Locarno Treaties

11 Key excerpts on "Locarno Treaties"

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  The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century

  A History and Guide with Texts

  • John Grenville, Bernard Wasserstein, John Grenville, Bernard Wasserstein(Authors)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  This the French had to accept as better than nothing. The attraction to France of a , ,   ,  –   German proposal for a security pact to cover the Rhine area was that Britain promised to support such a settlement. On French insistence the scope of the treaties was enlarged to include some arrangements for eastern Europe. The British government favoured the treaties signed at Locarno as they appeared to solve a number of problems simultaneously: France would be promised support only conditionally on following a defensive policy in Europe; the reduction of Franco–German tension would contribute to general paci fi cation, yet British commitments would remain strictly limited whilst allowing her the diplomatic initiative. But the Dominions were not bound and the British government signed on behalf of the United Kingdom alone, not for the British Empire. In Anglo– French relations the Locarno relationship remained important until the eve of the Second World War. The architects of the Locarno complex of treaties were Aristide Briand, Austen Chamberlain and Gustav Stresemann. For the German governments of the Weimar Republic, Locarno represented the exchange of a German undertaking to accept the Versailles territorial settle-ment in the west for the concrete advantages that a growing sense of French security would lead to the recovery of German sovereignty, to the relaxation of Allied control over German armaments, and above all, to the early evacuation of all the parts of the Rhineland occupied by the Allies. But Germany was not reconciled to the  frontier with Poland. An alignment with Soviet Russia had been established at Rapallo,  April  (p.  ) and was maintained after the signature of the Locarno Treaties, with the Treaty of Berlin,  April  (p.  ).

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  Grandeur And Misery

  France's Bid for Power in Europe, 1914-1940

  • Anthony Adamthwaite(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Bloomsbury Academic

    (Publisher)

  The outcome was the Rhine Pact. Germany, France and Belgium recognized their existing borders as permanent, including the demilitarized Rhineland zone; Britain and Italy guaranteed the accord. All disputes would be referred to the League of Nations for arbitration. Germany concluded arbitration treaties with France, Britain, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain and Briand wept, Briand embraced German chancellor Hans Luther. The public greeted Locarno as the start of real peace, the Promised Land in sight. In truth, the treaty was a mixed blessing for France. To be sure, Germany recognized the Versailles order in the west and promised to arbitrate disputes LOCARNO, 1925 121 in the east, but this implied no renunciation of territory in the east. Locarno confirmed the deadlock of French policy. France at last had a guarantee of sorts but not her eastern allies, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Indeed, Locarno made their position more vulnerable because it discouraged French assistance. If Germany attacked Poland and Czechoslovakia, France could only respond by counter-attacking in the west across the Rhine; yet this might be construed as aggression against Germany, endangering the guarantee. The deadlock could only have been ended in one of three ways: by a British decision to underwrite the settlement in the east; by a French decision to act offensively on the assumption that Britain would follow; or by French disengagement from eastern Europe. It was this third path that France followed after Locarno. Even for western Europe Locarno had serious drawbacks. The guarantee was only half a guarantee. The guarantors, Britain and Italy, were sole judges of what constituted unprovoked aggression. There was no military machinery for implementing the guarantee nor inspection procedures for monitoring demilitarization. Locarno, by excluding eastern Europe from the guarantee, destabilized France's position. Poland and Czechoslovakia were alarmed and anxious for the future.

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  Beyond the Balance of Power

