PART ONE: STATE OF THE UNION
THE ENLARGED AUDIO-VISUAL EUROPE: THE MANY FACES OF EUROPEANIZATION
Hedwig de Smaele
The transition from Communism to post-Communism in the 1990s was accompanied in central and eastern European countries by the emergence of new nation states, new political and economic systems and subsequently new media systems. At the same time, collaboration among eastern European countries, based on a shared ideology and Soviet hegemony, largely disappeared and was replaced by new alliances, mainly with the West. Membership of (western) European institutions such as the Council of Europe and especially the European Union became for many central and eastern European countries a priority to which they geared their reforms. As of writing, ten central and eastern European countries have joined the EU â the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia in May 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007. The European Union represents, with 27 Member States and several more candidate Member States, indeed an enlarged Europe.
A commonly used concept to discuss the impact of EU membership on the domestic policies and practices of old and new Member States is that of âEuropeanizationâ. But can we speak of Europeanization in connection with the audio-visual field in the enlarged Europe â and, if so, in what sense?
A return to Europe?
In the period 1945â1989 âEuropeâ became identified with âwestern Europeâ. The Berlin wall was de facto the eastern border of Europe. Behind it lay the eastern bloc, âthe Otherâ in political, economic, ideological and military terms. Researchers studying the European audio-visual field automatically limited themselves to western Europe and the European Union in particular. Eastern Europe was involved, at the most, as a âthird partyâ, not as an organic part of Europe.
The end of the Cold War also ended the concept of Europe defined as West in opposition to East (Kevin 2003: 1). New definitions of Europe â both geographical and cultural or ideological â were formulated in connection with the question of membership of the EU. According to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and Article O of the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) âany European State [...] may apply to become a Member of the Union.â The word âEuropeanâ was not officially defined. Moreover, the European Commission (1992: 11) spoke out against a closed definition of âEuropeannessâ that would define for now and forever the borders of Europe. European identity was instead considered a dynamic concept, related to the integration process. Some definition, however, was felt to be necessary. Article O was amended by the Amsterdam Treaty of 2 October 1997 (which entered into force on 1 May 1999). The new Article 49 stipulates that âevery European State which respects the principles laid down in Article 6 (1)â can apply for membership. Article 6(1) refers to the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law â principles that have been identified by many authors (for example, Arthur Schlesinger in Huntington 1997: 342) as characteristic of European civilization. Since the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 these principles have become known as the âCopenhagen criteriaâ. At the Copenhagen Council the European Union set forth in broad terms the conditions for membership. Prospective members need to have a âfunctioning market economyâ and âthe capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Unionâ, as well as âstability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minoritiesâ. Next to these political and economic conditions, candidate Member States have to take on the âobligations of membershipâ â i.e. they have to take on the 80,000 pages of legislation, directives, regulations and judgements which constitute the acquis communautaire (European Parliament 1993). An additional condition for enlargement is, from the EU perspective, the capacity of the Union to absorb new members. The Madrid Council Conclusions (1995) also mentioned the adjustment of administrative structures as important in preparation for accession though not as a condition (European Parliament 1995).
The European Union candidacies of central and eastern European countries, though largely inspired by political, economic and military interests (stability, prosperity and peace in the region), carried an important emotional, even moral, dimension as well. The âreturn to Europeâ would do away with the âmistake of Yaltaâ and symbolized a definitive break with the Soviet past. Acceptance by international organizations, such as the European Union, appeared to the young eastern European states as the confirmation of their independence and the proof of their successful transition (Grabbe and Hughes 1998: 7). The European Union, on the other hand, agreed on enlargement in principle, but showed less enthusiasm in considering enlargement a priority. Bideleux (1996: 241) describes it as significant that the European Union dealt with the enlargement issue as an aspect of foreign policy. Enlargement, in the view of the European Union, was not allowed to disturb the already far-reaching European integration process (internal market, economic and monetary union, etc.). The starting point for the European Union therefore was the necessary adaptation of central and eastern European prospective members prior to membership. As a consequence, the asymmetry and rigidity of the European Union were far greater in the last eastward enlargements (2004 and 2007) than in previous enlargements. Notwithstanding the qualifying conditions of market economies, democracy and the rule of law, the stress was laid almost entirely on on the adoption of the acquis as key to the accession process (Kuneva 2001). Although the enlargement procedure was essentially a process of negotiations, the acquis â the basis of every negotiation â appeared as non-negotiable. The eastern European applicants could at best influence the pace, but not the content, of reforms. In addition, an extensive system of verification (monitoring the process of harmonization) was set up. This âlogic of controlâ (Maniokas 2004: 32) made enlargement an exclusively one-way process.
