History
Gulf War
The Gulf War, also known as the First Gulf War, was a conflict that took place in 1990-1991 between Iraq and a coalition of 35 nations, led by the United States and United Kingdom. The war was triggered by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and resulted in a swift and decisive victory for the coalition forces, leading to the liberation of Kuwait and significant changes in the regional balance of power.
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11 Key excerpts on "Gulf War"
- eBook - ePub
- James Ciment, Kenneth Hill(Authors)
- 2012(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
Iraq Gulf War, 1990-1991 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and border disputes PARTICIPANT: United Nations CoalitionThe Gulf War represents a major turning point in the history of the post-World War II era. By organizing a multinational coalition to oust Iraq from Kuwait—following its August 1990 invasion—the United States demonstrated its unchallenged superpower status in the first major war of the post-cold war era. While the Soviet Union and China stood by, after effectively giving their blessing to the U.S.-led mission, the allied forces, under U.N. aegis, overwhelmed Iraqi forces in a matter of weeks, not only driving them from Kuwait but virtually destroying Baghdad's capacity to make war.The war also represented a major turning point in the history of Middle Eastern relations as well. By arraying most of the Arab countries against Iraq—and persuading Israel to stand aside—the United States asserted itself as the dominant outside power in the region. Moreover, the war left Iraq militarily, politically, and economically crippled—especially after seven years of sanctions imposed during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988—essentially ending its decades-old effort to assume leadership of the Arab world. In the United States, the war's impact was not quite so clear. While President George Bush asserted that the decisive victory over Iraq had ended the so-called Vietnam syndrome in American foreign policy—whereby the American people resisted major U.S. combat intervention overseas—the massive antiwar demonstrations sent a different message.Historical Background
The ultimate causes of the Gulf War go back nearly 300 years. Since the 1500s, the Ottoman Empire had ruled Mesopotamia—modern Iraq—and much of the western littoral of the Persian Gulf. As per imperial tradition, the sultan in Constantinople had ruled these domains by a variety of direct and indirect means. In the more settled and accessible plains of Mesopotamia, Ottoman control was tighter, largely being in the hands of governors appointed by the sultan. In the poorer and more nomadic Persian Gulf littoral, the sultan governed by means of various local sheiks. Since the 1750s, the territory that is now Kuwait was ruled by the al-Sabah dynasty. Still, Kuwait was considered part of the province of Basra, one of three that would eventually come to form Iraq. - eBook - PDF
- P. Everts(Author)
- 2002(Publication Date)
- Palgrave Macmillan(Publisher)
6 Support for War: the Gulf War, 1990±91 Introduction: the relevance of public opinion In August 1990, a dispute between Iraq and the neighbouring country of Kuwait over oil policies and financial claims resulted in an Iraqi attack and the forced incorporation of Kuwait as just another Iraqi province. The United Nations strongly and unanimously condemned this occupation and Iraq was ordered to withdraw its troops. The United States sent troops to neighbouring Saudi Arabia to deter further Iraqi advances. Gradually, other states also promised to come to the assistance of Kuwait should Iraq fail to abide by the orders of the Security Council. A period of threats and negotiations followed. None of these resulted in Iraqi obedience to the demands of the United Nations, and in January 1991 the international military coalition that had meanwhile been formed began military oper- ations against Iraq, consisting first of air attacks which were followed by actions on the ground. These were successful in the sense that Iraq was forced in a very short time to withdraw, and had to accede to a number of international conditions including halting its development of weapons of mass destruction and disarming its existing weapons of this kind under international supervision. The country's leader, Saddam Hussein, remained in power, however, and succeeded in surviving the international sanctions against his country and in time removing the international inspectors of his armaments from the country. He was able to continue to challenge the international community until today. Gradually, the international coalition opposing him began to disintegrate. For an overall image of the political forces at work in the Gulf conflict and the ensuing war of 1991, insight into public opinion is essential. In the Gulf conflict fundamental moral and political questions were at stake. - eBook - PDF
