Second Fitna

4 Key excerpts on "Second Fitna"

• 

  eBook - ePub

  The First Muslims

  History and Memory

  • Asma Afsaruddin(Author)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Oneworld Publications

    (Publisher)

  The Umayyad succession crisis was resolved when Marwan ibn al-Hakam, an uncle, finally acceded to the throne after the battle of Marj Rahit in 684. This battle fought between the Qays (northern) and Kalb (southern) tribes effectively ended the Sufyanid line of caliphs and inaugurated the Marwanid one. Both Marwan (known as Marwan I) and his son ‘Abd al-Malik moved swiftly against Ibn al-Zubayr and his supporters. The attack led by ‘Abd al-Malik’s formidable governor, al-Hajjaj, in 692 against Mecca, during which the Ka‘ba caught fire, led to Ibn al-Zubayr’s death at the age of seventy and the dismantling of his ill-fated counter-caliphate. The Second Fitna was over.

  The very popular Zubayrid revolt and the two earlier ‘Alid uprisings led by al-Husayn and Mukhtar appear to have convinced the Umayyads that they too, at least publicly, had to assert their Islamic credentials in order to establish their political legitimacy and hold onto their power. This realization very likely prompted ‘Abd al-Malik to undertake the building of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, completed in 692, on the site where the Prophet, according to tradition, commenced his ascension to the heavens.14 Another example of overtly religious activity is afforded by ‘Abd al-Malik’s loyal governor, al-Hajjaj, who is credited in some of the sources with adding diacritics to the unpointed Qur’anic text so as to standardize its reading. Al-Hajjaj is also said to have undone the changes made to the structure of the Ka‘ba by Ibn al-Zubayr and restored it to its former appearance. It is possible to read this latter action as claiming both physical and symbolic ownership of Islam’s most sacred, central site and thus asserting undisputed legitimacy on both religious and political grounds.

  In the aftermath of the second civil war, ‘Abd al-Malik, with the help of his governor al-Hajjaj, instituted a highly centralized government which asserted more direct control over the people. Several important administrative developments occurred in this period. The language of the chancellery (diwan) was officially changed from Greek into Arabic, an extensive postal system (al-barid

  Sign up to read

  Learn more about book
• 

  eBook - PDF

  Britannica Guide to the Islamic World

  • Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.(Authors)
  • 2009(Publication Date)
  • Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

    (Publisher)

  The Third fitnah Meanwhile, in the central caliphal lands, growing discontent and opposition to the Marwa Ån ids culminated in the third fitnah (744±50) and the establishment of a new and final dynasty of caliphs, the `Abba Å sids. Ever since the Second Fitnah , a number of Muslims had begun to raise serious questions about the proper Muslim life and the Marwa Ån ids' ability to exemplify it. Pious Muslims tried to define a good Muslim and to decide whether a bad Muslim should be excluded from the community, or a bad caliph from office. They also considered God's role in determining a person's sinfulness and final dispensation. The proper relationship between Arab and non-Arab Muslims, and between Muslims and dhimmõÅ s, THE ISLA -MIC WORLD 93 was another important focus. The willingness of non-Arabs to join the ummah was growing, but fiscal stability seemed to depend on continuing to discourage conversion. In the posi-tions taken in these debates lay the germs of Muslim theology: rejecting the history of the community by demanding rule by Muh Ç ammad's family; rejecting the history of the community by following any pious Muslim and excluding any sinner; or accepting the history of the community, its leaders, and most of its members. In the course of these debates the Marwa Ån id caliphs began to seem severely deficient. Al-H Ç asan al-Bas Ç rõ Å, a pious ascetic and a model for the early Sufis, called on the Marwa Ån ids to rule as good Muslims and on good Muslims to be suspicious of worldly power. To the pious, the ideal ruler, or ima Åm (the word also for a Muslim who led the s Ç ala Åt ), should, like Muh Ç ammad, possess special learning and knowledge. The first four caliphs, they argued, had been ima Åm s in this sense, but under the Umayyads the caliphate had been reduced to a military and administrative office devoid of ima Åm ah , or true legitimacy.

  Sign up to read

  Learn more about book
• 

  eBook - ePub

  Approaches to the Qur'an

  • G. R. Hawting(Author)
  • 2005(Publication Date)
  • Taylor & Francis

    (Publisher)

  fitna in the quranic text.