Europeanization as institutional adaptation
The concept of Europeanization takes many forms. Europeanization as a neutrally defined process of âdomestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membershipâ (Featherstone 2003: 7) did indeed occur in central and eastern Europe, as it also had in western Europe. Harcourt (2003a), for example, detected substantial convergence at the national levels of the fifteen old Member States in policy paradigms, domestic laws and policy instruments. Europeanization took place both via vertical mechanisms (directives and competition decisions of the European Commission, decisions of the European Court of Justice) and via horizontal mechanisms (suggestion of best practice through European-level policy forums). There are good reasons to assume that policy convergence in central and eastern Europe is even greater â similar, but wider and deeper in scope â than in western Europe. Grabbe (2003: 306â307) lists three such reasons. In the first place, there is the speed of adjustment, the fast adaptation prior to membership, and the fact that these countries start at a much lower point. In the second place, Grabbe points to the openness of central and eastern Europe to EU influence as a result of the process of post-Communist transformation: âThis process has made them more receptive to regulatory paradigms than the EUâs Member States were, because EU models were being presented at the same time as central and eastern European policy-makers were seeking a model to implementâ (Grabbe 2003: 306â307). Thirdly, Grabbe cites the breadth of the EU agenda in central and eastern Europe, including also economic and political conditions: âthat gives the EU a license to involve itself in domestic policy-making to a degree unprecedented in the current member statesâ (Grabbe 2003: 307). Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2004: 185) observe, on the one hand, effects that are âfarther-reaching than Europeanization effects in the current member statesâ. On the other hand, they also point at the danger of âsymbolicâ or âinstrumentalâ adaptations due to conflicting sets of values in central and eastern European countries and the European Union, coupled with the necessity to comply with some of the EUâs wishes in order to become full members (Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2004: 190). âPressures from the EU promote these sorts of Potemkin-village organizational structures,â writes Wade (1999: 64).
EU audio-visual policy rests on two pillars: audio-visual legislation (in particular the Television Without Frontiers directive [TWF directive]) and funding programs to support the audio-visual industry (in particular the subsequent MEDIA Programmes). Implementation of the first is a condition for participation in the second. Audio-visual legislation is subsumed under Chapter 20 of the acquis under the heading of âCulture and Audio-visual Policyâ. The focus, and the sole legal requirement, of Chapter 20 is alignment by the candidate countries with the Television Without Frontiers directive (1989, replaced in 1997, and again under revision). Negotiations concerning Chapter 20 were opened with the central and eastern European countries in two waves: in OctoberâNovember 1998 with the first, relatively advanced group (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary) and in MayâOctober 2000 with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Romania. On the basis of progress achieved in the legislative alignment process (as monitored by the European Commission on a yearly basis), negotiations were completed with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic in December 2002, and with Bulgaria and Romania in December 2004. There are no transitional arrangements in this area. Legislative alignment, leaving aside the possibility of Potemkin-like harmonization, has been realized.
Harmonization of national media laws in central and eastern Europe took place at almost the same time as the original shaping of those national media laws. Between 1991 and 1996, following the transformation of their political, economic and societal systems, all central and eastern European countries passed new media laws, putting an end to the state monopolization of press, radio, television and film industries, and initiating the moulding of an indigenous media system. As Harcourt (2003b) observed, all these laws reflect hybridization and adaptive borrowing from different western (American, French, GermanâŚ) models. Complete alignment with EU law, however, caused âa second waveâ of media legislation in central and eastern Europe, following âthe first waveâ in the first half of the 1990s. From 1998 onward, but mainly in the years 2000â2002, all the relevant national laws in central and eastern Europe became the subject of numerous amendments and/or replacements by new laws. The changes and replacements were dictated by the âneedâ to adapt the different national legislations to the European Television Without Frontiers directive (for a more detailed overview, see de Smaele, 2004).
