Geopolitical Change, Grand Strategy and European Security

The EU-NATO Conundrum

L. Simon

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137029126
• eBook ISBN: 9781137029133
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Examining the interplay between geopolitics, the strategic priorities of Europe's most powerful nations, Britain, Germany and France, and the evolution of NATO and CSDP, this book unveils the mechanics of the tension between conflict and cooperation that lies at the heart of European security politics.

1

Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and the EU–NATO Conundrum

This first chapter outlines the book’s driving hypothesis, namely, the existence of a relation of causality between geopolitical change, the grand strategies and policies of Britain, France and Germany, and the evolution of the CSDP and NATO. The chapter starts by identifying nation-states as the highest subjects of power and explaining international cooperation and institutions through the lens of national power. Next, it elucidates on the relationship between power, geography and (national) grand strategy, and discusses the meaning of those concepts in a British, French and German context. The final part of the chapter establishes a distinction between a nation’s grand strategy and its policies towards the CSDP and NATO.

1.1. The power of nation-states

Nationhood and statehood are two concepts that are often casually interchanged in the International Relations (IR) literature but carefully differentiated in that of political science (Brubaker 1992). Nations result from the calculation by different groups of individuals within a given territory that joining their forces around a common enterprise is the most effective way of pursuing their own power (Bulpitt 1983, Flora, Kuhnle and Irwin 1990). They are communities of power, articulated around a common and enduring political experience. They are bound by ‘a common rich legacy of memories’ and ‘the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form’ (Renan 1882: 7). States, in turn, are specific politico-legal manifestations of nationhood in time or, for that matter, space. It is precisely the enduring quality of nations that leads all states or state-like entities (i.e. sub-state or above-state legal entities) to engage in nation-building enterprises (Hroch 1985). Statehood, however, remains critical. States are the politico-legal entities that exercise the legitimate power or authority (Weber 1918). It is precisely their power to create and refashion states at will that distinguishes cultural or stateless nations from political nations or nation-states. Without statehood, nations risk perishing (Mearsheimer 2002). We will henceforth use the expression ‘nation-state’, which brings together the political and legal aspects of sovereignty. Accordingly, when we use the word ‘nation’ or ‘nationhood’, we will assume the qualifier ‘state’ unless specified otherwise.

Classical realism identifies nations and their drive for power as the central force of international politics (Carr 1939, Morgenthau 1985). Hans J. Morgenthau, broadly considered as the father of classical realism, holds a rather broad understanding of power. He defines power as the control of man ‘over man’ (1985: 11), ‘over nature, or over an artistic medium, such as language, speech, sound, or color, or over the means of production or consumption, or over himself in the sense of self-control’ (1985: 32). He argues, however, that political scientists should be concerned not with this (broad) idea of power but instead concentrate on the (narrower) concept of political power. And political power, according to Morgenthau, is the power of man over man or, by extension, of nation over nation (ibid.). This is a point where classical realism and structural realism or neorealism (Gilpin 1983, Waltz 1979) concur. The latter, despite placing its emphasis on states instead of nations and on security instead of power, defines a state’s security in relation to that of other states or like-units (ibid.).

Reducing ‘political power’ to the nation-to-nation or inter-state level of analysis raises a number of problematic questions. In what way exactly are non-state actors or phenomena ‘non-political’? Are not nation-states concerned with internal problems such as political unrest, economic stagnation or social backlash? Are they not threatened by external non-state actors? Are they not supposed to protect their people against a whole range of natural, man-made or animal-caused disasters such as fires, floods, tornadoes or epidemics? And are not the same military, economic, political and other resources a nation devotes to countering those threats the same as it uses to compete against other nations? Does not all this mean that the two are irrevocably intertwined and impossible to isolate from each other?

That nations have sought the favours of terrorists, pirates and other criminal organisations or engaged in internal meddling in their quest for an edge against other nations is as old as nationhood itself. Since the end of the Cold War, the link between rogue states, international terrorist organisations and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation has been in the spotlight (Litwak 2000). Similarly, during the Cold War, the instigation of internal turmoil through foreign proxies was much resorted to by the superpowers to weaken their opponents and gain geopolitical clout. In fact, in the aftermath of World War II the threat of the Soviet Union supporting local parties to instigate a communist insurrection in some of the economically devastated Western European countries was the greatest preoccupation of US policymakers (Hogan 1987).

