collectively. A grand strategy must necessarily be translated into strategies, sub–strategies and policies for it to be put into action, but the objectives of “building security in our neighbourhood” and “effective multilateralism”¹ have proved too broad, and Member States have been far too hesitant to act upon the strategy that they have adopted, to generate clear priorities. As a result, the EU has not become markedly more proactive, capable or coherent since the adoption of the ESS. In other words, the EU has yet to become a real strategic actor.

The 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS

A chance to revisit the EU's first strategic document presented itself when the December 2007 European Council mandated High Representative Javier Solana “to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it”. Great expectations were raised. Many observers hoped for a thorough review and the definition of clearer priorities, in order to generate a new dynamic, but the outcome of the debate was disappointing. The December 2008 European Council duly adopted a Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, while deciding to leave the ESS itself untouched. This might have been an acceptable result, had the Report offered concrete recommendations to improve implementation – but it did not, although recognizing that “despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress”. Even though mostly an issue of timing and partly also of expectations management, in the eyes of many this outcome has once again confirmed the image of a hesitant and reactive EU, uncertain of its role on the world stage, internally divided and riddled by institutional blockages (Biscop 2009b).

The idea to revisit the ESS was put forward by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, arguing (in the fall of 2007) that four years after its adoption, significant changes in the international environment warranted a revision. A further argument was that adopting a revised document at 27 would increase ownership, since the ESS had been adopted at 15, before the 2004 enlargement, even though all accession countries were involved in the debate. The idea did not meet with universal enthusiasm, however. Many Member States feared that a fully fledged revision would generate an all too openly divisive debate, notably about Russia. Even before the 2008 Georgian crisis attitudes towards Russia differed greatly between western and eastern Member States, the former tending to be markedly more optimistic about the possibility and opportunity of good–neighbourly relations with Moscow than the latter. There was also the concern that the method used by Solana in 2003, i.e. drafting by a small team around him, would not be repeatable and that a revision “by committee”, with Member States combing through every paragraph in the intergovernmental bodies of the CFSP, might produce a worse rather than a better document. In the end, a similarly small team did the drafting (Grevi 2009b), including representatives of the Commission's DG Relex, but Solana was not able to avoid difficult intergovernmental discussions towards the end of the process.

Following this hesitant start – nothing much happened in fact in the first half of 2008 – events conspired to render the exercise even more difficult. Just as in 2003, when the draft text of the original ESS was discussed, the EU Institute for Security Studies in 2008 again organized a series of seminars involving officials, academics, NGOs, etc. in order to debate the implementation of the ESS. In 2003, the intra–EU divide about Iraq had provided the push for Member States to adopt the very first strategy, which, it must be noted, surpassed the temporary circumstances surrounding its adoption precisely because it built on the acquis of EU foreign policy. In 2008, the conjuncture turned decidedly negative when on 12 June the Irish electorate rejected the Lisbon Treaty. With its important innovations in the field of foreign policy – the double– hatted High Representative, the European External Action Service, Permanent Structured Cooperation – now jeopardized, and in view of the concern not to be seen to pre–empt ratification, the appetite for a thorough strategic debate became even weaker. An oral report by Solana had been planned for the European Council (19–20 June), but in the end there was little or no discussion about the ESS. The debate picked up somewhat after the Georgian crisis, but that had an ambiguous impact: although it generated...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces
• Cass Military Studies
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• About the authors
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 EU grand strategy and foreign policy strategy
• 2 A strategy for CSDP
• 3 Military capability development in CSDP
• 4 Military convergence through CSDP
• 5 CSDP and NATO
• 6 Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index