Europeanization as âcultural diffusionâ
While Europeanization as a process of institutional adaptation is clearly real, Europeanization as âtransnational cultural diffusionâ â that is âthe diffusion of cultural norms, ideas, identities, and patterns of behaviour on a cross-national basis within Europeâ (Featherstone 2003: 7) â is less evident. Television programmes and films, however, are considered a potential vehicle to spread norms, ideas and identities; and the European Union clearly has the ambition to foster a âsense of Europeannessâ and a âEuropean identityâ as well as an awareness and appreciation of Europeâs national cultures via the Europe-wide distribution of audio-visual products (de Smaele 2004: 166â167). However, despite a decade of policy measures to enhance the European cross-national distribution of audio-visual products (for example, the European quota, and financial support for European co-productions), little has changed in this respect. European productions remain nationally produced and nationally distributed. The inflow of U.S. films and TV series has not been diminished, whereas the internal European circulation of television drama remains stagnant (De Bens and de Smaele 2001). European habits of film consumption reveal that audiences watch either domestic productions or American ones, but not those of other European countries (IMCA 2004: 30). A pan-European audio-visual culture has not come into existence. Attempts to make films that reflect a cross-cultural European content (as some Euro-funded initiatives have tried to) remain artificial and end up as weak Europuddings (Iordanova 1999), failing in cross-national distribution as they lack even a home market.
Schlesinger (1993: 11) refers to the âcontinuing importance of the national level and the resistance it offers to Europeanizationâ [emphasis as original]. The conflict between national and European identities and interests, felt in the old Member States, is a fortiori present in the new central and eastern European Member States. The concepts of a European market, European identity, and European culture are difficult ideas for countries that only recently regained national markets, national identities and national culture. The asymmetry, felt by central and eastern European countries, between the old EU and the new EU fuels the idea that the term âEuropeanâ mainly refers to âthe interests of othersâ in contrast to their own national interests. Passages of the Television Without Frontiers directive, implemented in some new Member States only hesitantly or belatedly, invoke the freedom of reception and transmission of television programmes (Article 2) â which primarily benefits such U.S.-controlled and UK-registered channels as CNN, MTV and TNT Cartoon network, channels which were the first to make use of the newly opened eastern European market (Levy 1999: 161) â and the promotion of European works (Articles 4 and 5, the so-called European quota â see de Smaele 2004). âEuropeâ is perceived as the outsider and Europeanization, then, inscribes a threat analogous to Americanization.
One market, several markets?
The main characteristic â and at the same time the main weakness â of the European audiovisual market is its fragmentation into numerous small national markets with consequently limited financial means for national productions and low chances of survival for minor producers. Most of the new countries of central and eastern Europe fit this model â with only Poland, and then Hungary and the Czech Republic, as countries with sizeable markets. Productions from small states are often not exportable because they are too culturally specific. In addition, there are extra costs for dubbing or subtitling (for a discussion of the structural handicaps of small countries see Burgelman and Pauwels 1992: 172â173). The European Commission has calculated that 80 per cent of the films made in the âEU of the fifteenâ never leave the country of origin. The same goes for television programmes (De Bens and de Smaele 2001).
Central and eastern European countries also follow this trend. A study by the European Audiovisual Observatory showed that between 1996 and 2001 only 42 films from the countries of central and eastern Europe were distributed commercially in at least one âoldâ Member State of the European Union; these films were seen by a total of 2.2 million people in the Union, giving them a market share of 0.054 per cent (European Commission 2003). On western European television, eastern European films are broadcast only sporadically and outside prime time (De Bens and de Smaele 2001: 61). At the same time, exchange programmes within the region of central and eastern Europe (for example, OIRT) have disappeared, bringing to a halt cross-border circulation within the central and eastern European region (de Smaele 2000). As Iordanova (2002: 33) points out: âIn their drive to get themselves out of the economic ghetto of the Soviet sphere (which they believe also extends over culture), Eastern Europe...