The importance of non-state actors and phenomena and their own impact in nation-to-nation relations exposes the limitations of Morgenthau’s narrowing of political power to the ability to control other nations. In order to capture the interdependence between state and non-state phenomena or, for that matter, internal and external politics, it is appropriate to adopt a broader definition of power and focus on a nation’s ability to act and assert itself against any forces that might threaten its freedom and individuality. These forces may include other individual entities (nations, private companies, terrorists or other criminal organisations), internal imbalances, natural or man-made disasters as well as uncertainty itself, that is, ‘unknown unknowns’.

A number of prominent philosophers have highlighted the link between power and individuation. For Aristotle, the power or telos of a creature, whether animal or human, consists in it acting in its own nature as the self-fulfilment of its essence (1999, 2004). Nietzsche too conceives life as will to power (1903/1968). He asserts that ‘every living thing reaches out as far from itself with its force as it can’ (ibid.: 403), seeking to overcome, appropriate and incorporate everything it finds. Spinoza, for his part, defines power as an individual thing’s ‘ability to act’ (1677/1996: 75) and identifies power as the measure whereby all individual things are constituted as such: if ‘taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away’ (ibid.: 32). Without power, an individual thing ‘can neither be nor be conceived’ (ibid.). For Spinoza, it is in the essence of all individual things to ‘strive to persevere in their own being as far as they can’ (1677/1996: 75). By linking power to individuation we are affirming the inherently ‘political’ nature of all individual things (individuals, private companies, terrorist groups and other kinds of criminal organ-isations, nations, states, etc.) and of their interactions. What makes nation-states the highest subjects of power?

By virtue of their monopoly of the use of physical force within their territory, nation-states hold legitimate power (Weber 1918). Their legitimate power gives nation-states the authority to produce laws; administer justice and taxation; regulate the domestic market and the supply of money; control migration flows; conduct trade negotiations; represent their territory and population externally; and to wage war on their behalf. These attributes allow nation-states to achieve a degree of power that is not achievable to any individuals or groups by themselves. From this follows that all individuals or groups must either constitute themselves in nation-states (Mearsheimer 2002), seek their influence and protection or enjoy their favours. This applies to terrorist organ-isations or other criminal groups such as drug-trafficking networks as much as it applies for private companies or trade unions. Just as nation-states seek power, so does power seek nation-states. Nation-states are, after all, the highest institutional expressions of power and hence the most effective vehicles for individuals and groups to maximise their own power. The relationship between power and nationhood is therefore mutually constitutive. Insofar as they are the highest expressions of power, nation-states are the central subjects of international politics.

A broad understanding of power (i.e. a nation’s ability to assert itself against any forces that might threaten its individuality) does not prejudice the specific importance or instrumentality that influence over ‘like-units’ (in the IR jargon) can have over a nation’s freedom or ability to act. Nor does it necessarily deny Morgenthau’s assertion that it is in man’s nature to control and subdue other men. It merely affirms that the power of a man or a nation transcends the limited realm of influencing like-units (i.e. other men or nations), as important as that may be.

An emphasis on nations-states and power (broadly understood) is distinctively at odds with structural realism’s depiction of power as a means to security against ‘like-units’ (Gilpin 1983, Waltz 1979). Power cannot be encompassed by security: it can either contain it or be synonymous with it. If security is defined in its narrowest form as physical survival then it surely is contained by power. One’s ability to act surely includes the ability to procure for itself physical integrity or, for that matter, economic prosperity, a way of life, and so on (Morgenthau 1985: 31). However, if one conceptualises security in its broadest form as the preservation of one’s essence or individuality then security and power become conterminous. We understand security in this broader sense and therefore make no distinction between security, power or liberty. However, in order to eschew a common tendency to understand security narrowly, we will generally refer to nations’ quest for power.