- T. Henriksen(Author)
- 2007(Publication Date)
- Palgrave Macmillan(Publisher)
How the Gulf War precipitated a redux, served as a first counterproliferation campaign, and a case study for possible clashes with other so-called rogue states made the initial war with Iraq of international importance. It also shaped U.S. diplomacy for well over a decade. The war began on January 17, 1991 with an aerial bombardment that soon incapacitated Iraq’s military. The 39-day air campaign preceded the land operations. Saddam Hussein threatened the “mother of all battles” to defeat the multinational coalition arrayed against him. Instead, he saw the birth of a new form of warfare for which his forces were woefully unprepared. For Iraq, it was worse than a rout; it was a humiliation of towering proportions. Baghdad suffered an unmitigated calamity. The coalition won an unalloyed victory. Conditioned by the eight years combating Iranian-massed suicidal waves and static trench warfare reminiscent of World War I, Iraq collided with techno-American power. Dubbed “Nintendo warfare” after the popular video game, the “smart” weaponry boasted a much-ballyhooed revolution in military affairs. This so-called watershed in the art of warfare announced a new era in human conflict that promised push-button wars whereby enemy combatants were eliminated without miring young men in the mud and close combat. A decade later, the post–Iraq War insurgency, nevertheless, provided a necessary corrective to the Star Wars scenarios as U.S. Marines and Army soldiers fought insurgents in alleyways and gutted buildings, with classic infantrymen tactics of one step back for every two forward. The ground-war phase of the Gulf War commenced on February 24 and lasted a mere 100 hours. American armored forces, long trained to smash the mighty Red Army across European plains, rolled over the Iraqi tanks, leaving decimated iron hulks, dead bodies in the thousands, and demoralized adversaries in their wake. - eBook - PDF
- L. Potter, G. Sick, L. Potter, G. Sick(Authors)
- 2004(Publication Date)
- Palgrave Macmillan(Publisher)
Introduction Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick The Persian Gulf states, and indeed the entire Middle East, were profoundly affected by the Iran–Iraq War that raged from 1980 to 1988 and its sequels, the Gulf War of 1990–91 and the war against Iraq in 2003. 1 The first war was immensely destructive in terms of lives and infrastructure. It set back the development of both Iran and Iraq for perhaps a generation, inflamed ethnic and religious tensions, and raised the level of distrust in the region to new levels. The wars together focused international atten- tion on the Gulf and led the United States to an unprecedented level of involvement there, beginning with the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in 1987, continuing in the dispatch of over half a million American troops to oust the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991, and culminating in the campaign against Iraq. The Gulf/2000 project has, over the past decade, brought together citizens of the Persian Gulf states to explore their mutual concerns and to seek ways to improve personal contact and understanding. 2 In this case, Iranians and Iraqis were invited—for the first time, we believe—to join a few “outsiders” for a discussion of how the Iran–Iraq War affected the personal lives and politics of their respective countries and the region. This book is based on papers presented at that meeting—the ninth international con- ference organized by the project—from October 22 to October 26, 2001, in Bellagio, Italy. 3 These papers, now revised and updated, help clarify the evolution of relations between Iran and Iraq—how they developed historically, how they rapidly deteriorated when war broke out in 1980, and the issues that must be addressed in the context of future rapprochement. Those issues are likely to be amplified and given greater urgency by the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in the spring of 2003. - No longer available |Learn more
- (Author)
- 2014(Publication Date)
- University Publications(Publisher)
Bush Norman Schwarzkopf Colin Powell Calvin Waller King Fahd Prince Abdullah Prince Sultan Turki Al-Faisal Saddam Hussein Ali Hassan al-Majid Salah Aboud Mahmoud ________________________ WORLD TECHNOLOGIES ________________________ Saleh Al-Muhaya Khalid bin Sultan John Major Patrick Hine Andrew Wilson Peter de la Billière John Chapple Michel Roquejoffre Mohamed Hussein Tantawi Mustafa Tlass Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani Mirza Aslam Beg Strength 959,600 545,000 (100,000 in Kuwait) Casualties and losses Coalition: 240-392 killed 776 wounded Kuwait : 1,200 killed 20,000-35,000 killed Kuwaiti civilian losses: Over 1,000 killed Iraqi civilian losses: About 3,664 killed Other civilian losses: 2 Israeli civilians killed, 230 injured 1 Saudi civilian killed, 65 injured The Persian Gulf War (August 2, 1990 – February 28, 1991), commonly referred to as simply the Gulf War , was a war waged by a U.N.