  Fitna in the Islamic Perceptual-Symbolic System

  Humphreys and Geertz have suggested that a culture’s conceptual universe may be generated by, and thus appreciated by reference to, a number of symbols and models. The symbols may be represented by singular words or clusters of signifiers interrelated with each other, expressing and building a conceptual universe.3

  As a key term in the perceptual-symbolic system of Islamic culture, fitna (civil strife) maps a conservative religious approach to political or social issues.4 Sunnī Muslim use of the word fitna carries a negative connotation. It evokes a bitter recollection of the great rift in the community shortly after the death of the prophet Muḥammad. This conflict, later dubbed the Great Fitna or the First Fitna, pitted some of the closest companions of the Prophet against each other, resulting in major schisms in the community. The conflict was never fully resolved, but its memory left a deep impression among Sunnīs that the best stance in such a conflict was simply to stand aside. The activist alternative, it was argued, almost always leads to some or other form of civil war, disruption or strife.

  The political reserve that resulted from the fear of fitna has led Muslim political theorists to legally (shar‘an) prohibit all forms of revolutionary reform. In particular, Sunnīs have taken recourse in the ḥadīths of the prophet Muḥammad that declare that governments may not be displaced except on clear evidence of disbelief (kufr bawwāḥ).5 This political reserve was also expressed in theological tracts and creeds, as in Abū ’l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Ismā‘īl al-Ash‘arī’s Al-Ibāna ‘an uṣūl al-diyāna (The elucidation of Islam’s foundation).6

  Thus, Enayat argues that the concept of fitna has stood as a stumbling block in contemporary efforts among Muslims to redress political and social inequities. Sunnīs in particular have resisted efforts to reform Muslim societies that would involve conflict, a dilemma Sivan has called the ‘trauma’ of Sunnī political theory. Echoing the same sentiment, Keddie has called fitna a ‘catch-all phrase’ for conservatism, inaction, and conflict.7

  Sign up to read

  Learn more about book
• 

  eBook - ePub

  Fathers and Sons

  The Rise and Fall of Political Dynasty in the Middle East

  • M. McMillan(Author)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  Chapter 2 Dynasty The Origins of the One-Party State Stability after Strife: The First Decade in Damascus

  M u‘awiya became caliph in 661, and ever after, the year would be known as the Year of the Community (‘am al-jama‘a ).1 Stability had largely returned after the chaos of civil war (fitna ), and Muslims were glad of it. At this stage, the unity of their community was almost sacrosanct to them. Islam is a faith defined by the public practice of rituals such as prayer and pilgrimage; neither is possible in a community at war with itself. The new caliph played on the desire for unity and the fear of fitna to legitimize his authority. Better to settle for a leader who could guarantee internal security, defend the borders against infidel invaders, and allow religious rituals to be practiced in peace than to risk the community disintegrating into internecine conflict again.

  As well as playing on fears of civil strife, Mu‘awiya deployed other strategies to strengthen his position: “I do not apply my sword,” he is reported as saying, “where my lash is enough; nor my lash where my tongue is enough. And even if there is one hair binding me to my fellow men, I do not let it break: when they pull, I loosen, and if they loosen, I pull.”2 This policy was very much in evidence when Mu‘awiya was trying to encourage his rival, al-Hasan, to give up his claims to the caliphate. Al-Hasan was the eldest son of ‘Ali, the fourth caliph, and had received the allegiance of many of his father’s supporters to continue the fight in his name. Having seen what happened to his father, al-Hasan accepted the settlement on offer from Mu‘awiya and abandoned a political life for a comfortable retirement in Medina.3

  Another of Mu‘awiya’s strategies for consolidating his grip on power, and perhaps the most important for him strategically, was to formalize the move of political power from Arabia to Syria. By sidelining Arabia, Mu‘awiya was able to distance himself from the early converts in Mecca and Medina who possessed the Islamic credentials he did not and who never missed an opportunity to tell him so.4 Syria, by contrast, was the province he had governed for two decades and the place where the military had proven their loyalty to him time and again, especially during the civil war. At the beginning of his caliphate, Mu‘awiya made a temporary truce with the Byzantines so he could keep these armies stationed in Syria to act as an internal security force against any potential domestic challenges to his authority.5

  Sign up to read

  Learn more about book