1.2. Cooperation and institutions: A power-centric approach

By linking power to individuation the importance of cooperation becomes self-evident. The immensity of the universe and the existence of infinite and powerful forces that threaten their power lead individuals and groups to often associate among themselves as well as to merge in greater entities, that is, greater amalgamations of power. It is not due to sympathy, a socialising instinct or some sort of abstract love to humanity that the rational individual seeks to associate himself with other men (Spinoza 1677/1996: 126). Only when combining its power with that of others can an individual or a group acquire the necessary strength to muster certain external causes and thereby maximise its power or ability to act. Cooperation among individual entities is premised upon similarity and utility (Spinoza 1677/1996).

The importance of similarity cannot be emphasised enough. The more two parties agree in nature the more attractive it becomes for them to cooperate with each other. In this sense, Michael Doyle has shown that liberal democracies display high levels of cooperation among themselves and that they seldom go to war with each other (1986). For his part, Colin Gray has identified a nation’s geography and geostrategic outlook as key variables in accounting for similarity and cooperation. For him, Britain’s maritime geography and the economic and strategic importance it attaches to its ability to use the seas makes its alliance with the USA, also a maritime nation, mandatory (2008). ‘While Britain’s interests [...] are not identical to those of the United States’, Gray contends, its maritime condition means they ‘are close enough, especially on the larger matters of concern’ (2008: 15). We shall return later to the importance of geography in the shaping of a nation’s identity and strategic culture.

If similarity is a necessary or facilitating condition for cooperation, utility is its ultimate driver. Cooperation among men and groups has been most instrumental in enhancing security and prosperity. It is a constitutive element of society (Hobbes 1651/1996, Rousseau 1762/1998). Cooperation becomes particularly useful when it comes to conquering new realms of possibility. Their will to reach higher and further has pushed individuals to associate themselves around greater entities. We have already referred to the fact that nation-states result from the calculation by different groups of individuals within a given territory that they are the most effective way of pursuing their own power (Bulpitt 1983, Flora, Kuhnle and Irwin 1990).

Its ‘narrow’ emphasis on security against like-units largely accounts for realism’s limitations when it comes to explaining international cooperation. Realists tend to reduce cooperation to those cases in which two states face the threat of a third party or in which two enemies resort to communication as a means of avoiding miscalculations (Glaser 1994, Jervis 1988). For them, anarchy, uncertainty and their quest for security against like-units lead states to permanently worry about the prospect of relative losses and therefore represent a systemic constrain on cooperation (Grieco 1988). Since, because of anarchy and uncertainty, today’s friends can be tomorrow’s enemies, the realist logic goes, a state will think twice before engaging in a cooperative relationship that can benefit other states more than it can benefit itself (ibid.). Their emphasis on security against like-units and on relative gain considerations leads realists to either reject or downplay the benefits nation-states can reap from cooperating against non-state threats or challenges (i.e. terrorism, natural disasters, climate change, etc.) or the fact that nations have created common rules and procedures (i.e. global institutions, diplomacy, law) that are permanent and can benefit them all (Bull 1977).

Other schools of IR thought have been more apt in explaining the salience of cooperation in international affairs. Their focus on absolute gains (Axelrod and Keohane 1985), shared values (Katzenstein 1996) or the societal nature of international politics (Bull 1977) has allowed neoliberal institutionalists, social constructivists or adherents of the so-called English School to explain the importance of pulling resources for the sake of common benefits. It is perhaps neoliberal institutionalists who have devoted most time to explaining the logic of cooperation. Pointing to the inherent benefits that result from a global (economic) division of labour, institutionalists have sought to justify cooperation without disputing realist notions of anarchy or the existence and importance of relative gains. In this spirit, a number of scholars situated within the neoliberal institutionalist tradition have sought to determine the conditions in which a state’s quest for absolute gains might outweigh its concerns for relative losses and result in successful cooperation.

Having surveyed different cases of international economic cooperation, Lipson concluded that states are more likely to overlook relative losses for the sake of absolute gains in the economic realm than in the security realm (1984). In a similar vein, Powell has linked changes in state behaviour, the feasibility of cooperation, and especially states’ concerns for relative versus absolute gains to changes in the constraints that states face, paying particular attention to whether force is or not ‘at issue’ (1991: 1304). Looking back at the lessons from the neoliberal versus neorealist debate around the question of whether states worry about absolute or relative gains, Keohane concluded that what is important is not to determine whether states worry about relative or absolute gains, but to establish the conditions that make states’ calculations tilt one way or the other (1993).