-authorized coalition force from thirty-four nations led by the United States and United Kingdom, against Iraq. This war has also been referred to (by the former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein) as the Mother of All Battles, and is commonly, though mistakenly, known as Operation Desert Storm for the operational name of the military response, the First Gulf War , Gulf War I , or the Iraq War , before the term became identified with the 2003-2010 Iraq War. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops that began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation, and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the UN Security Council. U.S. President George H. W. Bush deployed American forces to Saudi Arabia almost 6 months afterwards, and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition. The great - eBook - PDF
The Gulf Wars and the United States
Shaping the Twenty-First Century
- Orrin Schwab(Author)
- 2008(Publication Date)
- Praeger(Publisher)
I have wanted my readers to discern a broad understanding of how this period fits into both American and international history and how the actors involved were connected to the larger forces of history. Typically, the causes of any war are complex. 2 The First Gulf War, as we have seen, grew out of changes in the Gulf region and in the international system. Relieved of the pressures of the war with Iran and the bipolar confrontation between the superpowers, Hussein had the opportunity to move against his much smaller and very wealthy neighbor. The financial pressures of the eight- year conflict with the Iranians, combined with the impulsive drive of Hussein to exert his power rationally or irrationally, set the script for the First Gulf War. The trigger for the West and for the United States was easy enough, the invasion of Kuwait, and a presumed threat to the Saudis and the UAE. Bush Sr. had only to be told of the invasion. As soon as the fall of Kuwait was a fait accompli, his administration mobilized the institutional mechanisms of the national security state. In six months, a carefully constituted international coalition launched their war against Hussein, whose respective tribal, Iraqi and pan-Arab identities left him no choice but to face the Western coalition and to fight, using his large, powerful but woefully inadequate military. American power and the American script responded reflexively to Hussein in 1990. The debate in Congress suggested a reluctance to go to war premised on the legacy of Vietnam. That conflict, just a decade and half in the past was a vivid historical memory in the minds of law-makers just as it was for high-ranking military officers and executive branch policy-makers. Yet, the compelling interest of the Gulf and the other historical memory of twentieth-century America, of Munich in 1938, established the script for war. - eBook - ePub
Western Military Interventions After The Cold War
Evaluating the Wars of the West
- Marek Madej(Author)
- 2018(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
1 The GulfThe first Western war after the Cold War
Kamila Pronińska1 Strategic context
1.1 The sources of the armed conflict in the Gulf
The Gulf War broke out in the broad strategic context of the end of the Cold War and the changing balance of power in the Middle East. The reduced role of the Soviet Union (USSR) provided the United States (US) with greater possibilities of influencing the Middle East and thus transforming the existing regional order. At the same time, the limited capability of the USSR in providing assistance to the ‘friendly’ regimes significantly upset the balance of power in the Middle East.1 Yet, the West perceived the new security environment as ambiguous, and the US administration had no ‘clear and consistent Middle Eastern policy’.2A highly significant factor in the new strategic context was the policy of the Iraqi regime and its relations with the Arab world. The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein openly voiced his concerns regarding the possibility of a new balance of power unfavourable to Arab countries emerging in the region after the erosion of the USSR. Verbalising the concerns of the Arab countries, Saddam also offered an alternative: if these countries worked together and consolidated their resources and financial assets, the US would have to take heed of their positions and interests to a greater extent.3The factors that induced Iraq to invade Kuwait were both of a geopolitical and an economic nature. On the one hand, Iraq never came to terms with the borders of Kuwait and had already challenged its border with Kuwait in 1938. Its territorial claims became even more significant when considerable oil deposits (the Rumaila field) were discovered close to the border. After Kuwait gained independence, Iraq consistently demanded that Kuwait return the territories given it in 1923 and regularly accused Kuwait of ‘illegally exploiting’ the oil and gas deposits in the borderland. On the other hand, Iraq’s financial problems caused by a changed situation in the oil market and by the debts from the time of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) were also a strong impulse for the aggression. In the 1980s, there was a considerable change in the oil market, involving a sudden decrease in oil prices. Kuwait decided to increase output from the contested Rumaila field from August 1988 onwards. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) increased their output as well. By effecting a decrease in oil prices, these actions were detrimental to the indebted Iraqi economy. - eBook - PDF