  France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War

  • Peter Jackson(Author)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  This was an implicit commitment to negotiate over terms of the Rhineland occupation. Locarno opened the way for a long series of Franco- German negotiations over issues ranging from a commercial accord to indus- trial cooperation and a possible revision of the Dawes Plan. 110 108 MAE, SDN, vol. 754, ‘Réunion du 8 octobre 1925 au palais de justice de Locarno’ and ‘Réunion du 15 octobre 1925’; Série Z, GB, vol. 86, ‘Note au sujet du pacte rhénan’, 2 Nov. 1925; ‘Lettre collective: Accords de Locarno’, Laroche (for Briand), 4 Nov. 1925; ‘Rapport’ on the Locarno Accords prepared by Paul-Boncour, 23 Feb. 1926; AN, C/14763, CAEAN, XIIIème Législature, Briand audition, 19 Dec. 1925. 109 Reproduced in Johnson (ed.), Locarno Revisited, 214–18. 110 Steiner, Lights that Failed, 396–7; Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy, 26–41; Pitts, German Problem, 90–102. 494 The Cartel des gauches and the ‘internationalisation of security’ VII As a substitute for the Geneva Protocol, however, the Locarno Treaties left much to be desired. The operation of the mutual assistance treaties, like action under Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant, remained dependent on a unan- imous vote of the League Council. This, when combined with the British determination to reserve the right to interpret the precise meaning of ‘flagrant violation’ for themselves, meant that France did not secure a guarantee of ‘automatic assistance’ embedded in the Protocol. Most importantly, however, the Locarno Accords provided implicit endorsement of the principle that European security was divisible. Germany was not obliged to recognise and guarantee its frontiers with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Nor were there any third-party guarantors of the eastern arbitration conventions. The operation of France’s alliance with Poland, finally, had been made subordinate to League Council approval. The Locarno Accords thus had far-reaching ramifications for the role of eastern Europe in French policy.

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  Shaping British Foreign and Defence Policy in the Twentieth Century

  A Tough Ask in Turbulent Times

  • M. Murfett(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  3 The Struggle to Maintain Locarno Diplomacy Britain and the Idea of a Political Truce in 1931

  Frank Magee

  As far as British policy makers were concerned the central issue in European diplomacy since the end of World War I was how to deal with the German problem and the associated question of French security. It was hoped in London that Britain’s adherence to the Treaty of Locarno in 1925 had gone a long way to satisfy French anxieties; anxieties that had to be addressed if the preferred option in London – some revision of the Treaty of Versailles in Germany’s favour – could be tackled. The early 1920s had demonstrated how difficult it was for Britain to persuade France to accept British policy in Europe without some kind of security commitment over and above the somewhat nebulous obligations outlined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Anglo-American guarantee offered to France during the Paris Peace Conference had lapsed when the United States Senate refused to ratify the Peace treaty with Germany. Further attempts to provide for French security through a bilateral Anglo-French alliance failed due to Lloyd George’s refusal to undertake commitments in Eastern Europe to underpin the Cordon Sanitaire of states around Germany which France had constructed as a makeweight against German revival. Conscious of its global commitments, Britain after 1918 was more anxious to limit its commitments than extend them, especially into areas such as Eastern Europe which were not perceived to be areas of vital British interest. Security initiatives through the agency of the League of Nations, such as the Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee and the Geneva Protocol, were similarly dashed upon the rocks of Britain’s unwillingness to undertake further, and apparently unlimited responsibility for international security.1

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  Foreign Pol France 1914-45 V7

  • Nere(Author)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Taylor & Francis

    (Publisher)

  If we wish to pass judgment on the Locarno Agreements today, we must obviously view with considerable detachment the vehement outbursts which greeted their publication. Germany renounced the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and even remilitarization of the Rhineland, no longer under coercion, but of its own free will; this appeared to be a considerable concession, but Stresemann explained constantly that in his opinion Germany was not in a condition to wage war against France in the foreseeable future. France renounced acting alone against Germany – except in the case of her eastern allies – but this was exactly what Briand, who was aware of the disproportion of the actual forces of the two countries, wished most of all to avoid. Britain and Italy acquired, or thought they acquired, considerable diplomatic prestige as arbiters of Europe, or at least, of the main European question: doubtless they were undertaking to guarantee the Franco-German and Germano-Belgian frontiers and the demilitarization of the Rhineland, but the execution of this guarantee, subject to the procedures of the League of Nations, afforded by that very fact a wide margin of interpretation. The Locarno Treaty was above all a beginning, and very different consequences were expected from it: for the Germans, a revision of the peace treaties, for many Frenchmen, their consolidation. Thus it was an eminently diplomatic piece of work, which consisted of postponing the problems and relying on time to solve them.