By showing that states’ quests for absolute gains often outweigh their concerns about relative losses, neoliberal institutionalists have effectively demonstrated that, as important as it may be, the relational aspect of power (influence over ‘like-units’) is subordinated, contained within a broader absolute conception. While relative gain considerations are indeed crucial and often trump cooperation (Grieco 1988), nations worry about their relative power position insofar as it affects their ability to act. Neoliberal institutionalism’s empirical demonstration of the salience of cooperation is a clear tribute to the need to transcend a narrow understanding of power, that is, ‘influence over like-units’. However, if their emphasis on absolute gains has allowed neoliberal institutionalists to account for patterns of international cooperation, their acceptance of realist notions of anarchy and security against like-units has led them (as well as many social constructivists) to the belief that cooperation through institutions or norms can lead to the overcoming of conflict. Cooperation, communication and institutions, the logic goes, enhance transparency and contribute to reducing uncertainty (Keohane 1986, Risse 2001). In turn, transparency and greater certainty lead to trust and ‘security’.

By defining security narrowly (i.e. against like-units) and using institutions or norms to tackle the key sources of uncertainty, institutionalists and constructivists offer the promise of beating realists at their own game: achieving a point of balance or equilibrium where conflict is overcome and the nirvana of security achieved. However, an emphasis on power as ability to act unveils the problems of this logic. Insofar as it is in the essence of nations to constantly strive for more power, there can be no such thing as a point of balance or equilibrium where security is ‘achieved’. Any cooperative enterprise, whether underpinned by a norm or an institution, is necessarily riddled with conflict (Mouffe 2005). As we have argued above, by virtue of its different nature, each party to a cooperative enterprise (whether an institution or a norm) has a different perspective on what the purpose of that enterprise should be, and will never cease in its attempt to turn the enterprise into something that resembles its own essence and serves its individual interests. In other words, just as the link between individuation and power explains the salience of cooperation, it also explains why conflict cannot be eradicated and why it is always present in every cooperative venue.

A broad understanding of power allows us to capture the mechanics of a world characterised by a permanent state of imbalance, where nations can never be satisfied and Nash equilibriums do not occur. It explains why cooperation is necessary and why conflict is ubiquitous. Conflict and cooperation are constantly intermingling. Even if several individuals or groups cooperate around a larger venue they still continue to strive for power. And insofar as they have different ideas about how to pursue power, conflict impregnates every cooperative initiative. As successive chapters will show, this is the case with both the CSDP and NATO. In order to understand the nature and evolution of the CSDP and NATO, it is the evolving mix between cooperation and conflict that must be examined. That requires looking at its sources: the similarities and differences between the main national powers that constitute those institutions. And in order to understand those similarities and differences, we need to look at the special role of geography in framing the context in which power is exercised (geopolitics) and to the grand strategies of Britain, France and Germany.

1.3. Geopolitics: Geography and the context of power

Throughout the centuries the influence of geography upon the conduct of warfare and statesmanship has been taken as a given by historians and statesmen alike (Cohen 2003, Haslam 2002, Luttwak 1979, Pearson 1939). However, it was not until the end of the 19th century that geopolitics emerged as an intellectual and academic discipline in its own right, situated at the intersection between geography and political science. As happens with most grand ideas and concepts, there is no agreed definition of geopolitics. Each definition attributes a different meaning to power, to geography and to their interaction.

Rudolf Kjellén’s classic definition refers to geopolitics as the study of the impact of geographical factors upon the life of peoples and states (1916). Given its emphasis on ‘peoples and states’, Kjellén’s understan...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures, Maps and Tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and the EU–NATO Conundrum
• 2. Geopolitics and Grand Strategy in Cold War and Post-Cold War Europe (1945–2000)
• 3. 11 September, the Big Three and the EU–NATO Conundrum (2001–2005)
• 4. Iraq, the Big Three and the EU–NATO Conundrum (2005–2010)
• 5. Europe, the West and the EU–NATO Conundrum
• 6. Conclusions
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index