- Guy Arnold(Author)
- 2016(Publication Date)
- Bloomsbury Academic(Publisher)
In October Iraq launched a series of missile attacks on Iranian cities and mined the Gulf approaches to the port of Bandar Khomeini. An international row erupted following the French agreement in October to supply Iraq with five Super fetendard aircraft armed with Exocet missiles, since it was feared that these would be deployed against Gulf shipping. Even so the international community was generally more favourable to Iraq than Iran: this was the result of the anti-Western and isolationist stands taken in Tehran and the generally unsympathetic view taken of the revolution from outside Iran. 232 The Middle East: the Gulf War 1984 During 1984 Iraq demonstrated the advantages of air superiority; it used this especially to harass Iranian oil tankers in the Gulf, and the 'tanker war' became increasingly threatening to international interests. By June the tanker war was endangering the entire oil business of the Gulf; in one engagement Saudi Arabia shot down an Iranian plane. At the same time Iran suffered heavy losses in its land offensives, which failed to make any real headway except in the south, where the Iranians broke the Iraqi lines to take the Majnoon oilfield. Iran mobilized huge numbers - possibly 400,000 - during the year, many of them boys in their early teens. Late in the year Iran abandoned the tactic of human wave attacks, which simply proved too costly in manpower. When the war entered its fifth year in September it appeared to be in stalemate, although the shipping war in the Gulf escalated dangerously. Further attempts at mediation came to nothing, with Iran still insisting that Saddam should be ousted from power in Baghdad. The international line-up of support increasingly favoured Iraq: thus, while Iran only had support from Iraq's sworn enemy Syria, most other Arab states lined up behind Iraq and the USSR gave it substantial support. - eBook - PDF
Political Leadership in Foreign Policy
Manipulating Support across Borders
- A. Grove(Author)
- 2007(Publication Date)
- Palgrave Macmillan(Publisher)
CHAPTER 3 FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: GEORGE H.W. BUSH AND THE PERSIAN Gulf War, AUGUST 1990–JANUARY 1991 Introduction In early August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and offered up a challenge to President George H.W. Bush’s hopes for a new world order in the wake of the unraveling Soviet bloc. Instead of handling this crisis with its former ally in the Gulf alone, the Bush administration chose to enlist a broad segment of the international community to expel Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait and prevent an attack on Saudi Arabia. In fact, domestic opposition was one of the largest obstacles as Bush sought to move ahead with military force; dealing with that resistance posed a puzzle for the president and his advisors. One observer noted after the 1991 Persian Gulf War that “military schools will long be studying Schwarzkopf ’s march through the Gulf. Government schools will be studying Bush’s march through Washington.” 1 In this case study, we explore not only how President George Herbert Walker Bush marshaled improbable support from within the United States for military mobilization in the Persian Gulf region, but also from the international community. By using the four strategies, he managed both through intermestic policy making. A brief history of events is provided in the next section, which highlights the obstacles George Bush faced in 1990. The chronology at the end of the chapter summarizes many of these events. An Impossible Situation For numerous reasons it was a far-fetched goal to get Americans and an international coalition to threaten, and then employ, force against Saddam Hussein in response to Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. This section presents the obstacles that constitute the puzzle in this case, and the bulk of the chapter illustrates Bush’s use of the strategies for taking advantage of, changing, or reinterpreting the domestic and global contexts to fit with the goals of forcing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and protecting Saudi Arabia from invasion. - eBook - PDF
Why War?