  One of the conditions – or necessary consequences – of the Locarno negotiations was the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. This had been regarded by many Germans and British as bound to occur a very short time after the signing of the peace treaty and as a logical consequence of it. At this time France had reservations; she considered that Germany must first of all prove its good intentions and good conduct for a certain number of years. The difficulties raised by the question of German disarmament and that of reparations quite naturally delayed the admission of Germany.

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  Locarno Diplomacy

  Germany and the West, 1925-1929

  • Jon Jacobson(Author)
  • 2015(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  2 9 Stresemann noted that D'Abernon told him that an agreement could be reached regarding a curtailment of the periods of occupation: Strese-mann, Vermdchtnis, 11, 102. D'Abernon, on the other hand, reported that he warned Stresemann against raising the subject: D'Abernon, An Ambassa-dor, πι, 169. 55 APPEASEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER LOCARNO guarantee of Germany's Eastern frontiers, and promised to evac-uate Cologne. This part of the Locarno bargain was soon brought to a conclusion, but other parts of the bargain, although arranged in the autumn of 1925, were not immediately implemented, and their fulfillment was the subject of negotiation for two years after Locarno. Agreed upon but not completed was the compromise disarmament settlement by which Germany would fulfill some but not all the Allies' disarmament requirements and the Allies would in return abolish the IMCC and reduce the strength of their armies in the remaining zones of occupation. The entire Locarno bargain was, of course, not formulated in terms of a crude do ut des agreement; Chamberlain and Briand were sensi-tive about any notion of payment being made for Germany's sig-nature; consequently, Allied concessions were spoken of as measures to promote an atmosphere of goodwill, peace, and harmony. Finally, one element—the complete withdrawal of Allied troops from the Rhineland—was completely excluded from the Locarno bargain. Stresemann regarded complete evacuation as the ultimate goal, the end point, of his Locarno policy, and in early November he asked both Briand and Chamberlain to make public declarations concerning Germany's right to the early evacuation of the entire Rhineland. The ratification of the Locarno Treaty by the Reichs-tag would be greatly facilitated, he stated, by statements that the improved international atmosphere, along with German com-pliance with the Treaty of Versailles, would result in the shorten-ing of occupation.

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  Locarno Revisited

  European Diplomacy 1920-1929

  • Gaynor Johnson(Author)
  • 2004(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  7 Germany, Russia and Locarno: The German-Soviet Trade Treaty of 12 October 1925 DAVID CAMERON AND ANTHONY HEYWOOD On 12 October 1925, four days before the initialing of the Western security pact in Locarno, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a trade treaty in Moscow. The timing of these two events was more than coincidental. The timing of the signing of the trade treaty and indeed the very fact of its signing was closely connected to events at Locarno; the German-Soviet trade treaty was part of Stresemann's policy of an East- West balance. The German-Soviet trade treaty has, however, received much less attention from scholars than has the Locarno Treaty. Even among historians of German-Soviet relations in the 1920s, the trade treaty of 1925 has generally received only passing mention. Even if the importance of German-Soviet economic relations during this period has been given a good deal of attention by historians, the trade treaty of 1925 has not. 1 There are a couple of reasons for this. On the one hand the trade treaty of 1925 is viewed as simply that, a trade treaty Consequently it is seen in a much more mundane light by historians than the Treaty of Rapallo or the secret military co-operation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. Moreover, the trade treaty was seen at the time of its signing as an agreement that fell far short of German expectations, if it was not seen as an outright failure in this regard. This view was widely held within the German Foreign Office as well as among German business and industrial circles. Indeed at the time of its signing there were individuals within the German Foreign Office, as well as some German industrialists and businessmen, who went so far as to argue against even signing the trade treaty. The proponents of such actions maintained that as an economic and trade agreement the trade treaty did not begin to meet the needs and expectations of the German economy

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  Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century

  Rivalry and Cooperation

  • Alan Sharp, Glyn Stone, Professor Glyn A Stone(Authors)
  • 2002(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  7 Anglo-French relations from Versailles to Locarno, 1919–1925 The quest for security