The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez
- Philip Smith(Author)
- 2010(Publication Date)
- University of Chicago Press(Publisher)
F O U R T H E G U L F W A R O F 1 9 9 1 Our next conflict takes place some three and a half decades after Suez. In August 1990 , Iraq invaded and took control of the small but rich emirate of Kuwait with which it shared a common border. The reasons behind this attack remain the subject of debate. There are several commonly cited factors. Iraq needed cash. It had a debt of some $ 90 billion after its long war with Iran dur-ing the 1980 s. Yet Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had failed to agree with OPEC policy on restricting output. Oil prices had fallen and so, conse-quently, had Iraq’s own oil revenues. There was a long history of border and territorial dispute between the two Middle Eastern nations. These revolved around extractions from the Rumaila oil field that straddled the border, and access for landlocked Iraq to the Persian Gulf. Most important of all, many argued, was the fact that Iraq had a large army in need of gainful employment and an ambitious leader—Saddam Hussein. In his diverse self-aggrandizing statements Hussein claimed to be inspired by the pan-Arab philosophy of Nasser and the empire building achievements of Saladin and Nebuchadnez-zar. In combination these provided the structural possibility, leadership, and material and ideological motivations for the takeover of Iraq’s neighbor. Observers and politicians throughout the world were quick to denounce the invasion. Only Arab nationalists and the “rogue” states of Cuba and Yemen openly approved of Iraq’s action. The U.S. president, George Bush, and his secretary of state, James Baker, played a crucial role in the assembly of an international coalition of forces in the Middle East. The United States was equally instrumental in assuring that there were United Nations resolutions 100 c h a p t e r f o u r providing a legitimating charter for forceful intervention. Under Operation Desert Shield the United States led a military buildup in Saudi Arabia in the second part of 1990 . - eBook - PDF
- Stephen C. Pelletière(Author)
- 2004(Publication Date)
- Praeger(Publisher)
Techno War in the Gulf In this chapter we look at the first war of the United States against Iraq. We will pay special attention to the manner in which the Americans prosecuted it. The fight was particularly brutal in the amount of aggression perpetrated against civilians. Civilian casualties in the war were enormous, and that was because of the prolonged bombing from the air carried out by the Americans against Iraqi cities. America defended its role in carrying the war to Iraq’s homefront, but, as we will show, the arguments it used were sophistical. In essaying to punish the Iraqis, Americans deliberately laid aside restraint, turning their backs on the norms of civilized conduct enshrined under international law. Moreover, when the war ended, America continued oppressing the Iraqi people through its Dual Containment policy, which manipulated U.N. sanctions. We will show that this harsh penalization of a whole people provoked a backlash against America throughout not just the Gulf but in all of the Middle East, and beyond. When the Clinton era ended, America’s standing in the region had sunk probably to its nadir. Targeting Civilians Americans’ conduct of the first Gulf War has been criticized on grounds that they need not have visited such destruction on a third-rate power such as Iraq. It is a matter of record that tactics employed against the Iraqis were designed originally for use against the Russian superpower. 1 CHAPTER 4 So, it would appear that, under the circumstances, the response against Iraq was excessive. Why could not the United States have tailored its assault to suit the fact of its having to fight a practically defenseless foe? 2 American commanders offered justifications for what was done, and we will deal with these. The defenses seem, to this author, to be legit- imate in some regards. At the same time, we will note the behavior of the neo-cons, whom we mentioned in the last chapter.
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