  Alan Sharp

  The European international balance of power in the aftermath of the First World War was very different from that of 1914. Italy’s status as a great power continued to rely more on the weakness of those around it than the strength of its own resources but the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires had disintegrated, the Russian empire had collapsed into revolution and civil war, Germany was defeated and, for the moment, prostrate and the United States had, at least in diplomatic and military terms, withdrawn, after making a decisive intervention in the affairs of Europe. It would thus be hard to fault the logic of Lord George Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, when he declared in December 1921,

  As a result of the war there remain only two really great powers in Europe—France and ourselves…For a considerable period, therefore, a combination of Great Britain and France would be so strong that no other likely combination could successfully resist it. It follows that a definite and publicly announced agreement between the two countries to stand by one another in case either were attacked would offer a guarantee of peace of the strongest kind.1

  This was clearly a desirable outcome yet no such Anglo-French alliance was concluded until very late in the inter-war years in very different circumstances. This essay investigates why war-time cooperation was not cemented in the post-war period into an effective alliance but instead how the entente cordiale deteriorated into a mésentente cordiale and then a rupture cordiale during the Ruhr occupation of 1923, to be only partially restored by the Locarno agreements of 1925. 2

  I

  Britain and France had cooperated in the early twentieth century and fought together in the recent war but were traditional rivals. David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, was only half joking when he pointed this out in 1921 to Georges Clemenceau, the French premier from 1917 to 1920.3 Earlier Lloyd George remarked to the French statesman, Aristide Briand, ‘Your countrymen from Brittany certainly distinguished themselves during the war’. Briand replied: ‘But naturally! They were under the impression that they were up against the English!’4 There were mutual accusations during the war that each partner was happy to fight until the last drop of the other’s blood. They were imperial competitors on a global scale. Britain perceived with great distrust France’s ambition to be, in Curzon’s words, ‘the mistress of Europe in respect of coal, iron and steel…and also…the military monarch’.5 The maintenance of a large standing army, the encouragement of Rhineland separatism and the consistent demands of successive French governments to punish real or perceived German infractions of the Treaty of Versailles by an occupation of the Ruhr all confirmed British suspicions. The Committee of Imperial Defence was further alarmed by the size of the French airforce and submarine fleet and was exercised to identify any alternative opponent against whom these assets might be directed.6 London believed that Prussian militarism had been decisively defeated and eradicated but that this had upset the balance of power in Europe, leaving France without a realistic continental rival. Curzon told the Cabinet’s Eastern Committee on 2 December 1918 that he was ‘seriously afraid that the great power from whom we have most to fear in the future is France.’7

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  Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe

  British Foreign Policy 1924-1929

  • Dr Richard S Grayson, Richard S. Grayson(Authors)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  5 Calming Germany: The Locarno System, 1926–29 For reasons of sound policy we desire to get rid of the control even though the Germans have not done what they agreed to do.

  Austen Chamberlain on the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, 18 Nov. 1926’1

  INTRODUCTION

  The Locarno system collapsed in 1936 when Hitler’s troops entered the Rhineland. But in 1929 everything seemed in order; and it is argued here that the system worked until it was overtaken by economic depression and the rise of Nazism. This chapter examines relations between Britain, France and Germany following Locarno, and considers Italy’s place in Chamberlain’s diplomacy; the main issue is Chamberlain’s understanding of Stresemann’s revisionism, and how he dealt with it. Some aspects of this have already been considered in Chapter Four ; for, after Germany joined the League of Nations, the focus of relations between the countries, over matters such as Saar railway troops, shifted to the League. However, the most important Franco-German issues remained outside the League’s remit, principally troops occupying the Rhineland, and reparations.

  Criticisms of the Locarno system come from Jacobson and Marks. Although Jacobson does not dismiss the stabilisation of the 1920s as years of illusion, a pause between 1919 and the mid-1930s,2 both writers argue that friendly relations between foreign ministers masked important differences. Marks sees ‘[…] a fearful France flanked by the unhappy east Europeans, trying to hide their humiliation and panic, and a resentful, revisionist Germany demanding ever more alterations in the power balance […]’; Jacobson argues that ‘[…] fundamental rivalries and antagonisms persisted through the Locarno era.’3 Furthermore, Chamberlain is specifically criticised. During the Locarno negotiations, he claimed to be an ‘honest broker’;4 afterwards, Jacobson believes, this was not true of his European policy. He views Chamberlain as basically closer to France than Germany, and not understanding German sensibilities as well as those of the French.5 An example of this was the French President’s May 1927 visit to Britain, when Chamberlain spoke to the press of the ‘Entente Cordiale’ rather than the ‘Spirit of Locarno’, causing some German anxiety. Jacobson takes this, and simultaneous discussions held between Britain and France, as indicating an ‘entente policy’.6 Is this what developed as part of Chamberlain’s policy of calming France, which was seen in Chapter Three to be central to his concept of European security? And did it undermine Locarno, making Chamberlain overlook German concerns? Fundamentally, are Jacobson and Marks right to see Locarno as failing to tackle Europe’s problems? Meanwhile, is Gilbert right when he says Locarno was Chamberlain’s ‘[…] last essay in appeasement […]’, that is, he constructed a system which he failed to maintain?7

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  Our Man in Berlin

  The Diary of Sir Eric Phipps, 1933-1937

  • G. Johnson(Author)
  • 2008(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  The Locarno powers, with the exception of Germany, had met in Paris on 10 March to consider a European security pact. Flandin had not been willing to entertain the notion until German troops had been withdrawn from the Rhineland. 49 If Hitler refused, sanctions could be imposed under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Eden had returned to London fearful that war was inevitable because he believed that the Fuhrer would not be deterred by economic sanctions. so His greatest concern was that the French government wanted to adopt a policy of confrontation rather than conciliation towards Germany. Nevertheless, Eden remained convinced that attempts to browbeat Hitler would be counterproductive. Talks with his Belgian opposite number, Paul van Zeeland, yielded a proposal to put to Flandin suggesting the replacement of the Treaty of Locarno with a general security agreement that could be extended to include assur- ances of military assistanceY In return, the Germans would be asked to garrison a minimum number of troops in the Rhineland and agree not to consolidate their position during the negotiation of the security treaty. Flandin acceded to the plan, but made it clear that no other concessions to Germany would be granted. French misgivings made the immediate start of negotiations unlikely. Eden's mood was darkened further when he learnt that Hitler refused to sanction the withdrawal of any troops. Nevertheless, he went ahead with plans for a raft of non-aggression pacts between France, Germany and Belgium, guaranteed by Britain and Italy. A second tier of pacts between France, Belgium and Britain would be created, along with co-operation agreements between the General Staffs of these countries. Eden's proposals met with Cabinet approval on 16 March. 52 However, when they were presented to the French and Belgian governments, Flandin rejected the idea of a common military strategy.

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  Belgium and Europe

  A Study in Small Power Diplomacy

  • Jonathan E. Helmreich(Author)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • De Gruyter Mouton

    (Publisher)

  Van Zeeland, for his part, called upon his friends to lift sanctions taken against Italy and in other ways attempt to gain Italian support for the March 19 agreement. At a July meeting of Belgian, French, and Abrogation 333 British representatives it was agreed to ask Germany and Italy to revise the Locarno pacts without setting any preliminary conditions. With no diplomatic solution to the problems of Belgium's perilous international position visible within the framework of collective security, with growing dissension at home, and sensitive to the failure of Britain and France to take strong action against the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Belgian diplomats began to reassess their policies. The secretary-general presented a carefully constructed position paper early in July. While rehearsing the collapse of collective security and the disruption of international agreements, Van Langenhove asserted Bel-gium's traditional role was that of a barrier between the powers; her security was based on an equilibrium among them. Belgium currently risked being caught in the middle of a great power war. She should strengthen her defenses, but it was also important that Belgium practice a policy entirely independent and freed of any exclusive lien... Finally.. .we must be strong and united at home. For this purpose, it is neces-sary that our international status be simple and clear, that it cease to be an ob-ject of controversy and distrust among large sections of public opinion. Our obligations should be limited to what is strictly indispensable. They should permit us to conserve our liberty of decision until the last moment. Should we fight, it must be evident to all that we do so uniquely for the defense of the country. 42 He concluded that maintenance of the responsibilities Belgium formerly held under the Locarno Treaties was beyond her means and posed exces-sive risks.

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